Analysis of Property Rights and Beneficial Interests in the Family Home

Beneficial interests being held in the family home

June is the only registered proprietor of the family home and as such, her right to the property is absolute and thus, cannot be challenged in any way. Moreover, without any form of express trust, she has sole beneficial interest in the property. However, it is arguable that there existed a common intention between her and her friends concerning the property, and this suggests the contrary (of the aforementioned, June’s sole beneficial interest). Owing to the fact that there was no legally binding express agreement, such kind of common intention could be inferred, based on her direct financial contribution. In this regard, it could be inferred that June contributed 90 per cent towards the purchase of the family home whilst vaguely relying upon a common intention that all parties would have a beneficial interest. However, this was not legally binding and as such, the court would be bent on holding June as the sole beneficiary of the family home. Moreover, whilst quantifying her beneficial interest, it is significant to put into consideration, the entire course of the dealing that existed between June, Al and Quinn in regards to the family home. Notably, the measurement of the dealing cannot rely upon financial contributions only, but for the fact that Quinn made a contribution of 10 per cent, whilst Al, did not make any financial contribution, although renovated the house prior to the three moving in, a task, which would earn him huge bucks. Moreover, Al and Quinn could make weekly contributions that covered the house expenses. For quantitative dissertation help in exploring these kinds of complex legal scenarios, consult experts well-versed in property law.

As such, it is evident that June’s beneficial share in the family home ought to be less that the 90 per cent financial contribution that she made.

Quinn and AL are not registered proprietors of the family home and as such, they do not hold any legal titles as joint tenants according to the law as stipulated in the case of Jones v Kernott [2011] UKSC 53. However, it is worth noting that without an express trust, the concept of equity follows and as such, the two are presumed to be joint tenants, owing to the fact that they initially had a common intention towards the family home, which changed their beneficial shares, as discussed amongst themselves. Notably, this can be supported, based on the objectivity of their conducts, which made June to agree that both Al and Quinn were making valuable contributions, as the trio could have spent much more if not for Al’s renovation work. Whilst Quinn made a financial contribution of 10 per cent towards the purchase of the home, Al renovated the premises before the three moved in. Moreover, both Al and Quinn could make weekly contribution towards meeting the home expenses. As such, it is clear that whilst June made a bigger financial contribution per se, that did not provide sufficient evidence that could bar common intention. It is evident that no substantial difference was established, which could amount to unusual facts that can displace the presumption. As such, the court can likely hold Quinn, Al, and June to be joint tenants in equity, and this could amount to them having equal beneficial shares in the family home as provided in the common intention constructive trust.

Beneficial interest being held in the builder’s house

Al is not a registered proprietor of the builder’s house and as such, does not have any beneficial share in the property. However, he can make an argument that the house is not owned by any specific person, but rather, has been restored by the builder’s association for over many years. Without an express discussion, it can be presumed that Al is a beneficial tenant in the builder’s house, owing to the fact that he is a member of the bricklaying community, not considering the fact that he joined the association later than others and not participating in the restoration and renovation of the house. This is evident, according to the provisions of the common intention constructive trust. It is then worth noting that all builders in the building community can share the property beneficially, inclusive of Al, as they all have a common intention. In this regard, the whole course of dealing is applicable and Al has the right of holding the keys to the property, but not preventing other bricklayers from accessing the house. Overall, the court can deduce that Al has a beneficial interest of the property, regardless of whether he has contributed towards its maintenance or not, but for the fact that he is a qualified member of the bricklaying community.

The administration of Justice Act 1970, section 36

In an attempt to suspend or rather, postpone the repossession of the family home by Boombank, Quinn, and Al may invite the court, in order for it to exercise its discretion, in accordance with the provisions, in accordance with section 36 of the Administrative of Justice Act 1970. Based on this Act, there is no jurisdiction that allows a property to be possessed by any mortgagee without the order of the court. However, it is also evident that because the family home are being occupied, and in an attempt to preventing any potential criminal liability, Boombank could as well purpose to make an application to the court, to give a possession order. Of importance to note, is the fact that the family home is covered by section 36 of the Act, owing to the fact that it is a residential home that is generally a dwelling home. In this regard, it is upon Quinn and Al to show that they are likely to pay installments for the home within a reasonable period of time that is often considered the outstanding mortgage term. For instance, they can make an argument that Quinn’s pastry business, Al’s bricklaying business and also June’s property business will pick up to be able to pick up, in order to be able to make the installments as agreed by the court.

