Migration and Transitional Justice

IDPs and living conditions:

The UN Guiding Principles on Internal Displacement, define IDPs as "persons or groups of persons who have been forced or obliged to flee or to leave their homes or places of habitual residence, in particular as a result of or in order to avoid the effects of armed conflict, situations of generalised violence, violations of human rights or natural or human- made disasters, and who have not crossed an internationally recognised State border" (United Nations, 1998). Thus, the UN has clearly described IDPs as those who are forced to leave their homes and habitual residence; the concern then shifts to the continued residence and living conditions of the IDPs. According to the deliberations made by participants, internally displaced population (IDPs) camps are very poor in terms of shelter and provision of services. This is a common characteristic of internal displacement as literature suggests that it is the poor and those who come from rural areas or belong to minorities who are more susceptible to internal displacement and who then continue to live in a state of poverty as internally displaced (Box, 2011). In Sudan, most of the IDPs populations live in huts made out of wood, and only a few of them were able to build rooms out of mud and bricks. Furthermore, their movement is restricted. They are also vulnerable to attacks on daily basis when going to collect wood or fetch water and those who attempt to go to their farms during rainy season are susceptible to attacks by militias. Addressing these issues effectively could benefit from comprehensive research and analysis, such as the type of education dissertation help that explores the broader implications of displacement and the effectiveness of various interventions.

The IDPs have their own internal administration system in each camp. Their management structures include different forms such as representative of the ‘Idara ahliya’ (Native administration)- Omdas, Sheikhs of the camp, women union and youth union. The IDPs’ camp are usually divided into sectors/blocks and each block is inhabited by a specific community (tribe, sub-tribe). Each block selects some persons to represent them, the representative usually includes sheikhs (men and women) and youth representatives (young men and women) for the entire camp with some sheikhs to serve their sectors.

[QUOTE 10]

‘’The land where the camps are located is mostly agricultural land; either belongs to individuals or to government. Attempts for relocation were made, especially through pressures on government by private owners. Nevertheless, the IDPs resisted such attempts and the attempts did not materialize.’’

The IDPs have been displaced more than once; some of them twice or even several times. It has been noted that “hundreds of displaced families who were returning to their areas of origin in South Darfur in connection with seasonal farming were forced to flee after large Misseriya crowds began arriving from different parts of the region’’(SUDAN Research, Analysis, and Advocacy, by Eric Reeves, May2013, p.2).

[QUOTE 5]

‘’Some IDPs from Fur tribe have been displaced more than once. e.g. In 2003 they were moved to East Jabal Marra and in 2012 after Abuja Peace Agreement they were forced by the SPLM-Minawi to move from east Jabal Marra to Shadad IDPs camp in Shangl Tubay then from Shadad to Abushock and Zumzum IDPs camps. Also, the Zaghawa tribe IDPs in Kalma camp were forced to leave the Kalma camp following the DPA-they moved to Draij IDPs camp.’

The involvement of the international community is an important factor in providing humanitarian assisting and peace process in Sudan (Sudan: Conflict Analysis and Options for Systemic Conflict Transformation A Northern and a Southern View January 200, p.6). UN agencies, such as United Nations World Food Programme (UNWFP) provide food and United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (UNOCHA) coordinate support to the IDPs. In 2009 and beyond, besides the UN agencies, there were other International Non-Governmental Organisations (INGOs) providing different services to IDPs, ranging from food to shelter, health and education and psychological support to the IDPs. However, in March 2009, the Albasheer regime expelled thirteen distinguished international humanitarian organisations and closed three important Sudanese relief organizations- together which formed roughly half the humanitarian capacity in Darfur. There was a political message behind this action, which was that the expulsions served among other things to signal to the UN that Khartoum wished such comprehensive reporting to cease. The consequence of that expulsion is still felt in the IDPs camps as limited access to or availability of basic services remains a key challenge(Maxwell, et al., 2012).

