Arafat's Role in Peace Failure

Introduction

The prospects of the Israeli-Palestine conceived following the establishment of the State of Israel in 1948, after Israel attained her independence. This conflict had been in dormant state since 1920 as a simple inter-communal conflict between Israelis and Arabs but sporadically intensified during the civil war, 1947-1948. Remarkably, the conflicts attracted global attention, leading to the formation of the Oslo Agreement of 1993 to help in its management. This protocol lacked comprehensive commitment and substance to the final commitment for peace as it was hampered with reserve options, and failed to articulate fundamental issues such as national narratives. In 2000, the Camp David negotiations mediated by the US government were determined to resolve this resilient conflict under what the enthusiasts of this conflict termed as “Israel’s generous offer”. It is along this premise that the Palestine’s Prime Minister Arafat Yasser is held accountable for the failure of these negotiations. This extended research intends to underscore this particular claim; “To what extent was Arafat responsible for the failure of the Israeli-Palestinian peace negotiations in 2000-2001 under the Clinton Administration?”

The Nature of the Israeli-Palestinian Conflict

The conflict between two antagonists can be described as existential between two identity groups with each group claiming same territory as the other for its political state and homeland. In this conflict that has survived the test of time and change, “The other's identity and its associated narrative challenge the group's claims to ownership - at least to exclusive ownership - of the land and its resources". These beliefs have resulted to the conceptualization of the conflict in zero-sum term based not only one the issue of national identity but existence.

Recognizing the other’s identity has been perceived as a potential tantamount to endangering one’s own existence and identity. Each inclination has contended to a view that only one can be a nation. Therefore, the conflict pathway has been plunged into divergent views which consequently have kept resolution at a standstill. Israel and Palestine has negated one another’s identity in its national narrative.

The intragroup disagreement emanating from such a division constitutes a key role propagating the continuity of intergroup conflict by making it intractable. Besides, the existential characteristic of the conflict induces a robust intergroup consensus. When societal members conceive a threat in their identity and national existence, they develop tendencies to soften their interior divisions and close ranks to pursue a common goal of safeguarding and protecting their nationality and existence.

The Oslo Peace Process and National Narratives

National narratives are cited as stories which nations narrate to themselves and others concerning who they are, who they were and what they intend to be. These stories are conceived on the threshold of meaningful events shaping the country’s earlier state, present and the future. The main amongst these stories a country’s founding and moments associated to it, and indeed the challenges the country encounters as it partakes in independence. In contrast to other narratives, national narratives have no ends. Systematic endings are knotted with end goals to be met, rendering then endless states.

This extended research the Zionist and the Palestinian master narratives as major narratives surrounding the Israel-Palestinian conflict. The Zionist narrative is premised on the grounds of ethnic and religious link between ancient Israelites and modern Israelis, which was disturbed when the Jewish were exiled to Mesopotamia and Babylon during the 6th and 7th century by the Assyrians. Away from home, the Jewish people suffered discrimination for centuries as evidenced through the Holocaust, Dreyfus affair and pogroms in Eastern Europe. The Zionist view then concludes that these woes can only be ended by securing itself a land and a state.

On the other hand, the Palestinian Master is structurally the opposite of the Zionist narrative. As opposed to Zionist’s ethnic and religious continuity, Palestinian master narrative is anchored on the presence of land. Palestinians maintain that they have co-habited the historical Palestine long enough beginning the genesis of the Arab conquest, but also many other layers including the philistines, Canaanites and the Israelites. British colonialism and Zionism perturbed this continuity, initially in 1917 through the Balfour Declaration, and later in 1948 through the creation of Israel state. The latter perturbation is commemorated as Nakba (catastrophe in Arabic) implying to the forced expulsion of more then 750, 000 Palestinians from historical Palestine.

Whereas the two narratives seem to be contrasting one another, the conflict between the two societies is not symmetrical. Such that history has professed that the ensuing conflict is founded on the rigid narratives, with neither side willing to compromise and narrow down strict these narratives for the essence of peace. The 1948 formation and declaration of the Israel state established its narrative above the Palestinian’s, by for instance repopulating, physically destroying and renaming many Palestinian towns, and outlawing Palestinian cultural practices. The situation diverged more when Palestine was given podium to narrate their story with the Oslo Peace Process.

