Raashi demanded money from the cashier stating that she had a gun. This caused the cashier to panic thus pushing the alarm button. It would seem that the actions of Raashi caused the cashier to be frightened and fear for her life. The House of Lords in Fagan v MPC defined assault thus: ‘an assault is committed where the defendant intentionally or recklessly causes the victim to apprehend immediate unlawful personal violence’. In view of the actions of Raashi it ca be presumed that she caused fear in the cashier and other persons present at the bank. To prove the physical element of assault, the victim must apprehend immediate unlawful personal violence. As long as the victim is aware that she is about to be subjected to personal violence it is not necessary for the victim to be in fear. However, if the victim does not contemplate unlawful personal violence the conclusion is that there is no assault occasioned. For students who are delving into criminology dissertation help, understanding cases such as these and the legal intricacies involved can be very critical in their academic pursuits.
It is possible that the cashier was aware that the glass was bullet proof and may not necessarily have feared for her life. Nevertheless, it has been held in Logdon v DPP that it is enough for the victim to apprehend immediate unlawful personal violence. In the present scenario, the cashier and other customers at the bank including Manyari believed that Raashi had a gun hence they were afraid for their lives. Further, it was revealed much later that Raashi did not actually have a gun at the time but just a banana. In R v Wilson, the court commented that mere words could amount to an assault and this position has since been echoed in R v Constanza where a person who sent threatening letters was convicted of assault. More interestingly, the House of Lords in R v Ireland upheld the conviction of a defendant who made a series of silent telephone calls to some women. The law requires that the threat of personal violence must be immediate to meant that future violence or the fact the defendant has no means of carrying out the threat would negate the commission of assault.
The cashier was frightened and Manjari feared for her life and for that reason she took steps to stop Raashi. It is immaterial that she had a banana instead of a gun as long as the victims in this scenario reasonably believed her statement to the extent that she had a gun. The mens rea of assault is the intention to make the victim contemplate immediate unlawful personal violence. Alternatively, it is enough to show that Rashi was reckless as to whether such apprehension is caused upon the cashier and other people present at the bank. Having established both the physical and mental element of the offence, Raashi will be criminally liable for common assault as defined in Fagan v MPC and set out in section 39 of Criminal Justice Act 1988. Apart from common assault, Raashi actively pushed ahead of Manjari to reach the bank employee. It follows that she must have pushed or touched Manjari and other customers on her way to the front. Therefore, she may have committed battery when she pushed her way to the front. According to Lord Steyn in R v Ireland, battery is the ‘unlawful application of force by the defendant upon the victim’.
The offence of battery requires that there be an application of unlawful physical force with the intention to do so. In DPP v K (a minor), the court held that the application of force need not be direct. The element of consent in bursary is fundamental since in its absence, the act of touching another person becomes unlawful. Consequently, the court has held that a policewoman who got hold of a woman’s hand committed battery and the act of the defendant against her was merely self-defence. Lord Lane CJ in Faulkner v Talbot has stated that the application of physical will suffice by simply intentionally touching another person without lawful excuse.
Manjari hit Raashi hard on the neck with her bag containing books that she was taking back to the library. As a consequence, Manjari could have committed the offence assault occasioning actual bodily harm (ABH) as provided in section 47 Offences Against the Person Act 1861. For one be found guilty of having committed ABH, there must be assault or battery which causes actual bodily harm. Therefore, all the elements of battery or assault must be present for one to be criminally liable of the offence of ABH. In this case, it is clear that Manjari committed battery because she unlawfully applied force using her bag on Raashi by hitting her on the neck. Once battery is established, it must further be proved that the battery caused actual bodily harm. According to Lynsky J in R v Miller, ‘actual bodily harm includes any hurt or injury calculated to interfere with the health or comfort of the victim’. Similarly, LJ Hobhouse interpreted the word actual to mean that must be an injury that does not necessarily have to be permanent but should not be as small as to be considered as insignificant.
Further, bodily harm means that there must be some sort of harm caused to the victim’s body. In R v Ireland, the court found that psychiatric injury is part of bodily harm caused on the victim, and in DPP v Smith, bodily harm extends to the cutting off of the victim’s hair. In this case, Manjari hit Raashi on the neck with a bag thus causing her to be hospitalised for six months. Taking into account the requirements of legal and factual causation, it is the action of Manjari that caused Raashi to be injured. The injury and hospitalisation of Raashi are the direct consequences of Manjari’s actions. On factual causation, it can be demonstrated that but for Manjari hitting Raashi on the neck with a bag, she would have not sustained any injuries necessitating hospitalisation for six months. In the same vein legal causation requires that the injury caused on Raashi must result from a culpable act. The hitting of another person with whatever object is culpable act that falls within the requirements of legal causation.
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In R v Dalloway, the defendant was held not to have caused the death of a child who run in front of the horse cart. It was held that although failing to hold the reins was a culpable act, it was not the cause of the death of the victim. However, the fact that Manjari was acting under fear for her life could a mitigating factor in determination of her criminal liability for causing ABH to Raashi. Arguably, she could plead that she was actually acting in self-defence and that she feared for her life at the time. However, she cannot say that she was acting in defence of the cashier or the bank unless she had a special relationship with either the bank or the cashier. In this case, the pleas of self-defence may not succeed given that the threat was addressed to the cashier and she was not at risk of losing any of the possessions or being harmed. In addition to this, Manjari claimed that she did not intend to hurt Raashi and that she simply wanted to surprise her so that the cashier can get away.