Overriding interests

June is considered a beneficial tenant in the family home. Nonetheless, owing to the fact that the money for the construction of the swimming pool had been paid to two trustees, which

include Al and Quinn, it is evident that June’s equitable interest has been overreached by the family home (mortgage). It is of no significance discussing whether the priority of her interest has been protected, owing to the fact that an interest that is overreached cannot be overriding. In this regard, the beneficial interest that she has on the property has been detached and as such, attached to the mortgage money rather. In this regard, it is evident that it is unlikely that she would have any proprietary rights against Boombank from repossessing the family home. However, she would make the argument that her beneficial interest should be given priority over the mortgage, considering the maxim stated as “first in time prevails.” This is owing to the fact that her beneficial interest had been granted prior to her being granted the mortgage. Moreover, the mortgage, based on a legal charge, was made, based on a valuable consideration, and was completed through registration. Putting into consideration, these legal underpinnings, the court can postpone her interest, and as such, Boombank can take free from June’s interest.

In addition, owing to the fact that Al could only spend some days at the family home and others with his friend Matilda at the builder’s house, it is worth noting that he is not to be regarded as the actual occupier of the family block, and as such, he does not have an overriding interest. However, his interest’s priority in the family home ought to be protected as he has been contributing weekly for the weekly expenses in the house and has been renovating the house. In this regard, he has a beneficial interest just as the other partners. On the other hand, Quinn should be considered an actual occupier of the family home as that is where he spends all his days living. Quinn has a beneficial interest in the family home and as such, the court should not allow Boombank to possess the family bank, as there are other partners who are beneficiaries in equity, who also need to be put into consideration. Clearly, Quinn can make an argument that her interest’s priority should be protected. For the fact that she lived in the family home suggests that there was a degree of permanence, as well as continuity of physical presence during disposition. In this regard, the court is in a position to find her as an actual occupier of the family home, just like June. Furthermore, his occupation would obviously be put under reasonable inspection and as such, Boombank de facto knowledge of being in occupation is immaterial, and this is whether the beneficial interest he has on the family home is obvious or irrelevant. In this regard, it is evident that his beneficial interest on the family home has a likelihood of overriding the legal charge and of importance, he has an equitable interest against Boombank in their quest to repossess the family home.

Continue your journey with our comprehensive guide to Analysis of Authority and Fiduciary Duty.

Bibliography

Cases

Cheltenham v Norgan [1996] 1 WLR 343, 355.

City of London Building Society v Flegg [1988] AC 54

Grant v Edwards [1986] Ch 638, 647.

Jones v Kernott [2011] UKSC 53.

Lloyds Bank Plc v Rosset [1991] 1 AC 107, 125.


Stack v Dowden [2007] UKHL 17 [68]-[69] (Baroness Hale)

Walker v Hall [1983] 1 WLUK 645

Statutes

Criminal Law Act 1977, s. 6

Explanatory Notes to the LRA 2002, para 67.

Law of Property Act 1925 (LPA 1925), s 1(6).

Section 2(1) (iii) of the Land Registration Act 1925.

Section 29(2) (a) (ii) Land Registration Act 2002 (LRA 2002)

Section 36; Administration of Justice Act 1973

Books and journals

Bently, L., & Sherman, B. (2014). Intellectual property law. Oxford University Press, USA.

Berkowitz, D., Lin, C., & Ma, Y. (2015). Do property rights matter? Evidence from a property law enactment. Journal of Financial Economics, 116(3), 583-593.

Dixon, M. (1992). Of Mortgages and Beneficial Interests—Again. The Cambridge Law Journal, 51(2), 223-225.

Etherton, T. (2008). Constructive trusts: a new model for equity and unjust enrichment. The Cambridge Law Journal, 67(2), 265-287.

Feeley, M. (2017). Two models of the criminal justice system: An organizational perspective. In Crime, Law and Society (pp. 119-137). Routledge.

Graham, C. B. (2017). Reshaping the courts: Traditions, management theories, and political realities. In Handbook of court administration and management (pp. 3-26). Routledge.

Gray, K. J., & Gray, S. F. (2009). Elements of land law (Vol. 5). Oxford: Oxford University Press

Hill, J. (2000). Overriding Interests: Occupation of Part of the Land. Mod. L. Rev., 63, 113.

Lessig, L. (1996). Intellectual property and code. Journal of Civil Rights and Economic Development, 11(3), 6.

Miles, J. (2003). Property law v family law: resolving the problems of family property. Legal Studies, 23(4), 624-648.

Musselman, J. L. (2012). Separate but Equal: Proposal for Harmonizing the Rules for Martial Property Characterization of Beneficial Interests in and Distributions from Trusts with those Application to Similar Types of Property. Est. Plan. & Cmty. Prop. LJ, 5, 55.

Nimmer, R. T. (1998). Breaking Barriers: The Relation Between Contract and Intellectual Property Law. Berkeley Tech. LJ, 13, 827.

Oldham, M. (Ed.). (2016). Blackstone's Statutes on Family Law 2016-2017. Oxford University Press.

Pawlowski, M. (2007). Beneficial entitlement: no longer doing justice?. Conveyancer and Property Lawyer, 354-364.

Televantos, A. (2016). Unconscionable Bargains, Overreaching and Overriding Interests. The Cambridge Law Journal, 75(3), 458-462.