The Palestinian-Israel Camp David Negotiations

In the year 1979, the then Israeli Prime Minister Menachem Begin and Egyptian president Sadat Anwar signed an agreement based on the negotiations which took place at Camp David, leading to end of war between the two countries that had begun 31 years earlier. By so doing, Israel and Egypt induced an international framework in the Middle East for future agreements. The basic premise for the agreement was “land for peace”. Fatefully, Israel resumed to Egyptian sovereignty (the Sinai Peninsula) which the Egyptians had seized during the 1967 six-day war. The Camp David meeting of 1979 lays an excellent foundation for solving future related conflicts.

The Camp David Model has been applied to the case of Israel-Palestinian conflict on the precept of land for peace. With the signing of a sequence of treaties erupting from the Oslo Negotiations (Oslo Accords), Israel ceded administrative control over the West Bank region which was captured from Jordan during the six-day war; and the whole Gaza Strip that was seized from Egypt to the newly dispensed Palestinian Authority in return for the Palestinian Authority’s cognition of Israel’s right to exist and renunciation of terrorism.

Palestinian uprising erupted in 2000 and since then the conflict has ensued, thus signifying the collapse of Camp David talks. The discussions leading to the conclusions of the July 2000 were termed as generous enough, and failure to uphold peace presented the Palestinian leader Yasser Arafat as a resister of the generous move granted by Barak, Israeli’s prime minister.

How Arafat Account for Failure of the 2000-2001Peace Accords under Clinton

The trilateral talks between the US, Israel and Palestine to resolve the conflict within were held at Camp David summit from July 11th to July 24th, 2000. President Clinton, the Palestinian Authority leader Arafat, and Israeli Prime Minister Barak were present. At this juncture, President Clinton summoned Arafat and Barak for final status negotiations, in which Israel provided dramatic and unprecedented concessions on all points every raised in the peace negotiation process. Based on the media, Barak reiterated the following offers;

Establishment of military-free Palestinian state on 100% of the Gaza Strip and 92% of the West Bank region.

Secondly, the Palestine was to establish their capital in East Jerusalem and have control of over half of the Old City of Jerusalem which was the Christian and Muslim quarters. In addition, the Palestinians were to have sovereignty over religious custodianship over some Arab neighborhoods in Jerusalem, Temple Mount and become sovereign Palestinian territory, as others resume “functional autonomy”.

Disbandment of a larger percentage of Jewish residences, uproot settlers from isolated centers and bring them to an eight percent of the West Bank’s Green Line and annex this region to Israel in exchange of 3% of the land in Israel adjacent to the Gaza Strip.

A return of Palestinian refugees to the Palestinian territories despite no Right to Return to Israel would be permitted. International help to resettle the refugees was also to be encourages.

The above concessions proposed by Israel were tailored to meet two objectives namely; end violence and inspire a public declaration that these provisions marked the end of the conflict and that there would be no more demands from the Palestinians in the future. Barak made it clear in these negotiations, that these offers were a “one time, now- or- never” which neither him nor the future leadership would offer again. However, Arafat trod out shutting the door, in demand of permanent status negotiations.

Israel suggested remaining united under its sovereignty, allowing Palestinians to control over East Jerusalem and Muslim Holy sites. In addition, Israel was free to cede above 90% of the West Bank, and wanted to add houses where more than 130,000 settlers dwelled, and suggested to accommodate thousands of Palestinian refugees in a family unification program. The other refugees were to be compensated by an international funding and Israelis from Arab states.

The Palestinians were willing to embrace and accept Israeli control over the Jewish segment of Western Wall and Jerusalem but sought sovereignty over East Jerusalem in particular the Haram al- Sharif (a holy site to Muslims and Hews).

On September 2000, Israeli Opposition Leader Ariel Sharon and his security forces ascended the Temple Mount (Haram al – Sharif). In response, the Palestinians protested, with Israel responding back forcefully. The subsequent uprising consequently started. On 12th October a mob killed 2 Israel militants. This provoked Israel helicopter gunship attacks on Palestinian military sites.

Prior to the Camp David meeting, the Palestine had given her candid and clear suggestions concerning the impeding Camp David negotiations. The Palestinian leader maintained a view that it was not a time for setting any conditions, based on the perspective that the previous summits seeking peace such as the Elat talks and those in Stockholm had not achieved anything. Arafat suggested a need to hold more meetings in the future before coming to a conclusion about the fate of the existing Israel-Palestine conflict. Arafat therefore believed that the Palestinian problem was so huge to be addressed in a one-session meeting as this in the Camp David as it would not be enough to address the in-depth issues lying within the history if this particular conflict.

