Analysis of the Legal Principle in DPP v Majewski

Lord Elwyn-Jones L.C. held in Majewski that if a person gets intoxicated on some substance voluntarily which causes them “to cast off the restraints of reason and conscience,” it is appropriate to hold them liable for any injury they may cause while in that condition (DPP v Majewski [1977] A.C. 443 , 1977, p. 474). This essay critically discusses the ratio in Majewski in the wider context of law of self-induced intoxication.

Evidence of intoxication has presented a difficulty in criminal law with regard to ascertaining of the defendant’s guilt with the House of Lords decision in Beard (DPP v Beard [1920] AC 479, 1920) becoming the first case where the court provided the first modern restriction on the use of evidence of intoxication (Dimock, 2011, p. 187). Since then, in Majewski, the House of Lords provided a clear principle on the role of intoxication evidence in basic intent crimes. Both the Beard and the Majewski decisions can lead to a suggestion that intoxication can provide an evidentiary consideration of relevance to proof of fault.

In criminal law, liability for an offence arises when there is a presence of both actus reus and the fault element. The principle of criminal law is that conviction of a serious crime is premised both on proof that the defendant an injurious result to another as well as the state of mind when so acting was culpable; this rule is encapsulated in the maxim actus non facit reum nisi mens

sit rea (R v G and another [2003] UKHL 50, 2003). In cases of intoxication, there may be an absence of specific intent to commit a harm to the victim, but the compromised mental state of the defendant may still lead them to commit the harm. The law provides that where the defendant voluntarily consumed intoxicants knowing that this exposes them to risk of commission of harmful acts or omissions, they are to be held culpable for at least the offences of basic intent. This rule, also called as Majewski rule, is discussed below in greater depth.

The law of self-induced intoxication is premised on the logic that if a person takes drugs or other intoxicants knowing that this could make them reckless or free from restraint, then they are criminally liable for their actions when they amount to crimes of basic intent (DPP v Majewski [1977] A.C. 443 , 1977). The line of reasoning taken in Majewski is linked back to Beard’s Case, wherein the Court stated that, where a “specific intent is an essential element in the offence, evidence of a state of drunkenness rendering the accused incapable of forming such an intent should be taken into consideration” for ascertaining whether they had in fact formed such intent (DPP v Beard [1920] AC 479, 1920, p. 499). This has been thought to have led to distinction between specific and basic intent (Loughnan, 2012, p. 185). This distinction has become central to the law of self-induced intoxication as laid down in Majewski because this decision draws a line between specific and basic intent offences by holding that voluntary intoxication can establish that the defendant did not form the requisite mens rea for offences of specific intent, while the defendant can be made culpable for the residual category of offences of ‘basic intent’ (Loughnan, 2012).

Crimes of basic intent require subjective fault, and if the prosecutor is able to establish that the defendant committed the external element or the actus reus, then there cannot be a defence made out by arguing that the defendant acted without the required fault because of self-induced intoxication (DPP v Majewski [1977] A.C. 443 , 1977). On the other hand, defendant will not be held liable for an offence of specific intent if the state of mind required for liability is not established on account of intoxication (Law Commission for England and Wales , 2009, p. 29). What this means is that while there can be a defence of intoxication for crimes of murder and wounding with intent as these are crimes of specific intent, the defendant can still be held liable for the basic intent offences of manslaughter and unlawful wounding underlying these offences and the defence of intoxication will not be available to them (Ashworth, 2006, p. 212).

Thus, the jurisprudence on intoxicated offending has developed so far to prescribe culpability for voluntary intoxication (Loughnan, 2012). This is distinguished from the defences allowed to a person who commits an offence while in a compromised mental state. In Majewski, Lord Edmund-Davies specifically distinguished cases of voluntary intoxication with a situation when the defendant is considered to be free of fault due to onset of a mental state (DPP v Majewski [1977] A.C. 443 , 1977, p. 487). Therefore, at the outset, it may be considered that with respect to fault element, there is a distinction drawn between voluntary intoxication and compromised mental state. In Hardie, Parker LJ explained the rationale for this criminal liability for voluntary intoxication as the idea that the defendant is at fault for becoming intoxicated in the first place (R v Hardie (1985) 80 Cr App R 157, 1985). This does not mean that the fact of self-induced intoxication supplies evidence of mens rea but that the defendant’s voluntarily making themselves dangerous in disregard of public safety, provides the moral equivalence to having the fault element of recklessness (Law Commission for England and Wales , 2009).

In criminal law, blameworthiness is attached to a person who takes an obvious and significant risk of causing injury to another and it is excluded in cases where a person does not perceive such a risk; however, in cases of self-induced intoxication even if the person could not have perceived a risk to another, such blameworthiness is engaged. In Majewski, the court attached such culpability where a person cannot perceive risk due to their state of intoxication because this state is self-induced (DPP v Majewski [1977] A.C. 443 , 1977). This is also clear from the law that does not attach the same culpability to involuntary intoxication, which may occur when the defendant commits a crime under a state of intoxication due to no significant fault of their own, such as when they are forced to take a drug or alcohol or when their food or drinks are laced with drugs; in such cases, the law does not hold the defendant criminally liable for the absence of fault element (Law Commission for England and Wales , 2009). As the fact of intoxication and the fact of absence of perception of risk remains the same in the case of both voluntary and involuntary intoxication, it can be surmised that the attachment of liability in the former situation is based on the premise that the person taking an obvious and significant risk by self-induced intoxication must be considered to be culpable for their crimes.