She further claimed that she had forgotten that she had the books in her bag. While it is possible that she had forgotten that she had the books in her bag considering the situation she was in at the time, there is no requirement that she intended or was reckless as to the injury inflicted. In fact, the law does not care whether she foresaw the fact the bags could have caused Raashi serious injuries requiring hospitalisation for six months. The court considered the above issue in R v Roberts where a young woman jumped out of a moving car driven by the defendant after he made repeated sexual advances at her. The Court of Appeal of England and Wales held that there was no need for the prosecution to establish that the defendant was reckless as to the level of force envisaged under section 47. Hence it was enough to show that the defendant had intention or was reckless as to the assault or battery. Equally, it is enough to show that Manjari intended to cause battery or was just reckless as to the consequences of her action. In view of the above, Manjari could be criminally liable for causing ABH on Raashi contrary to section 47. Separately, she can is also criminally liable for gross bodily harm (GBH)
under section 18 or 20 of the Offences Against the Person Act 1861 provided that grievous harm is occasioned causing a wound on Raashi.
Steve fired his gun and the bullet ricocheted off the bullet proof glass thus hitting Jim in the chest. In the end Jim died, presumably, as a result of the bullet wound to the chest. To begin with, Steve shot in the wildly in the air. For the offence of murder, it must be the unlawful killing of a human being in the Queen’s peace with malice aforethought. Unlawful killing in this case is the reckless act of Steve shooting in the causing the death of Jim. Steve did not have any lawful excuse to shoot his gun in the air or at someone hence it is an unlawful killing. However, it must be shown that the death of Jim was caused by the bullet fired from Steve’s gun. The courts have discussed the requirement of causation in R v White where it was found that although the
defendant poisoned the mother, she died of heart attack and not the poison. The defendant was thus liable for attempted murder and not murder. Although, the actions of Steve meet the actus reus requirements of murder, he lack the mens rea which is the malice aforethought. Basically, it was not his intention to kill Jim but to scare the people in the bank. Therefore, he cannot be criminally liable for murder.
Nonetheless, he could be liable for constructive manslaughter or unlawful act of manslaughter. This is a form of involuntary manslaughter where there is unlawful killing of another person but the defendant lacks malice aforethought. For Steve to be criminally liable for the offence of constructive manslaughter, it must be established that: he committed an unlawful act, which act was dangerous and it is the unlawful and dangerous act that caused the death of Jim. It has been established in R v Franklin that the unlawful act in constructive manslaughter must constitute a criminal offence and not one against civil law. In this scenario, Steve discharged his gun in a public reason without any lawful excuse for purposes of theft or robbery hence constitutes a criminal offence against property. It is immaterial that the unlawful act of robbery
was directed at the cashier and not Jim and this position has been upheld in R v Larkin. In the above case, the defendant intended to frighten his mistress’ lover but ended up killing his mistress. His conviction was upheld despite the fact that the offence was directed at a different person.
Further, there is no requirement that the unlawful act be directed against a person. in this regard judicial precedent show that where a man intends to and actually commits a crime not directed against any person but the act results in the death of another, the he will be convicted of manslaughter. The unlawful act involved must be dangerous even if it does not cause serious harm. The question as to whether the unlawful act was dangerous is one that is to be determined by looking at the facts using an objective test.
For Steve, the question is whether a sober and reasonable person would regard the act of shooting into the air as giving rise to some harm. Guns are lethal weapons and shooting in the air wildly is more than dangerous. This element has been clearly elucidated by Edmund Davies LJ in R v Church where he stated that it must be that a reasonable person in the circumstances recognise the risk of harm resulting from such action of the defendant. It must also be shown that it was the unlawful dangerous act that caused the death of the victim. It is indeed the act of Steve shooting in the air that caused the death of Jim, therefore he is criminally liable for constructive manslaughter despite the lack of intention which need not be established. Raashi will also be criminally liable for constructive manslaughter since they were joint offenders with Steve.
R v Franklin (1883) 15 Cox CC 163
R v Larkin (1942) 29 Cr App R 18
R v Goodfellow (1986) 83 Cr App R 23
R v Church [1965] 2 WLR 1220
R v Cato (1976) 62 Cr App R 41
DPP v Smith [1961] AC 290
R v Parmenter [1991] 94 Cr App R 193
R v Latimer (1886) 17 QBD 359
Fagan v MPC [1969] 1Q.B. 439
Logdon v DPP [1976] Crim LR 121
R v Wilson [1955] 1 WLR 493
R v Constanza [1997] Crim LR 576
R v Ireland [1997] 3 WLR 534
DPP v K (a minor)[1990] 1 WLR 1067
Faulkner v Talbot [1981] 3 All ER 468
R v Miller [1954] 2 All ER 529
R v Chan Fook [1994] 1 WLR 689
R v Roberts [1971] EWCA Crim 4
Moriarty v Brookes [1834] EWHC Exch J79
Criminal Justice Act 1988
Offences Against the Person Act 1861
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