Evolution of Global Governance

Introduction

Global governance can be described as loose, cooperative arrangements that are made beyond borders between states and other agencies and which are related to global issues (Slaughter, 2004). From a legal doctrine perspective global governance can be defined as a new global order which is characterised by “porous borders and power sharing amongst states, non-state actors, and new geographic and/or functional entities” (Winchester, 2009, p. 22). Global governance systems are now seen in the areas of security, finance, and health, to name a few. Global governance are now manifested in a number of governance arrangements and institutional forms; these involve collaboration involving states and non state actors (Koenig-Archibugi, 2002).

The question that this essay seeks to answer is how far this system of global governance is effective. This essay argues that while there is a rise in the global governance system, it is not as effective. There are a number of challenges that compromise the effectiveness of the global governance system. Some of these challenges are related to internal issues with the global governance system, particular amongst these being the problem of the democratic deficit (Weber, 2010). There are also some challenges that are external to the system, but which do affect the effectiveness of the system; principal amongst these challenges is the problem of the lack of consensus between states on the core values that would guide global governance due to the differences on core moral questions or issues (Cottier, 2009). Such lack of consensus can be seen to impede global governance related to a variety of issues like environmental protection and finance. Due to these internal and external challenges to the global governance system, some scholars, like Murphy (2000) and Weber (2010) have raised doubts about the efficacy of the global governance systems. On the other hand, there are scholars like Weiss and Thakur (2006) who are more optimistic about the role of global governance. This essay will first briefly discuss the meaning and nature of global governance and then crticially analyse as to its effectiveness.

What is global governance?

The concept of global governance is related to the making of a new world order, which is very different from the old world order on the point of the place of the state in governance. Traditionally, international law perceived states as unitary, but in the new model of global governance, states are ‘disaggregated’, which means that governments are part of a loose global system that views the former as disparate institutions (Slaughter, 2004). In the new world order, the disparate institutions that are governments work collectively along with non-state actors on issues that are of global significance (Slaughter, 2004). In the traditional context, the concept of states and state sovereignty as depicted in the Treaty of Westphalia was predominant. In the contemporary period, the Westphalian system has been deviated from where a global governance system finds place (Falk, 2002). In this sense, the global governance system has been envisaged as a possible successor to the Treaty of Westphalia (Falk, 2002, p. 345).

The pragmatic reason for which there is a deviation from the unitary system of states to a more loosely constructed global governance system is the need to respond to global problems that need collaborative efforts from different states (Weiss & Thakur, 2006). In this sense, global governance system can be envisaged as a multi-layered approach to governance. In this context, global governance system involves the application of different and even non-traditional state mechanisms to respond to issues that need collaborated action by states.

Global governance can also be explained as the globalisation of certain norms and decision making procedures that control or standardise the behaviour of states and other non-state actors (Betts, 2011). In this sense, global governance can be seen as a normative system, wherein laws and norms are made and are meant to be observed by states. An example can be seen in the World Trade Organisation (WTO), which maintains the system of tariffs in the member states.

Weber (2010) explains the way global governance system is structured by noting three core themes that are a part of the system. The first theme relates to the motivating factor for global governance system being the need for collective decision and action by states, as well as non-governmental organizations and corporations, on regulatory problems. The second theme relates to the hierarchical structures of the global governance system. Weber (2010) notes that there are no hierarchical structures in the international level, which is an impediment for addressing complex global problems and that global governance systems address this lack of hierarchy. The third theme relates to the significance of non-state actors in the global governance scheme. The traditional notion of state sovereignty and state as a unitary actor is no longer relevant as along with states, other non-state actors such as international organisations and non-governmental agencies become a part of the processes of globalisation and integration. Indeed, in the contemporary period, there are certain ways in which legitimacy of the state action is maintained through the involvement of the non-state actors like non-governmental agencies, technical communities and academics (Weber, 2010). To sum up the three themes as a way of explaining the global governance system, it is a system of collaboration involving states and non-state actors, which responds to the problems of state inability to address certain global regulatory issues on its own; absence of hierarchical structures in international law, and need for increased legitimacy for certain kinds of decision making.

There are different areas in which global governance systems are already in place, predominant amongst which are finance, health, environment, and security (Woods, et al., 2013). These areas have seen greater involvement of global governance systems because of the concept that effectiveness of functions can be enhanced if states respond to these issues collectively rather than at their unitary or individual levels (Koenig-Archibugi, 2002). In order to achieve greater effectiveness in the performance of certain regulatory functions or issues, certain governance arrangements have been formulated where states and other entities have common goals that can be achieved better if they act in a collaborative manner (Koenig-Archibugi, 2002). Be it as it may, it cannot be said that global governance systems have attained adequate effectiveness. There are serious challenges that come in the way of the global governance system to achieve effectiveness which are discussed in the next section.

Global governance systems’ effectiveness

Although the increase of global arrangements signify the states’ increasing acceptance of global governance for achieving certain common goals, the inherent challenges that are involved in the conflict between sovereignty and self-interest of the states and the need to achieve certain common aims through global governance means that global governance systems are often unable to be as effective as they should be. Therefore, one of the problems coming in the way of the achievement of the effectiveness for the global governance systems is the problem of states’ self-interest, which comes in the way of formulation of consensus on core principles, moral understanding on different issues, and self-restriction on sovereign powers or rights. Added to these problems and challenges is the problem of hegemony in international relations where a few powerful states come in the way of accepting a global government (Woods, et al., 2013). This has also led to polarisation in the world, like the North-South divide, which affects consensus making in global governance and adversely affects effectiveness of the global governance systems.

