Ottoman Empire Rise Fall And Modernity

The rise and fall of the Ottoman Empire took place over a timescale of around 400 years and was once one of the largest empires in history (Rogers, O, 2004: 5). Beginning in Turkey, it expanded throughout centuries, peaking in the 16th century and expanding territories within what is now known as Greece, Egypt, Jordan, Lebanon, Syria as well as many others. It wasn’t until the first world war that the Ottoman Empire began to lose its entire power. The “military defeat by the British and French…produced radical change throughout the whole Middle East” (Rogers, O, 2004: 6). British, French and American forces wanted to practice political control over these Middle Eastern territories by establishing “constitutional governments in the new states as a way of preparing their peoples for eventual independence” (ibid, 2004: 6). States such as the British and French did this by implementing declarations such as the Balfour Declaration and this created tension and revolts from Arab governments and military forces. Despite this conflict, Western powers continued to gain control and access to the Middle East. This colonial shift of power adopted “the essential features of a modern state” (ibid, 2004: 9). But as Owen notes, during the end of the Ottoman Empire, modernity was already taking flight through the breakdown of traditional societies (2004: 9). Adopting this modern notion suggests Arabs were already defining individuals by things such as “nationality and citizenship”, rather than “tribe or religion” (Lockman, Z, 2005: 134), a dichotomisation that Max Weber distinguished within the modernisation theory.

The modernisation theory is a useful model to understand the social change that occurred throughout the Middle East, including “political change, economic development and social transformation” (ibid, 2005: 133), as well as linking to Orientalism; a powerful European ideological creation of an ideal of an othering in the Middle East (Said, E, 1978: 9-10). Western scholars have often used the dichotomisation of tradition and modernity in their analysis. Modernisation is largely from the political influence of the West through foreign policy interests in favour of capitalism and democracy over communism. Rostow for example in his book The Stages of Economic Growth: A Non-Communist Manifesto, supports Western modernisation in states such as the Middle East by believing that “with assistance and investment from the wealthy capitalist countries, poor countries could achieve economic development without embracing communism” (Lockman, Z, 2005: 135). Lockman recognises the modernisation theory to be the modern substitute for Orientalism and in Daniel Lerner’s book The Passing of Traditional Society: Modernizing the Middle East, sees modernisation as a crucial theory into the study of Middle East and its development and emergence post second world war (ibid, 2005: 136).

Theorists such as Kaveh Tagharobi and Ali Zarei introduce the three waves of modernity in relation to the politics and social sciences of the Middle East. Throughout the three waves, the Middle East goes through much change in representation and development. The first wave begins before the second world war and focuses on the influence of “Western cultural and political domination in the region” (Tagharobi K., Zarei, A, 2015) as well as a period of constitutionalism. Middle Eastern countries such as Iran and Egypt entered a liberal and democratic “enlightenment” (ibid, 2015) and in 1906 saw Iran write its first modern constitution (Khalil, M, E, 2016: 33). As modern constitutions that were emerging in the late nineteenth century and early twentieth century were highly driven by Western values, this created problems for contemporary Islamists. Islamic values and beliefs were lost and misrepresented, subsequently letting people believe “(mistakenly) that Islamic laws and values cannot govern a modern society” (Kayadibi, S, 2011: 49), resulting in the misunderstanding of Islam being an archaic religion. On the other hand, military commander, Muhammad Ali Pasha respected his affiliation with the West. His ambition was to modernise Egypt, from the economy all the way to military modernisation. To do this he adopted a “European model...[and] sent the first cohort of Egyptian students to Europe, a decision almost simultaneously taken in Iran” (Tagharobi, K., Zarei, A, 2015). Once Ali Pasha began the modernisation of Egypt, which included the building of factories and improved agriculture, he became an Authoritarian ruler and favoured foreign workers to Egyptian workers, becoming completely driven by Western values.

The second wave of modernisation in the Middle East announces the return of the rightful Islamic control. This era began after the second world war and focuses on reform and nationalism, a move away from colonialism. Without Western dominance, Muslims within the Middle East believed they could seek independence and “saw European imperialism as the main cause of modern [ignorance]” (ibid, 2015). To confirm this, Iran released a new constitution in 1979 called the Constitution of the Islamic Republic (Kayadibi, S, 2011: 50). The constitution represents the movement and return of religious power and was a moment when people realised the absence of religion in their constitution and values were the reasons for failure (World Bank, 2019). As Iran adopted the same strategy as Egypt, by sending cohorts to Europe, this sparked the constitutional revolution since Iranians knew they were still being controlled by European states, such as Russia, who also delivered “new customs and commercial agreement” (Farah, A, A, 2011). as well as two loans to Iran. This led countries such as Egypt to enter a conflict “between state authoritarianism and social resistance” (Kamrava, M, 2013: 235).

Lastly, the third wave which continues to cultivate surrounds the development of the Middle East. While the world faces new challenges and global movements, the Middle East is determined to engage in the “changes in the socio-political domain due to the appearance of a new world order” (Tagharobi, K., Zarei, A, 2015). Modernisation in this instance looks to economic development and political development. Over the past few decades, the Middle East has seen a shift in powers once again. After the Arab Spring in 2011, countries such as Egypt, Syria and Libya are “now barely functional states” (Foreign Affairs, 2018), following failed uprisings for a new democracy. Economic development is one key issue that shapes “the politics of the contemporary Middle East” (Kamrava, M, 2013: 235). In a fast-paced global economy, developing countries such as Egypt struggle “to foster economic development” (ibid, 2013: 374). With the help of oil within the Middle East, countries could industrialise throughout the modern industry, which the government of Iran “managed to raise substantial income [of oil revenues] which helped it to industrialize the country” (Farah, A, A, 2011). And with a global demand for oil, they could practice nationalisation by assuming control over its resources. OPEC (Organisation of Petroleum Exporting Countries) proved to be useful for Iran as it helped shift their dependence on the West (mainly Europe). However, as the production of oil decreases in the Middle East, the potential for economic development is in strife.

References

• Tagharobi, K., Zarei, A. (2015).
• Foreign Affairs. (2018).
• World Bank. (2019).
• Kayadibi, S. (2011).
• Khalil, M, E. (2016).
• Lockman, Z. (2005) pp. 135.
• Said, E. (1978). pp. 9-10.
• Rogers, O. (2004). pp. 5-9.
• Farah, A, A. (2011).
• Kamrava, M. (2013). pp. 235, 374.