Analysis of Criminal Responsibility

Part A – 1

Olga will be criminally liable for common assault under section 39 of Criminal Justice Act 1988. The act of Olga of shouting and slapping Julie is an assault. She intentionally or recklessly caused Julie to suffer or to apprehend immediate unlawful violence. For this offence, it must be proved that Olga committed assault, including battery where she applied unlawful force. In this case, there was a battery, and so, Olga should be charged with ‘assault by beating’. This is supported by the case of DPP v Little (1992).

Julie will be liable for causing grievous bodily harm. Grievous bodily harm shall bear the ordinary meaning of “really serious”, as was held in DPP v Smith (1960). She will be liable under Section 18 of OAPA 1861 for unlawfully and maliciously wounding or causing grievous bodily harm to Olga. In JJC (A Minor) (1983), it was held that "wound" would mean a break in the continuity of the whole skin. The “wounding” form of the offences applies to really serious wounds such as caused by a knife to reflect the seriousness, as was occurred in this case. It must be proved that Julie intended to wound and/or cause grievous bodily harm to Olga. The intention should be nothing less than an intention to produce the grievous bodily harm caused to Olga.

Mara will be liable under Section 20 of OAPA 1861 for inflicting bodily injury to Olga. The act of Mara of holding Olga in headlock and punching her until she was immobilised, constitutes unlawfully and maliciously wounding or inflicting grievous bodily harm upon Olga. She will be guilty of a misdemeanor, and be liable for convicted. It should be proved that Mara intended, or actually foresaw, that her act might cause some harm to Olga. It is enough to prove that Mara foresaw some physical harm to Olga, as was held in Savage.

Part B – 1

Actus Reus relates to the causing of apprehension of some imminent unlawful force. The doctrine represents the physical aspects of crime. Actus Reus represents has two rules. Firstly, the behaviour is satisfied only by a positive act of the defendant, and not by the defendant's omission. The second rule is the exception to the first rule. This exception may make the defendant criminally liable. In case the defendant has a duty to intervene and prevent prohibited harm from occurring, his failure to intervene of prohibit in according with that duty, such failure will be counted as omission. Such omission will also be counted as the physical aspect of the crime or the behavioural element of actus reus. Such exception and duties are specific and confined. The imposition of omission can be applied in case of strong reason. This approach is similar to the civil law principles, which impose duties to intervene subject to conditions, such as the defendant have created the risk of harm or have assumed responsibility for it.

The common law crime, an omission will be sufficient to represent the physical aspect of crime where there is a duty to act. Such duty arises when there is a contractual duty to act, as was held in Pittwood (1992), duty arising out of a relationship (father and child), voluntary duty, as was held in Stone and Dobinson (1977), duty arising out of official position, as was seen in as was seen in Dytham (1979), and as duty arising due to the defendant act of setting in motion a chain of events, as was seen in Miller (1983).

In case of determining actus reus of murder, the act of killing could be by an act or omission, which must cause death. So, omission can also make a person liable for the offence. This rule was applied in Gibbons and Proctor (1918). The defendant cannot be held guilty unless his act or omission has caused the death. Applying the doctrine to actual bodily harm, the offence is committed if the act or the failure to act, which is omission, results in the consequence.

Actus reus is subject to the prove of an act or an omission, causation and the criminal consequence. It is the physical element, which can take the form of what was done or not done.

Part B – 2

The legal principle about oblique intention applies when the result was not intended, but the defendant has knowledge that it would occur in the ordinary course of events if the defendant were to succeed in her purpose of causing some other result. The oblique intention result as a necessary pre-requisite of the defendant’s main purpose. The defendant can be made liable for a crime even when there was no intention to cause a harmful result. This situation is covered by the law of recklessness.

The case of Hyam (1975) , the court equated intention with high probability that the defendant had knowledge that her action would cause serious harm or death. In the later case of Moloney (1985), the court held that the element of foresight of consequences must not be equated with intention, although it could be an evidence of intention. The court , in this case, held that if the result is the natural consequence of the act and the defendant had knowledge about this, intention could be inferred. In 1986, Hancock and Shanland case happened before the House of Lords. The Lords observed that the “natural consequence” principle did not take the degree of probability into consideration. If the probability of consequence was found high, then the probability of a foresight is also high. This would make the probability of inferring intention.

Cases such as Nedrick (1986) and Woollin (1998) laid down tighter rule of oblique intention. The rule requires the juries to return verdict of murder only when it is found that the defendant had foresight of death or serious injury as “virtually certain consequence” of her voluntary act. Lord Steyn stated that a result foreseen as “virtually certain” is an intended result. However, in Matthews (2003), virtually certain rule was held evidential, but not substantive.