[QUOTE 13]

‘‘Sudan Red Crescent provided water pumps, UNHCR-they promised resettlement, but did not come back- and Far East Organization provided agricultural support sometimes ago. Oxfam and MSF used to work with us but were expelled [in 2009 following the indictment of president Albashir by the ICC]’. Since then the situations in the IDPs camp continues to go from bad to worse’’

[QUOTE 6]

‘’Food distributed by the WFP is not enough. Some IDPs involved in agriculture while others receive support from the migrants in the diaspora and others from the armed movements-specially the Zaghawa. The migrants are very organized; they are organized in social media groups along tribal lines and they sponsor some families and send financial support on monthly basis.”

The humanitarian agencies have reported that Covid-19 pandemic has complicated an already highly challenging humanitarian situation (Abdelkrim, et al., 2021 ). Lockdown measures imposed in response to Covid-19 have constrained mobility, and has brought work in the informal sector to a standstill. IDPs’ households depend on informal daily labouring for their survival (Betts, et al., 2021 ). Consequently, food insecurity for IDP groups are further at risk due to the pandemic. Thus, Covid-19 restriction measures negatively impacted low paid workers and workers like IDPs, particularly women.

The IDPs did not mention these aspects in their discussions. This could be because in Darfur Covid restrictions have not been observed by ordinary people, as clearly noticed by the researcher during the field mission.

The absolute majority of the respondents who took part in this study were sceptical when it came to the present status of the peace process and transitional justice process. They revealed that in terms of legal framework, new policies, legislation reform and establishment of related mechanisms, nothing significant has been achieved. Issues like redressing the legacy of the ousted regime in terms of violations, proliferation of weapons, land issues and equal rights of citizenship, received attention.

[QUOTE 12]

‘’Transitional Justice (TJ) is much bigger than just a legal issue and should not be left for the Ministry of Justice and lawyers alone to handle. TJ relates to socio-economic, cultural, and political issues, which need to be identified beforehand then to decide how to be addressed. Questions should be asked about what type of justice TJ is hoping to achieve? who are the victims and how they can be effectively included and engaged?’’.

Emotional and socio-psychological problems:

IDPs in Darfur suffer from trauma, mental health problems and lack of socio-psychological support and emotional support. All these have left huge devastating and long lasting negative impacts on the IDPs. This has been mentioned in the deliberations during the focus group discussion (FGD) and during interviews, in the course of which majority of the participants agreed that IDPs have been traumatised and as a result they suffer mental- health problems resulting from the terrible experiences that they have gone through. Nonetheless, all the participants, with no exception, admitted that the problem has not been dealt with seriously and up to now no socio-psychological support is being made available to IDPs.

As reflected by one of the respondents “IDPs experienced behavioural change as they have been rooted out of their social and cultural environm"ent. Their behaviour tends to be aggressive and violent due to the atrocities, such as forceful displacement, verbal and physical abuses that they have been subjected to”. All these factors have resulted in negative impacts on societal relations and social fabric among communities, loss of confidence and social ties (Hamid & Musa, 2010 ). Furthermore, there are cases within families where a mother killed her daughter and father killed his son over stress and depression.

[QUOTE 11]

“This situation [of behavioural change] affects the IDPs in dealing with the TJ. It hampers their participation and contribution. In a sense that they have become nervous, intolerance- some of them are against the Juba peace process all together and refused to engage in any process relates to JPA what so ever.”

In regard to addressing emotional and socio-psychosocial problems, it may be argued that the IDPs have been left to face all these terrible negative impacts alone. Even though, they were able to develop coping strategies of their own, it can be argued that these strategies are not adequate to address these issue without means of external support

[QUOTE 7]

“The mass killing, the rape, the destruction of properties, livelihood, looting and other atrocities made our people suffer range of psychological problems that have been manifested in different forms such as depression, hallucination and nightmare, lack of motivation and frustration. These problems have been most prevalent amongst youth; young men and women. They feel helpless, deprived and they do not have work to do. This makes them suffer even more. The impact manifests itself in suicide, drug dealing and addiction, domestic violence and aggression. Cases of divorce increased and crime rates rocked too; youth commit crimes without realizing due to trauma and psychological problems.”