On 4th, July 2000, President Clinton called Arafat informing him about Barak’s new offers, and showed interest to be part of the peace-making process which would happen at the Camp David. Arafat still maintained his former view of a need for intensive preparatory talks. However, the US hastily sent her peace team members, thus rejecting Arafat’s convictions.

Arafat was too careful in any decision that would come out of the Camp David talks. The entire Palestinian were watching on him, to articulate what in their eyes was Israel’s historical injustices especially following the 1948 displacement which Israeli could not take responsibility. In addition, Arafat believed that the US was intentionally backing Israel; and therefore there was impartiality. The Americans has come to the negotiations table with an absolute and the course of the predetermined conflict. Failure of Palestinians to accommodate the verbally proposed submissions was not only perceived by Clinton as a disintegration of a great opportunity for peace-making which would have otherwise replenished him in the American history.

During the July 2000 Camp David summit, the offers which Israel under the leadership of Prime Minister Barak made were unprecedented offers but yet which Arafat declined. According to the report by Robert Malley, the US representative to the summit; Israel made historic and generous suggestion which Palestine under Arafat turned down. The failure to attain and actualize the proposal is attributed to Arafat’s uncompromising nature, in that he was unwilling to compromise anything for the signing of a peace deal.

Each part came to the table with very divergent perspectives, leading to divergent approaches to the talks. Barak was governed by three major precepts. The first one was a deep antipathy towards the conviction of stepwise approach that laid foundation for the 1993 Oslo Agreement between the two states. In his conviction, Barak maintained that the withdrawal of Israeli soldiers from the Gaza Strip and the West Bank region had compelled Israeli to pay heftily for without anything in return. A second guiding precept for Barak was that the Palestinian leader was to find a place for yet an historic compromise as the last resort towards the final outcome of the meeting.

An in-depth analysis of Israeli politics drove Barak to the third precept. His team was determined that Israeli public could ratify consensus with Palestine, even that which could be far-fetched so long as it could be viable and futile. In addition Barak and his bench assumed that the most vibrant approach of inducing agreement to the Israeli people was to alleviate any possible political friction along the way. Prime Minister Yitzhak Rabin had paid both physical and political price by alienating Israelis’ right wing and failing to induce its members into the Oslo process. Barak maintained a strict position, not to repeat the mishap.

Upon the commencement of the discussions, Barak threw various interim steps, including the ones which were formally committed by previous agreement such as partial redeployment of soldiers from the West Bank, release of Palestinian imprisoned for crimes prior to the Oslo agreement and the handing over of three villages abutting Jerusalem to Palestine. Under these important negotiations, Arafat was meant to comprehend that that there was no other way, and the only way for peace was at the moment. It is upon this awareness that Arafat should have compromised for the essence of love for peace and lifelong prosperity.

The happenings at the Camp David meeting have a rich repertoire from which many scholars have further accounted Arafat responsibility for peace failure. The Israelis contending to Barak disintegrated each and every conceivable taboo and went further as no other prime minister could. His proposals of the complexity revolving around the West Bank territory, which had been a contentious issue for the Palestinian, would have been a major stepping stone to the lifelong and sustainable solution. On the climax of the negotiations, Israeli defined their purported the annexation of more than 10% of the West Bank over parts the segment along the Jordan River. Prior to the start of the negotiations, Barak had warned about that he could not agree to the Palestinian control over any Jerusalem territory. However, Barak had hinted flexibility on this conception only Arafat showed seriousness to the subject of peace end. Along this trajectory, Arafat remained resilient and immovable in mind to narrow down into this intended end.

Barak’s proposals were constructed on a less firm statue in comparison with Arafat’s. Barak maintained a long-sighted view that being flexible would reorient the Palestinians into failing into a deal. In every transaction, the Palestinian said no, even to proposals they would not have turned down. A critical eye can ever see that Israel had an offer to give and form a basis for resolving the huge conflict between Israel and Palestine. Barak was even willing to diagnose the issue face-to-face with Arafat but denied the chance. Structural, the Camp David negotiations were orally propagated without any record. Arafat was reminded to take these negotiations as the basis of for negotiations, before embarking into more severe and detailed negotiations. The failure of Arafat to embrace these proposals as the geneses for sustainable talks therefore portrays how responsible he is to the fate.

