Criminal Liability Of Minors Kyles Case Analysis

The Children and Young Persons Act 1933, s50 provides the age of criminal responsibility and provides that no child under the age of 10 years can be held guilty of any offence. In the current case, Kyle being 14 years old, the issue is to determine the criminal liability of Kyle for the death of Amir.

The Homicide Act 1957, s3 provides for murder on account of provocation. A person can be provoked through acts or words or both. He may loss his self control. The issue is to determine whether the provocation was sufficient to make a reasonable person do as the person did. Provocation is a defence stipulated under the Justice Act 2009, ss 54 and 55. It applies to a person charged with murder. Thus, the issue is a question of fact; however, a reasonable person must share characteristics, which bear on the seriousness of provocation. This was supported by the case of Camplin.

The Homicide Act 1957, s3 provides for murder on account of provocation. A person can be provoked through acts or words or both. He may loss his self control. The issue is to determine whether the provocation was sufficient to make a reasonable person do as the person did. Provocation is a defence stipulated under the Justice Act 2009, ss 54 and 55. It applies to a person charged with murder. Thus, the issue is a question of fact; however, a reasonable person must share characteristics, which bear on the seriousness of provocation. This was supported by the case of Camplin.

Where a person has actus reus and mens rea for murder, but he has one of the three defences, which are loss of control, diminished responsibility and suicide pact, the liability for murder will reduce to manslaughter. Where he intended to kill or cause grievous bodily harm, it amounts to voluntary manslaughter. In the case of Smith, grievous means “really serious harm”. In such cases, he had the actus reus when he caused the death of the victim, and mens rea he intended to kill or cause grievous bodily harm to the victim.

The loss of control defence has three components. They are provided under Section 54(1)(a)(b) and (c) of the Coroners and Justice Act 2009. Firstly, there must be sufficient evidence to establish that the killing resulted from loss of control. If not, there is no need to consider the other components. The loss of control does not need to be sudden. In Ahluwalia, it was held that it is for the jury to determine provocation where there is evidence of a time lapse between provoking words or conduct and the killing. However, if the delay is longer and there is stronger evidence of deliberation, it increases the likelihood that the defence of provocation will be negated.

Secondly, there must be a qualifying trigger. Section 55(3) provides that it is not sufficient that a person is fearful of serious violence. In specific relevance to the case, it must be noted here that rape is one of the serious violent offences. This is the fear trigger. Section 55(4)(a) provides that circumstances must be extremely grave. In Davies, it was held that the provoking act could come from provocation by a third party. Section 55(4)(b) further provides a sense of grievance must arise from a justifiable sense that he has been seriously wronged. This is the anger trigger. Section 55(5) provides that the loss of control may be attributable to a combination of both the kinds of triggers.

Thirdly, there is the objective test to determine whether a person of the defendant’s sex and age having a normal degree of tolerance and also self-restraint and in the circumstances to which the defendant was exposed might have reacted in the same or in a similar way to the defendant. This is supported by Section 54(1)c, which provides that the reaction of a defendant must be compared as aforesaid. In Camplin, the defendant was of 15 years of age and he was raped by his employer who gloated and laughed about the rape. At that point the defendant struck his employer on his head using a chapatti pan and killed him. It was held that the boy must be judged according to the standard of a reasonable 15 year old boy, and consider his age and sex while determining the test of a reasonable person. The question is not just whether the reasonable boy of the same age would in similar circumstance be provoked to loss his self control. It is whether he would have reacted to the provocation as the defendant did.

In Dawes; Hatter; Bowyer, it was held that at the conclusion of the evidence, the court should consider whether sufficient evidence was in respect to all the above components constituting loss of control. The components must be separately and sequentially considered. If any one of them is missing, the defence cannot be left to the jury. In Gurpinar; Kojo-Smith, it was held that in case of insufficient evidence of the first component, the remaining two components must not be considered.

In the current case, Kyle will be liable for voluntary manslaughter. The act of Kyle grabbing the lamp and repeatedly hitting Amir over the head until he fell to the ground establishes actus reus and mens rea to either kill or cause grievous bodily harm to Amir. Kyle caused the death of Amir, which establishes actus reus and his intention to kill or cause grievous bodily harm establishes had mens rea. Kyle was provoked when Yasmine laughed at Amir’s sexual triumph and openly mocked him, and when Amir attempted to rape him when he started removing his belt and walked to stand between him and the door. For reducing the liability for murder to voluntary manslaughter, it is to be established that he lost self control and self restraint, according to Act of 2009, section 54 and committed that act of killing Amir. The loss of control may not be sudden in this case, but it does not amount to a time lapse between the provocation and the killing. The delay cannot be held long enough to amount to deliberation.

In this case, the loss of control can be attributed to a combination of the fear and the anger triggers arising from extremely grave circumstances. The act of the couple amount to creating a fear of serious violence to Kyle, and there was a justifiable sense that Kyle was seriously wronged. In that circumstance, a reasonable boy of 14 years old have also reacted to the provocation as Kyle did. Thus, considering all the components of loss of self control and the considering provocation as a defence, Kyle would be liable of manslaughter.

Legislation

The Children and Young Persons Act 1933

The Coroners and Justice Act 2009

The Homicide Act 1957Justice Act 2009

Cases

Ahluwalia (1993) 96 App R 133.

Davies [1975] QB 691.

Dawes; Hatter; Bowyer [2013] EWCA Crim 322.

DPP v Smith [1961] AC 290.

Gurpinar v R [2015] EWCA Crim 178.

Gurpinar; Kojo-Smith [2015] EWCA Crim 178 at 5.

R v Camplin [1978] AC. 705.

R v Clinton and others [2012] EWCA Crim 2.

Bibliography

Books

Monaghan N, Criminal Law (Oxford University Press 2016).

Ormerod DC et al, Smith and Hogan's Criminal Law (Oxford University Press 2015).

Smith JM, Relating Rape and Murder: Narratives of Sex, Death and Gender (Palgrave Macmillan 2010).