Critical Analysis of “Is There a Duty to Vote”

In “Is There a Duty to Vote?” Geoffrey Brennan and Loren Lomasky put into consideration several plausible explanations for the duty and conclude that none is sufficient to ground a general duty to vote. Brennan and Lomasky seemingly underestimate the value of voting by regarding it as merely an expression. While acknowledging the centrality of voting in the popular understanding of democracy, they argue that voting should not be central. This paper offers a critique of the different points advanced by Brennan and Lomasky in opposition to the duty to vote.

According to Brennan and Lomasky, there exist better ways through which societies could be helped to promote the common good other than voting. In line with their argument, of citizens of a country care about civic duty, there are plenty of ways through which they could be good citizens apart from just voting (Lomasky and Brennan, 2000 pg. 63). For instance, they could either work productively, teach, make art, heal the sick or give to charity. However, that argument of theirs is wrong because even though there are numerous ways through which the common good can be fostered, that is not enough reason not to vote. Voting is a basic obligation which the conscience of each human being requires of them.

Every individual in a society is with no doubt affected by the quality of the government in one way or another. Through elections, citizens are presented with a rather easy way of improving societies whereby they can vote and choose governments that are decent. While other acts like working productively are necessary, they cannot possibly affect the life of each individual as profoundly as the election of civic-minded and capable leaders would. Additionally, the concept of duty is stretched by the idea that working in the market can pass as a dutiful act which would require that self-interests do not necessarily motivate the acts being done but the welfare of others does.

Brennan and Lomasky also compare voting to farming whereby they posit that even if it could be catastrophic if none of us farmed, that in no way obliges any of us to become farmers (Lomasky and Brennan, 2000 pg. 77). That comparison is however quite mistaken because, in the modern contemporary societies, farming is some line of work, an activity people engage in for purposes of making a living. The fact that societies get to benefit from farming is a consequence that is not intended. Any democracy that is serious about the freedoms of its citizens should never infringe on the right of occupational choice by making a demand on its citizens that it is compulsory they farm.

However, democracies that are healthy have been observed to curtail the freedoms of their citizens for example in instances where they require of them to pay taxes, fight on their side during the war, and even serving as jurors. While individuals do not necessarily benefit from any of these activities, they also tend to be burdensome. It is, however, worth noting that whenever a countries citizens shoulder these burdens collectively, the society stands to gain. As such, voting should not be any different.

In their other argument, Brennan and Lomasky posit that from an instrumental and utilitarian standpoint, voting is futile (Lomasky and Brennan, 2000 pg. 67). Economists view voting as not being rational. The benefits an individual and society would accrue from voting are outweighed by the amounts of time one has to commit themselves to educate themselves about the different candidates, the issues at hand and also the time they consume in the actual voting. From this point of view, the vote of each individual is deemed to be a proverbial drop in the bucket that in no way affects the outcomes of an election, putting into consideration the votes cast in total. As such, no duty should force us into engaging in activities whose impact on the world is minimal.

However, such a claim misunderstands the operation of instrumental utilitarianism and rationality. We are all required by utilitarianism to make a contribution towards increasing the societies overall welfare. In no way does it require our acts to have impacts that are significant on their own or in their individual lives. Additionally, it does also not require that our actions have the greatest impacts possible. Through choosing a means that could further an end reasonably well, we become rational instrumentally ((Lomasky and Brennan, 2000 pg. 69). In the event that our tiny contributions to activities that are collective were to produce outcomes that are highly desirable, with instrumental rationality, we could act consistently. With a utilitarian logic, it is also possible to act in a manner that is consistent because we are well aware that the society would in a big way benefit from a collective project`s final outcome.

Additionally, there are elections year in year out that are decided by a handful of votes. That tends to happen more frequently than we could statistically guess. While it would be unlikely that the single vote of an individual would determine an election`s outcome, a single vote adds marginally to the set of votes that are needed to gain a majority. In the same breath, one vote may add to, even though modestly to a preferred candidate’s margin of victory. That would go a long way in strengthening the mandate of such a candidate and also their abilities to practically govern with zero stalemates. In the long run, marginal contributions add up. Finally, while most of us believe that we have to be verse with the issues at hand and candidates so as to vote, there is a small likelihood that a single bad vote would tip an election in the favor of a bad candidate. There is a high probability that such a vote would be offset by the vote of another voter who is uninformed for the other candidates.