[QUOTE 8]

“Some people had witnessed their fathers, brothers, sons been killed, and their daughters or wives been raped in front of them. Every individual IDP has become traumatised and psychologically unfit. I myself is deeply traumatised and psychologically damaged. I witnessed the murder of my uncle and two of my brothers- killed in front of eyes on the same day. Since then and until now I could not forget and/or recover. I still live with the trauma.”

[QUOTE 9]

“IDPs sympathise and support each other through social gatherings, meetings and sharing of experiences, sharing food and donate as little as they could, which represent symbol of solidarity in difficult times. I know young woman who has been subjected to rape and later on suffered mental health problems and in the end became psychotic. Another girl was abducted and raped when her father knew what happened to his daughter he became Psychotic as well. It happened in Zumzum IDPs camp there was a big shelter for the children whose parents got killed or gone missing and was not possible to be reunited with their families. The INGOs bring them food and clothes.”

Peace hopes and political agenda:

The Albasheer regime was overthrown through public demonstrations in April 2019 and a new Transitional Government (TG) took over in August 2019. This development raised expectations in Sudan and Darfur, and in particular regarding reforming the inherited legacy of the ousted regime (Price, 2019 ). The signing of the Juba Peace Agreement (JPA) in October 2020 with Darfur Armed movements and some other groups from South Kordofan, Blue Nile and East Sudan represents one of the highlights for the TG (Diatta, et al., 2020). Under the JPA, there is a separate dedicated sections with provisions related to voluntary return for IDPs and the facilitation of services provision and applying of transitional justice measures (Izuchukwu, et al., 2020).

These political developments were welcomed in Darfur as the bulk of the forcefully displaced and migrated populations are from Darfur and are located predominantly in five Darfur states (Price, 2019 ). Over 2 million IDPs as well as another additional 300,000 Darfurian refugees who fled the country and have been living in eleven camps in Eastern and northern parts of Chad since 2003/2004 (Ref). Returnee numbers remain modest as the insecurity and land occupation in Darfur persists up to date.

Following the signing of the JPA, the security situation in Darfur continues to be highly complex and fragile (Diatta, et al., 2020). The Sudan Liberation Army led by Abdul-Waheed (SLA-AW) refused to join the peace process and continue maintaining military presence in Darfur, yet only with pockets in and around the Jebel Marra area (Herr, 2020). Although clashes have been minimised to local levels, there has been an increase in violent confrontations in the Jebel Marra region since mid-March 2018, causing displacement and forced civilians to seek refuge in mountain tops and to neighbouring areas in North, Central and East Jebel Marra (Yahaya, 2019 ). Access to IDPs in these areas proved to be difficult and remains limited. On the other hand, Al-Geneina city in particular has suffered increasing violence and displacement very recently as late as the early months of 2021, largely as a result of fighting between Masalit and tribes of ‘Arab’ origin (Duursma, 2021).

[QUOTE 3]

‘’We, IDPs, lost hope because in terms of security, the situations look like going from bad to worse. The peace is only on papers, nothing being implemented. We have the experience of Abuja peace agreement, Doha Peace agreement, and now JPA is going in the same direction”.

The analysis indicates that there are three groups of displaced people: first, who flee their areas due to the conflict between the Government and the Armed movements, second, who left due to ethnic/ tribal conflicts, and third, who left due to attacks and forced land occupation. The first group is the only one that can return now if clashes between government and rebels ceased to happen. However, the two other groups need certain arrangements, such as ethnic/tribal reconciliation and ending land occupation respectively, before they can go back to their home lands, a goal which is far from being fulfilled yet.

