Criminal Liability And Defenses Dawn And Rhonson

Introduction

This essay advises Dawn and Rhonson for their potential criminal liability for the deaths of, respectably, Vik and Matteo. The essay also discusses any defences they Dawn and Rhonson may have.

Dawn

The issue with respect to Dawn is whether she is liable for murder or manslaughter of Vik. The criminal law related to murder and manslaughter is applicable in this situation. Murder is defined as the unlawful killing of another human being with malice afterthought (Morris & Blom-Cooper, 2011, p. 105). Therefore, two elements need to be established for proving the offence of murder: the first is the actus reus element, which is formed by the causing of the death of another human being; and the second is the mens rea element, which relates to the mental or fault element (Morris & Blom-Cooper, 2011). For both murder and manslaughter, the actus reus remains the same; however, the difference is in the mens rea which can distinguish murder from manslaughter (R v West (1848) 2 Cox CC 500, 1848). The defendant will be liable for murder or manslaughter depending on the corresponding fault element for the two offences (Attorney General Reference (No 3 of 1994) [1997] 3 WLR 421., 1997). Fault elements for murder are intention to kill or cause grievous bodily harm likely to cause death. If the defendant did not have the intention to kill, liability for manslaughter can be made out; this is relevant if the death was caused by negligence of the defendant or was the result of an unintentional killing (Attorney General Reference (No 3 of 1994) [1997] 3 WLR 421., 1997).

In the case of murder, the specific defences that can be pleaded by the defendant can include complete defence where the liability of murder is not made out at all; this includes the defences of automatism or where the defendant was acting in self-defence. Defence can also be in the form of partial defence, where the responsibility of the defendant for the murder can be diminished responsibility; this includes the loss of control of the defendant (Ashworth & Horder, 2013, p. 194). Thus, where the defendant has killed with the intent for murder but loss of control can be proved, then diminished responsibility can be argued as a defence under Section 52 of the Coroners and Justice Act 2009. Diminished responsibility can be argued in cases where the defendant has abnormal mental function which may account for the loss of control (R v Byrne [1960] 2 QB 396, 1960). In order to establish loss of control and diminished responsibility, the defendant would have to show that their ability to control their physical actions was compromised and they were unable to act as per rational judgement (R v Byrne [1960] 2 QB 396, 1960).

Considering the facts of the case, which indicate that Dawn is afflicted with an inoperable brain tumour, which according to her doctors, lead her to act impulsively, Dawn may argue that she did not act with an intention to kill Vik and that when Vik pushed her, she lost her control because of her mental condition. Therefore, the offence of murder is not made out because mens rea element is missing. However, the prosecutor may still push for a manslaughter offence as she did grab the metal chain-link lock out of Vik’s hands and hit him repeatedly over the head causing him to die. Therefore, the actus reus element is present. Dawn may take a defence of diminished responsibility under Section 52 of the Coroners and Justice Act 2009, which would allow for reduced liability for loss of control due to inoperable brain tumour.

Rhonson

The issue with respect to Rhonson is whether he is liable for murder of Mateo. The criminal law related to murder as well as the defences of insanity and automatism are discussed to advice Rhonson.

For establishing the offence of murder, both actus reus and mens rea are necessary (Morris & Blom-Cooper, 2011). Mens rea includes specific fault elements like an intention to kill, or an intention to cause grievous bodily harm (Ashworth & Horder, 2013). The defendant should have an intention to cause the death of the victim in order for the specific intention of murder to be established.

Insanity and automatism are two defences that can be used to absolve the defendant from their liability. Automatism can be characterised as 'non-insane automatism' and 'insane automatism', the latter being caused by mental illness, or 'disease of the mind' as per M’Naughten standard, which was established under the common law to allow the defendant to escape criminal responsibility for acts that occurr as a result of mental disease making the defendant incapable of understanding the wrongful conduct (M’Naghten's Case [1843] All ER Rep 229, 1843). Non-insane automatism is due to some factor that is external to the mind of the defendant meaning that the defendant has a normal mind but was temporarily affected by some external factor, such as a concussion.