At the core of the problem of lack of effectiveness of the global governance is the fact that state sovereignty concept still drives the international agenda and therefore makes states agree to structures or arrangements within the global governance system that are half-hearted or piecemeal approaches to global governance (Murphy, 2000). Thus, global governance is engendered in the same system of international relations which also protects state sovereignty as the primary principle. Consequently, while states and non-state actors create global governance structures to respond to global issues like poverty, health inequities, human rights protection, and financial regulation, the structures are limited in their effect so as to account for state sovereignty (Murphy, 2000). Therefore, global governance systems have so far not been able to reach effective functions in the area of global environment, human rights, or even financial regulation. Indeed, as seen in the recent movements of indigenous people against globalisation, there is dissatisfaction with the global governance structures due to the inability of such structures to enhance their rights to their land and environment (Kennedy, 2007). Ironically, these movements stress o the need to move away from globalisation and even transnational regimes of global governance structures and towards the return of sovereignty, and even unilateralism of individual and local rights (Kennedy, 2007).

Another core reason why global governance has been ineffective is because countries rarely if ever agree on the common core values that will be used to build the structure of global governance (Cottier, 2009). Because countries have different individual visions, principles, moral and core values, they may find it difficult to agree on the core values for a global government. More problematically, even if countries do agree on these core values, they cannot always be trusted to act on these values if there is a conflict between these core values and the self-interest of the nation. This can be seen in the United Nations itself. When the UN Charter was formed, some of the core values of the Charter were related to the principles of non-intervention and non-use of force in Article 2 of the Charter. However, since then many UN member states have used force against other members and justified such use of force on the basis of their self-interest. For instance, the US-UK coalition invaded Iraq on the ground of the latter having weapons of mass destruction, a charge that was later proved incorrect (Greenwood, 2003). This was done despite the UN Secretary General Kofi Annan’s public statement that any pre-emptive measure against Iraq would be unlawful (Greenwood, 2003). This exposes the weaknesses in the global governance system of the UN Security Council as well; because of the inherent weakness of the Veto power, no action was taken against US-UK coalition.

The problem of lack of consensus on core values is also derived from the varied value systems of countries, with differences seen in the approaches to free market, social welfare, human rights, democracy, and government action, to name a few. While western democratic countries as well as other democracies agree on core values like non-discrimination, equal treatment, and rule of law; other countries may not accept these core values. Even more problematic is the approach to governmental functions, such as protection of human rights, which have seen different standards being applied by different states (Koenig-Archibugi, 2002). This problem can be mitigated by adoption of pluralism, which is indeed essential to achieve concerted action within global governance (Woods, et al., 2013).

Global arrangements can be more effective if they are more inclusive, are based on common values, and see countries strive to achieve these common values. Within global governance structures, if there is hegemony of some actors, then the system is compromised and polarised. Two examples can be taken here to illustrate this argument. One example can be seen in Europe, which has managed to create a supra structure in the European Union, but where the autonomous bodies have been created with legislative, executive, and judicial powers delegated to them by the European states and where no one state can be said to have hegemony (Koenig-Archibugi, 2002). To a great extent, EU has been successful in laying down common core values, and common goals and purposes. It has also been effective in achieving many of these common goals, be these in the area of environmental protection, creation of free markets, and even municipal activities like waste disposal (Pires, Martinho, & Chang, 2011 ). The second example is that of the International Monetary Fund (IMF). More than 180 states are members of the IMF; however, some states hold more powers than most others for the purpose of making rules because the voting power depends on financial contribution made by each country (Koenig-Archibugi, 2002). One of the impacts of this hegemony in context of global financial governance through IMF is that the countries with lesser power with the IMF are increasingly wary of entering into financial global arrangements. In the wake of 2008 financial crisis, the power wielding countries within the IMF, i.e. the Unites States and the European nations have reached out to the countries in the Global South for entering into global arrangements, but the latter countries have chosen to instead align with each other in regional or bilateral systems (Woods, et al., 2013). This is one of the indicators of the failure of the global financial governance through structures like the IMF, which are not inclusive and promote hegemony.

A final example of the ineffectiveness of the global governance networks can be seen in the area of migration regulation. In recent years, migration has emerged as one of the core areas for global governance (Munck, 2008). International community has sought to achieve global institutional cooperation in the context of migration through the 1951 Refugee Convention and the 1967 Refugee Protocol as well as a host of other institutional measures, such as the Global Forum on Migration and Development (Betts, 2011). However, the failure of global governance to achieve the goals of protection of refugee rights as well as protection of the cultural and economic interests of migrants can be seen in the development of migrant networks that seek to fill the gaps in global migration governance (Taylor, 2016). Migrant networks emulate global governance systems in that they are loosely constructed and work beyond borders; however, they are networks of individuals and communities that seek to provide support to migrants in the way that the global governance system on migration aims to achieve but fails to do so because of the lack of coherent policy and disparate approaches of the states to migration.

Conclusion

Global governance cannot be said to be completely effective; indeed, there are a great many gaps in the global governance system which are primarily the result of the lack of common core values, self-interest of the states, and the need to accommodate state sovereignty. These lead to the creation of a global governance system that is fragmented and piecemeal. The presence of hegemony and lack of inclusiveness within structures like the IMF lead to the polarization between states and therefore a failure to come to consensus on core values. This leads to the engendering of a global governance system that has good aims but lacks the characteristics of inclusion, pluralism to achieve these aims. Global governance is yet to achieve a high level of effectiveness as shown even by supra-structures like the United Nations.

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