Juba Peace Agreement was signed in October of 2020, however, the situation has unfortunately remained the same in Darfur (Diatta, et al., 2020). Humanitarian reports indicate that since the beginning of the year 2021, over 200,000 local population were displaced in West Darfur, in Greida and Tulus localities of South Darfur as well as parts of East Jabal Mara and Kabkabiya locality of North Darfur mainly due to inter-communal violence. Villages were burnt, properties including livestock and markets looted. There are many hotspot areas (26) in these localities which includes IDP camps, gathering sites, villages of displacement and return (5th IDPs initiative Sudan update, IDP-Initiative Update Emergency preparedness and response UNHCR Sudan, June2021, pp.1).

[QUOTE 4]

‘’We want justice: justice is the only thing that can make situations get better. By justice we mean perpetrators must be prosecuted and held accountable. We want rule of law in a sense that everyone must subject to law. Now the Arabs in Darfur do not abide by or subject to law, i.e they are not held accountable. Justice has been absent in Sudan for so long. You know there were a lot of atrocities, such as genocide, rape, crimes against humanity and yet no one was prosecuted- we do not trust judiciary system in Sudan, we want international justice-ICC is the only option.’’

With regard to the peace process, IDPs seem to have different opinions. All the participants in this study support peace and express desire to see peace prevail in Darfur. However, when it comes to JPA, they divide into groups that fully support the JPA, or oppose the JPA, or offer conditional support to JPA. Thus, there is no consensus on this issue and there are three different groupings on this issue. The first group is politically motivated and representatives of this group are more likely to be supporters of the armed movements that are signatory to the JPA. It seems that representatives of this group have been engaged, received invitations and takenpart in the consultations of the on-going peace process. Example of this group can be reflected in the following Quote:

[QUOTE 14]

“I, personally took part in Juba talks and represented my community within Elsalam IDPs’ camp. However, I cannot claim that I represented the entire camp as the camp is divided into 5 sectors and each sector is composed of a certain community group. Some communities refused to take part because they do not believe that Juba talks can bring about peace”.

The second group, who opposed the JPA are also seemed to be counting on political viewpoints. The division among the IDPs looks to be based on ethnic lines. This group is closer to the SPLA/AW position. Their position was expressed as follows:

[QUOTE 15]

‘’Regarding JPA, In Abushock IDPs’ camp we have been contacted by the Armed movements to take part in Juba peace talks, but our opinion was different in a sense that we do not support partial peace agreements.’’

The third group which offers conditional support to the JPA, looks to be neutral in their relations with the armed movements; they do not have clear political affiliations and may neither belong to the Fur nor to the Zaghawa, which are the two main rivals within the IDPs camps. They seem to be keen to separate IDPs’ agenda and demands from the political agenda of the armed movements, a fact which armed movements are not pleased with. This position is reflected in the following Quote:

[QUOTE 16]

“We, in Zumzum IDPs camp did not take part in Juba talks. It is true that the armed movements in Juba have contacted us to bring our representatives to take part in Juba peace talks. However, when our representatives came to take part in the preparatory consultation meeting held in El Fasher, the security organs denied them access to the meeting and hence they did not go to Juba. This is why we do not consider ourselves as part of Juba Peace Agreement.”

IDPs and Transitional Justice (TJ):

IDPs appear to have different views regarding TJ. Nevertheless, they are aware of the concept in a broad sense and aware that the overall objective of the transitional justice measures is to address injustice, grievances and legacy of the atrocities committed by the ousted authoritarian regime.

[QUOTE 19]

“The first prerequisite of transitional justice is the confession, i.e perpetrators must confess that they have perpetuated crimes and now they are seeking forgiveness and ready to sit with the victims to see how they can resolve the problems and overcome the legacy of the past. Against this background, IDPs must be an integral part of the consultations with regard to transitional justice arrangements, including proposed institutions and procedures, a thing which did not happen up to now-neither in Juba Peace talks nor before that.”

