Corruption's Influence on Environmental Lobbying

Commentary on Fredriksson, P.G., Neumayer, E. and Ujhelyi, G., 2007. Kyoto Protocol cooperation: Does government corruption facilitate environmental lobbying?. Public Choice, 133(1-2), pp.231-251.

The study by Fredriksson and Neumayer (2017), explored the different ways through which environmental lobbying intended to influence the ratification of international environmental agreements (IEA) was affected by the level of corruption in the government. The study utilises various stratified hazard models and panel data drawn from 170 countries on the timing of the ratification of the Kyoto Protocol for purposes of testing the hypothesis that increasingly corruptible governments are more responsive to the demands of environmental lobbyists. If you are delving into environmental studies dissertation help, this research is going to provide the most valuable insights into the interplay between government corruption and environmental policy decisions. Specifically, the paper reports that a positive effect on the probability of ratification is exerted by environmental lobbying, and more corrupt governments reinforce the effect. Through increased corruption, environmental lobby groups are accorded more opportunities of influencing the ratification decisions of the government. The paper establishes that ratification probability is increased by environmental lobbying, and whenever the levels of corruption are higher, the effect is even stronger.

Fredriksson, and Nuemayer (2016), developed a lobbying theory which argues that governments are made up of multiple units, including coalition parties, legislative chambers and the president, all of who are involved in making ratification decisions. Ratification decisions, just like with most of policymaking, involves different veto players, all of whom are subjected to the pressures of lobby groups (Kelsey, 2018). There exists an asymmetry between the impact of environmental and industry lobbying, with the prediction that institutional arrangements with a higher number of veto players minimises the positive impact of environmental lobbying on the probability of ratification. On the other hand, there are ambiguous effects of the effects of these arrangements on the influence of industry lobbying. Dincer and Fredriksson (2018), extend this analysis through the incorporation of social trust into the interaction. They carry out empirical tests to determine whether the comparative influence of the environmental lobbying groups compared to industry lobbying groups could be determined by the existing degree of trust within a society.

Political institutions, are quite commonly acknowledged as taking relatively critical roles in the shaping of environmental outcomes and regulations (DÜR, 2018). Every other economic system is integrated within a particular political framework and therefore, environmental management cannot be solely viewed as an economic issue. In the development of solutions to environmental problems, there are political processes that are involved whereby balancing of conflicting rights happens. There is always the likelihood of different parties with competing environmental interests to conflict with one another. All these point to different players having varying interests. Giger and Kluver (2016), report that appointed elected politicians have to independently appease their constituents, while proportionally-elected politicians often cater for special interests. The study by Giger and Kluver (2016) shows that sectional and cause groups are involved in influencing the incentives for, and the extent of, proportionally-elected MPs defection. Defection comes about in the event the votes of an MP in parliament are not able to correspond to the decisions made by the majority of people one represents. When MPs have ties with sectional interest groups, they have higher chances of defecting, while a higher number of ties to cause interest groups leads to a decline in defection.

Corruption and lobbying have over time continued to be a subject of extensive interest from research and members of the public. There have, however, been only a few studies endeavoured to identify the links between corruption and global environmental policymaking. There have also been minimal studies on the impacts of environmental groups on IEAs.

It would perhaps help to understand the different reasons as to why firms make the decisions to either bribe or lobby and the consequences that come about from their decisions. Goldberg (2018) reports that lobbying groups often make the decisions to bribe as a way of bypassing different laws and regulations that are put in place in different countries. Subsequently, the firms resort to bribing any of the veto people. Campos and Giovanni (2017), posit that government corruption has the effect of lowering the stringency of energy policies and energy intensity. Bennedsen et al. (2011) find that there are higher levels of sulphur dioxide emissions in the countries that have higher levels of corruption. Giovanni (2011), report that corruption has a negative effect on renewable energy deployment. Fredkinsson and Svennson (2003) report that increased corruption brings about a decline in the stringency of environmental regulation and that is because there is not adequate political turbulence. This follows the logic that increased political instability reduces the expected returns of bribes which comes about from the reduced likelihood of bribed officials to maintain in their offices through the stages of implementing policies. Goldberg (2018), however, identified political instability as a cause of the continued persistence of corruption. That comes about because of the weakened judicial efficiency of politically unstable countries and corruptions effects of reducing environmental compliance.