According to these bases, Palestine would have control over 91% of the highly contested West Bank strip, with Israel only annexing 9%. Besides, Palestine would have control of over some parts of Israel equivalent to 1% of the West Bank. On the volatile issue of refugees, the discussion recommended a “satisfactory solution”. Moreover, the issue concerning Jerusalem was equally left blank for later persuasions. Arafat was informed that his country worlds have control over the Christian and Muslim quarters of the Old City. Arafat declined all these favorable terms that would have built the foundation for sustainable peace. After all these proposals by Barak, he was keen enough not to accept anything. His utterings concerning positions he would support were conditional and driven by the US’s proposals provided Arafat did the similar thing.

Much as they strived, the Palestinian authority became unable to spell their case. In the context of US and Israel, they are continually presented as uncompromising and dumb to the excellent efforts by Israeli’s Barak. Yet from their own convictions, the Palestinians see themselves as the greatest contributors to major concessions.

For all the conversation on reconciliation and peace, majority of the Palestinians were more inclined to two state solutions than they were willing to accommodate. They were ready to accept Israel’s existence, but denounce the moral legitimacy. The fight over the entire Palestine ended because it had been lost. Palestine conceived Oslo not as a tool of peace but as a tool of surrender. This view substantiates Oslo as an historic compromise and as an agreement to control 78% of mandatory Israel and Palestine. This conception equally exemplifies why the Palestinians were keen on Israeli’s application of language. The view that Israeli providing them land was “generous” appeared to them as a significant wrong by recognizing Israeli’s right and ignoring Palestinians’.

Following the Oslo negotiations, Palestine maintained they contributed creative ideas addressing Israeli’s issues. While denouncing the Israeli’s settlement as illegitimate, they concurred agreed that Israel ought to add part of the West Bank land in exchange of an equal size of Israeli land being given to Palestinians. The Palestinians insisted Palestinians refugees to return to homes they had lost in 1948, and they were anchor this demand as an implementation offering alternative options for the refugees while moderating the numbers resuming to Israel. Alongside emphasizing Israeli’s withdrawal from areas occupied in 1967, they remained flexible to a division at East Jerusalem, providing Israel control over its Jewish regions.

The tragedy of Palestinians is that they were not able to agree to any American-baked idea from the advent of the Camp David summit, which had otherwise provided a sound rapport for each party to compromise. The Palestinians were still convinced that the meeting at hand would not be able to address a series of issues standing between the Israel-Palestinian conflicts. By virtue of failing to agree to any of the proposal, the Palestinians denied the US a ground to substantiate and approve whether Barak’s proposals were true as proposed in Camp David discussion. Upon the decline of Palestine to work on a map negotiating for a potential outcome, on ground that Palestine had to first agree that any territorial consensus would be based on the line of June 4, 1967; president Clinton’s response was that;

President Clinton further maintained; “This is a fraud. It is not a summit. I won’t have the United States covering for negotiations in bad faith. Let’s quit! …“If the Israelis can make compromises and you can’t, I should go home. You have been here fourteen days and said no to everything. These things have consequences; failure will mean the end of the peace process. . . . Let’s let hell break loose and live with the consequences”.

The Palestinians had sound reasons behind their strict stands concerning the conflict at hand. Further, the Palestinians believed that that peacemaking process is not an event but rather a process in which the involved proponents confess committed wrongs and find lifelong solutions. Even as this study respects these convictions, the art of peace-making is complex and one requiring sacrifice and situational compromise. In addition, the concept of peace building cannot be constructed on the reliance of the past mistakes, but rather focuses on the present and future from which to draw best alternatives. Whereas Arafat seemed to dissent with this premise, he is easily held accountable and responsible for the negotiations breakdown, for overreliance of the past and ignoring the potentials of Barak’s proposals to solving the conflict at hand.

Conclusion

The study has penetrated into the various intrigues concerning the Israeli-Palestinian conflict that has ensued for a long period of history. The paper began at analyzing the structural content and nature of this conflict, with an aim to develop an holistic understanding of what it is before venturing into the context of 2000 Camp David negotiations and the leadership of the US. Whereas the nature of the conflict remains pervasive in literature, the aspect of social-psychological aspects has impeded attainment of solutions as discussed. Further, failure to properly address the national narratives entrenched within the conflict has inhibited ability to compromise. The conflict has survived the test of time. This study believes that the latitude which the United States under Bill Clinton laid in 2000 during the Camp David negotiations would have been better if only Arafat was willing to put history aside and focus on the present and future ways of finding peace for his people. His rigidity and immovable stand to embrace the proposals which literature has termed as “generous” led to a general feeling that he was unwilling to sign a peace deal; consequently leading to the US’s withdrawal as a mediator.

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