The justification of the law of induced intoxication has been related to the maintenance of order and keeping violence under control and to ensure greater social control by not allowing defendants to plead intoxication for crimes of basic intent committed by them while in a state of intoxication (Law Commission for England and Wales , 2009). The court has also observed that citizens cannot be left legally unprotected from unprovoked violence by an intoxicated person as this would shock the public and also bring the law into contempt (DPP v Majewski [1977] A.C. 443 , 1977, pp. 476-484). Thus, it can be surmised that behind the law, there is a justification made out in the name of social control and the need to protect citizens from the perverse effects of crimes committed by individuals under self-induced intoxication.

In R v G, the court explained the justification for the law of self-induced intoxication by

contrasting the culpability of a person who knowingly shuts their mind to risk and a person who genuinely does not perceive such risk even though they reasonably should have perceived such risk (R v G and another [2003] UKHL 50, 2003). The court explained that if a person deliberately shuts their mind to the risk, then they ought to be held liable but if a person does not have any such comprehension of such risk, then (barring the case of a self-induced intoxication) such a person is not to be held liable even though they may “fairly be accused of stupidity or lack of imagination” (R v G and another [2003] UKHL 50, 2003, p. 784).

To conclude, the law of self-induced intoxication allows the defendant to use the evidence of intoxication as a defence in specific intent crimes but does not allow them to use this evidence as defence in basic intent crimes. Therefore, the defendant can be convicted of the underlying basic intent crimes in cases involving serious crimes like murder but not the crime of specific intent. Courts do not allow defence of intoxication in basic intent crimes because the purpose of the criminal law is to prevent public and private violence and protect citizens. In some respects, the law is also a way to do social control and not allow defendants to escape criminal liability in cases where they knowingly and voluntarily consumed substances that compromise their sense of reason and expose them to a tendency to take risks and harm others.

PART B

In this problem answer, David’s and Vera’s liability under criminal law is discussed.

David

With regard to injury caused to Charita, the issue is whether David is liable for grievous bodily injury.

Offences against the Person Act (1861) defines grievous bodily injury in Sections 18 and 20. Section 18 is engaged where the defendant causes grievous bodily harm with intent. Section 20 is engaged where the defendant inflicts grievous bodily injury unlawfully or maliciously. There is a requirement of intention or foreseeability of harm which may also include recklessness (R v Cunningham [1957] 2 QB 396, 1957). Grievous bodily harm may be caused directly or by intentionally doing harmful act to the victim (R v Wilson and R v Jenkins [1984] AC 242, 1984). A question may also be whether the defendant is prepared to cause such harm to the victim, which may be ascertained by any words spoken or actions of the defendant that signifies such intent (R v Mohan [1976] QB 1, 1976). In Mohan, the court determined such intention on the part of the defendant as inferred from the ultimate aim or purpose. In this situation, such intention can also be ascertained on the part of David because he threw a bottle in the general direction of Andrew and shouted: ‘go away, we will get you’. Applying Mohan, it can be said that he was prepared to cause such harm to someone and threw a bottle in that direction with the intention to case harm. Therefore, there is presence of intention and foreseeability which is required to ascertain culpability for Sections 18 and 20.

With regard to Barnaby, the issue is whether David is criminally liable for Barnaby’s death. Barnaby was scared from David’s act and shouting, and tried to run away to the other side of the road when an oncoming car ran him over. Barnaby died because he refused a blood transfusion. This can be said to have broken the chain of causation. The liability of the defendant arises only where the act or conduct is factually and legally the cause of the death (R v Taylor [2016] UKSC 5, 2016). Factual causation is established where but for the conduct of the defendant the harm would not have ensued (R v White [1910] 2 KB 124, 1910) and where the original injury is more than a minimal cause of the consequence (R v Hughes [2013] UKSC 56, 2013). The prosecution should be able to establish that at the time of death, the original cause of death was attributable to the defendant’s conduct, and that the operating reason for death is the defendant’s conduct (R v. Miller [1983] 2 A.C. 161, 1983). Miller’s doctrine is applicable where the defendant is the one who caused a chain of harmful events to start, and did not take reasonable steps to mitigate or prevent further harm or damage to the victim (R v. Miller [1983] 2 A.C. 161, 1983). The court has held that there distinction is drawn between conduct that sets the stage for an occurrence and that which brings it about occurrence (Galoo Ltd v Bright Grahame Murray (a firm) [1994] 1 WLR 1360, 1994). Thus, the ‘but for’ test is applied to see whether the chain of causation is broken by an intervening act of the victim done voluntarily (R v Kennedy [2007] UKHL 38, 2007). If the victim makes an informed choice then this is novus actus interveniens that can break the chain of causation (R v Kennedy [2007] UKHL 38, 2007).