The extent to which an effective media presence would help to resolve the issues found in Fredriksson et al. (2007)

Environmental lobbyists could shun corruption and instead use the media to push for their causes. Corruption has harmful effects as it erodes government’s institutional capacities in the event government procedures are disregarded, siphoning of resources happens and buying and selling of public offices happens. Corrupt actions also undermine government`s legitimacy and other various democratic values like tolerance and trust. Lobbying is meant to either change or maintain policies by way of influencing them, either through direct or indirect actors, and the media can come in handy. The media, being a major source of political information, plays an important role in shaping political reality, and is at the centre of power and control struggles in different societies in the world (Iaryczower, Lewis and Shum, 2010). By influencing the salience of attitudes towards political issues, media forces attention to political issues and further sets the agenda. Over time, media`s significance as a factor in government decision making has increased the significance of the media presence of lobbyists and interest groups. Politics have become increasingly mediatised and that has seen political actors increasing their efforts to have a media presence. The media also has an influence on political discourses and decision making, and in journalism, lobbyist`s news value comes from their privileged access to public making of decisions (Sobbrio, 2011). It is for this reasons that the actions of lobbyists and their viewpoints are reported on.

Lobbyists have the goal of gaining media coverage and additionally translating their preferences into policies which is achieved through decision making. Dur (2018), argues that the influencing of decision making through the use of media strategists is a rather indirect and complicated process. This process enables lobbyists to present information to journalists who then create it into stories. These stories are then regarded by citizens as news and act to change the minds of the citizens on particular issues or increase the salience of environmental issues. Different lobbyists have the intentions of gaining access to media as this enables them to monitor and influence their journalistic content and additionally make efforts to either correct of counter information that is not appropriate (Bruycker and Beyers, 2015). Although, the lobbyists could also criticise journalists or the media which would enable the doubling of influence on content. By lodging attacks on different news agendas, it could be possible to replace content and influence the policies and practices of media. Media`s political importance could be viewed as a factor that pulls groups towards increasingly advanced media strategies.

Environmental lobbyists could court media attention by carefully framing the issues they lobby, paying close attention to the used language, and constructing solutions to the issues at hand. Media presents the lobbyists with the opportunities of figuring out how to handle communication with more effectiveness so that they can be able to get through to the makers of decisions (Bernhagen, 2012). There are different media strategies that are commonly used in lobbying processes. These include, use of personal access strategies, contacting personally with reporters, journalists and editors, building close relationships with media organisations and journalists, embracing social media and digital technologies, interviews, expertise, and informational strategies, involving the use of information channels, information means, advertising, public relation stunts, publicity strategies, press briefings, conferences, research reports and use of images, videos and audio (Tresch and Fischer, 2015). Lobbyists could be able to purposefully shape public opinions.

Section B

Bootleg bonanza

Black markets are involved in trading illegal services and goods, legal goods and services with the intention of avoiding tax, or both. Because of their nature, black markets often take a toll on economies because they are shadow markets where there are no records of economic activities and no taxes are paid. There are other different drawbacks of black markets, including the possibility of violence, risks of fraud, being saddled with goods that are counterfeit and products that are adulterated (Gu, Roth and Wu, 2018). Money laundering is also rife in black market economies and is meant to convert payments into forms that are legitimate, effectively obscuring money trails. Through money laundering, the compliance officers in banks and federal officials are prevented from recognising the signs of underground businesses (Peterson, 2013). Money laundering has social, security and economic consequences that are potentially devastating as it provides the fuel for operating and expanding criminal enterprises for dealers in illegal arms, drugs, and corrupt public officials. Through this, critical financial sector institutions for economic growth are damaged, and corruption and crime are also promoted and these have the effect of slowing the growth of the economy (Sadeghi et al. 2012).