TJ means implementation of justice, such as prosecution of perpetrators, protection of civilians, including IDPs, ending of land occupation and safe return for forcefully displaced people and migrants to their original land, as well as collective and individual compensations (Duursma, 2021). However, IDPs were divided into three groups with regard to their conceptualisation of TJ; one believe that TJ as stipulated in JPA would certainly bring justice to Darfur if implemented in a good faith; second group has no confidence on the JPA, and describe it as a partial agreement that born dead and can offer nothing with regard to TJ in Darfur; while the third party appeals for the TG to be brave and take decisive decisions that can make difference and bring about justice without waiting for peace agreements. As stated during group FGD, IDPs’ demands are as follows, sequentially:

1/Security- law enforcement; disarmament of Janjaweed and arms collection.

2/Perpetrators must be sent to Hague/ICC to be held accountable.

3/Ending land occupation.

4/ Right to return to original land.

5/Rehabilitation and development of destructed areas.

6/ Individual compensations.

“None of these demands has been achieved. The only noticeable difference now is the freedom of speech. During the previous regime we could not sit with you like this and talk openly about our concerns. The security organs used to suppress us. Now I am hoping that the transitional government makes brave decisions which can enable us to go back and live with dignity in our original lands. We are attached to our land socially and psychologically.”

“The transitional government need to bear responsibility and take brave and effective decisions regarding implementation of JPA and transitional justice, such as prosecution of perpetrators and handover those who have been indicted by the ICC. Few months ago, Fatou Bensouda [ICC prosecutor] came and visited the IDPs’ camps. This is the kind of actions we want. This visit sent a message of emotional support as it’s for the first time the Sudanese government allowed a senior official from the ICC to visit the IDPs’ camps and talk to us directly. Without a comprehensive peace agreement, there will be no security, no peace and no justice in Darfur.”

Conclusion and Recommendations:

Forced migrants in Darfur, particularly IDPs have not been consulted properly with regard to issues relating to TJ and TJ process at large, including proposed institutions and mechanisms of implementation. This was clear from the deliberations during the group discussions and interviews with key informants.

The consultation that took place was overshadowed by political manipulation, especially from the side of armed movements. The partial peace agreement (JPA) was highlighted as an obstacle and opportunity regarding TJ process- for the JPA supporters it is an opportunity while for the opponents of the agreement it is an obstacle. Other key hindrances to successful redressal of violations are the existence of armed militias and proliferation of weapons which add to insecurity in the region. Resistance by new settlers to evacuate land that they gained by force during the conflict, absence of legal framework and absence of redressal mechanisms of TJ are also declared as hurdles.

Mental health related problems and lack of socio-psychological support such as counselling, treatment for women subject to rape and abduction, and rehabilitation for drug dealers amongst (mostly young men) is seen in relation to IDPs. Further, IDPs admitted to suffering from trauma due to physical and verbal abuses that they had gone through.

It was clear from the discussions that the key issues that TJ must address are protection through law enforcement and disarmament of the Janjaweed, prosecution of perpetrators, ending land occupation, right to return to original land, rehabilitation for the destroyed areas, and financial compensation.

Despite the fact that all the IDPs (with only very few exceptions) are from communities of African origin, they are diversified in terms of tribal affiliation and, of course, in terms of age and gender. When it comes to race and religion they are homogeneous. Their priority needs in relation to TJ at this particular moment remain unique, as above mentioned.

Recommendations:

The following recommendations suggest the way forward to overcome the obstacles facing the TJ:

Transitional government should establish necessary legal frameworks and institutions at national and local levels, such as the proposed national legislature and Human Right Commission that support TJ process.

Implementation of the JPA, especially the provisions connected to the security arrangements, including disarmament, demobilization and reintegration of the rebel combatants and militias in the formal security organs.

Establishment of Truth and Reconciliation Commission, as provided in the JPA, together with related institutions at provisional levels.

Efforts must be continued by TG to reach an inclusive peace that leaves no faction/community behind.

Inclusive TJ consultations through creative mechanisms that suit local communities most and encourage effective engagement, especially for women and youth.

Addressing mental health related problems and trauma must be an integral part of TJ process.

Building youth and community centres for IDPs and forced migrant community to meet, get socialised and address depression and loneliness.

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