Insanity automatism is a defence that relates to the insanity of the defendant, which may lead to the criminal behaviour. In one case, sleepwalking was held to be a form of insane automatism, which would be a defence to the offence of murder (R v Burgess [1991] 2 QB 92 , 1991). The facts of that case are similar to the facts involving Rhonson as the defendant killed his friend during an event of sleepwalking. Automatism relates to a condition wherein the defendant can be unaware of their actions that may lead to the illegal act (Hill v Baxter [1958] 1 QB 277, 1958). Sleepwalking can constitute automatism as explained by Lord Denning as follows:

Thus, a defendant may be allowed defence of automatism when they have committed a crime while sleepwalking. In such situations, the courts will not punish the defendant for the offence. Courts have allowed defendants to escape from criminal liability under automatism, even where actus reus is established because there is a lack of intention (Regina v. Harrison-Owen, 2 All E.R. 726 (Crim. App. 1951), 1951). In one case, the defence of automatism was allowed for the offence of burglary because the defendant was acting in a state of automatism (Regina v. Harrison-Owen, 2 All E.R. 726 (Crim. App. 1951), 1951). In an Australian case, the defendant was convicted of causing death by dangerous driving when he fell asleep whilst driving a truck, but the Court of Criminal Appeal (SA) held as the accused was deprived of voluntariness by automatism due to sleeping, he was not liable (Kroon v R (1990) 52 A Crim R 15, 1990). If there is evidence of a blackout, or sleepwalking, then the court may find that the automatism defence is established (Hill v Baxter [1958] 1 QB 277, 1958). For the purpose of establishing automatism, the defendant has to prove that he acted involuntarily, where such involuntariness may be a result of an internal condition. The underlying and important fact is that the defendant is unable to control their behaviour due to the condition (Attorney General Reference (No 3 of 1994) [1997] 3 WLR 421., 1997).

The facts of the case show that Rhonson skid on the wet road while riding his bicycle home from work in the rain, which caused him to black out for a few seconds. He may have suffered a concussion. At night while sleepwalking Rhonson, used his hockey stick to hit Matteo repeatedly over the head, which caused the latter’s death. Rhonson also has no memory of the event and the doctors believe concussion may have contributed to the violent episode. Applying the principles discussed in this essay, two approaches are possible to the defence; it can be argued that Rhonson did not act voluntarily and that his actions were a result of an internal mental condition that can be characterised as insanity automatism if the sleepwalking is taken as the reason for the commission of the offence. Then, he will not liable for the murder of Mateo but will be subject to a court order for institutionalization as the condition that led to the crime can reoccur (R v Burgess [1991] 2 QB 92 , 1991). If the defence of non-insane automatism is taken on the basis of concussion, then again he will not liable for the murder of Mateo and will not be subject to a court order for institutionalization as the reasons are external to him.

Conclusion

Dawn may take a defence of diminished responsibility under Section 52 of the Coroners and Justice Act 2009, which would allow for reduced liability for manslaughter due to loss of control due to inoperable brain tumour. Rhonson may take the defence of noninsane automatism caused by the external factor of a concussion. This will give him complete defence from the offence of murder.

Bibliography

• Ashworth, A. & Horder, J., 2013. Principles of criminal law. Oxon:Oxford University Press. Attorney General Reference (No 3 of 1994) [1997] 3 WLR 421. (1997).
• Bratty v Attorney-General of Northern Ireland [1963] AC 386 (HL) (1963).
• Hill v Baxter [1958] 1 QB 277 (1958).
• Kroon v R (1990) 52 A Crim R 15 (1990).
• M’Naghten's Case [1843] All ER Rep 229 (1843).
• Morris, T. & Blom-Cooper, L., 2011. Fine Lines and Distinctions: Murder, Manslaughter and the Unlawful Taking of Human Life. Waterside Press .
• R v Byrne [1960] 2 QB 396 (1960).
• R v Burgess [1991] 2 QB 92 (1991).
• R v West (1848) 2 Cox CC 500 (1848).