Regulation of black markets is one major way through which governments can be able to influence market economies (Medellin, 2021). Regulations are specific instructions and standards that concern what organisations, businesses and individuals are either able or not able to do, and these are necessary for the efficient functioning of markets. In the absence of a legal framework that establishes and subsequently enforces property rights, there would be no free enterprise systems in existence. The ex-ante goals of regulation in relation to black markets would be underpinning of markets, protection of the rights and safety of citizens, and ensuring the delivery of services and goods. Emerging technologies enable the development of new products, business models and services that could not be easily conceived in the past.

Taxi regulations

There are important roles played by taxis in both developed and developing countries. As a result of the various perceptions of passenger’s vulnerability to being exploited by taxi operators, entry to the market, and fares are regulated tightly in most countries. The regulation of fares happens through the setting of prescribed maximum fares and this is meant to prevent undue increment of fares that could come about in environments where entry restrictions constrain competition. That goes a long way in producing increased premium values for licences which implies monopoly profit for operators at the user’s expense.

Tzur (2019), reports that the actions of ex-ante interest groups, to some extent, limit the extent of ex-post regulatory acceptance of Transportation Network Companies, with regulators showing more preference for newcomer Transportation Network Companies as compared to the incumbent ones. The study`s findings demonstrate that taxi market ex-ante regulatory protection, limited the extent of ex-post regulatory change aimed at accommodating the transportation companies.

Water

There is extensive criticism for water privatisation. Profiteering is the most obvious disadvantage of privatisation of water. Corporations have the common tendencies of putting profits before people which is dangerous when it comes to water. It is not possible for the human body to survive without water, and that goes a long way in making it a perfect product to benefit from, as people are willing to pay any price to get it. That brings about the importance of governments continuously regulating water resources.

Privatisation of water facilitates better operations of water distribution. Underdeveloped and developing countries often do poor jobs in supply water, brought about by the rife corruption in these countries. Through privatisation, the coverage of water supply is increased and more people are able to access water (Islar, 2012). There is also extensive infrastructure required in water supply. To enable supply of water to people over long distances, dams gave to be built and pipelines put up. In addition, purification plants are also necessary for ensuring that the supplied water is clean and also fit for consumption. Many governments of developing and underdeveloped governments are not able to put up these infrastructure (Zafra-Gomez and Lopez-Hernandez, 2016). These government inefficiencies lead to the death of millions of people daily. When water supply is controlled by the government, these governments are not even able to protect the resource from wastage and pollution. Private companies on the other hand have the capacities of putting up effective and efficient systems for minimisation of wastage. The privatisation of water, however, also has its downside.

Water access is a rather fundamental human right, and the treatment of water as a marketable commodity translates to violation of human rights (Brown, 2010). That is mainly because market-based systems provide the rich with the opportunities of wasting water in the event they want to, while wastage could cause droughts for the poor. Water access should never be affected by social status.

There are common beliefs among people that the water resources that are present where they live are part of the natural wealth of those places. The private market, does not operate like that. There is really nothing that would prevent corporations from purchasing vast land tracts and going on to siphon the weather to different locations where they could be able to get higher prices for their products (Hall, Lobina and Corral, 2011). That would have the effect of hampering with a regions ecological balance.

As a result of these drawbacks, it is necessary that whenever the private sector is to be involved in water and sanitation projects, the legal framework of the host country has to be given consideration. Regulation of the sector facilitates better service delivery. Examples of these regulations are the Water Act 2003 in Europe which is aimed at ensuring that water resources are used sustainably, the interests of water consumers are protected, and competition in the field of water services is strengthened, in addition to promoting the conservation of the resource. Another regulation in place is the Water Statute of 1995 in Uganda which is meant to provide for the use, protection and management of water resources and supply for purposes of providing the constitution of sewerage and water authorities and additionally facilitating the development of water supply and sewerage undertakings.

Emerging technologies have the potential of affecting the regulation and privatisation of water services. For instance, Internet of Things has the capacity of transforming how the water industry operates as this allows for mass connectivity and sensors for purposes of transforming information to analytic tools and IoT platforms that are scalable. This would provide new opportunities for optimising networks on the basis of new data insights and automation, and increasing the transparency in the services that water corporations perform.

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