Applying the above principles to the present situation, the death of Barnaby cannot be directly attributed to David. Barnaby refused blood transfusion because of what he read in Facebook which can be taken to be an intervening act that breaks the chain of causation. David’s actions are not the immediate cause of death because even though the action done by David started the causation, the actions of Barnaby in refusing the blood transfusion led to the death and broke the chain of causation which started from David’s actions. To conclude, Barnaby may not be responsible for the death of Barnaby.

Vera

With regard to Vera, the issue is whether Vera is liable for manslaughter for Charita’s death. The question of Vera being potentially liable for Charita’s death arises because Charita died after being given the wrong medical drug for a swelling to the brain. Vera treated this with a standard medical drug and Charita being allergic to the drug died three days later.

A person can be held guilty of involuntary manslaughter even if death is unforeseen and unintended if they commit an unlawful action that is likely to harm another person (R v Creamer [1966] 1 QB 72, 1966). Involuntary manslaughter can occur if the defendant is at fault in committing a minor criminal act that may lead to death (R v Creamer [1966] 1 QB 72, 1966). There are four elements for the determination of involuntary manslaughter: intentional act, unlawful act, realisation of reasonable risk of physical harm, leading to death (R v Goodfellow (1986) 83 Cr App R 23, 1986). There must be an intention to commit the offence (R v Mohan [1976] QB 1, 1976). The defendant should understand that the outcome is a certainty (R v Woollin [1999] 1 AC 82, 1999). However, there should also be a base unlawful offence intentionally committed by the defendant (R v Lamb [1967] 2 QB 981, 1967). To be clear, the defendant should have intended to commit an unlawful act, even if without any foreseeability of death to be guilty of involuntary manslaughter (DPP v Newbury and Jones [1976] AC 500, 1976). In this situation, Vera did not commit a baseline unlawful act intentionally, therefore, the involuntary manslaughter cannot be applied to her.

With regard to Vera being a doctor, whether there is liability for manslaughter due to accidental or negligent action is also open to question. In R v Webb, the court held that accidental mistake in treatment by a doctor with competent degree of skill and knowledge does not lead to manslaughter (R v Webb (1834) 2 Lew CC 196, 1834). In R v Adomako, the court laid down a four stage test for establishing gross negligence manslaughter (R v Adomako [1994] 3 WLR 288, 1994). The first stage relates to asking the question whether there is existence of a duty of care by the doctor to the victim. The second stage is ascertaining whether there is breach of this duty of care. The third stage relates to identifying the causation or link between breach of duty and death. The fourth stage relates to ascertaining whether there was gross negligence on the part of the doctor, meaning whether the conduct of the doctor was so bad that it would amount to criminal act or omission. In Adomako, the court explained the last point as ascertainment of whether the doctor acted in the way that shows that they were indifferent to an obvious risk of injury, or had actual foresight of risk but were determined to run that risk anyway, and there was a high degree of negligence in attempted avoidance of the risk (R v Adomako [1994] 3 WLR 288, 1994). It may be admitted that

establishing this last point requires determination of high and gross degree of negligence on the part of the doctor. In a more recent case, R v Rose, the court had s confirmed that in order to be potentially liable, the doctor must be able to foresee a serious risk of death or that such risk must be obvious to the doctor ( R v Rose [2017] EWCA Crim 1168 , 2017). This leads to the consequence that in cases where a serious risk of death is not immediately obvious, then negligently failing to assess such risk does not lead to gross negligence manslaughter (Mullock, 2018).

In the present situation, Charita’s death was due to wrong medical drug for a swelling to the brain. However, this was a standard medical drug. Vera could argue that being a standard treatment for brain swelling, she was not negligent in giving this drug to Charita. However, the prosecution may argue that it was negligent to give this drug without ascertaining whether Charita was allergic to the drug. The question is whether negligence amounted to gross negligence manslaughter for which perception of a serious risk of death and a negligent or deliberate running of the risk has to be established. This is not the case here because there is no such potential risk of death perceived here. Therefore, it may be difficult to establish Vera’s liability for gross negligent manslaughter in this case.

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Bibliography

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R v Creamer [1966] 1 QB 72 (1966).

R v Cunningham [1957] 2 QB 396 (1957).

R v Goodfellow (1986) 83 Cr App R 23 (1986).

R v G and another [2003] UKHL 50 (2003).

R v Hardie (1985) 80 Cr App R 157 (1985).

R v Hughes [2013] UKSC 56 (2013).

R v Kennedy [2007] UKHL 38 (2007).

R v Lamb [1967] 2 QB 981 (1967).

R v. Miller [1983] 2 A.C. 161 (1983).

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R v Rose [2017] EWCA Crim 1168 (2017).

R v Taylor [2016] UKSC 5 (2016).

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