Exploring the Case for Physician-Assisted Suicide

Introduction

It should be noted that before 1 February 2010, the law regarding assisted suicide was categorized into two offences. In this regard, the first was a substantive offence, as indicated in Suicide Act 1961, s. 2, which was concerned with aiding, counselling, abetting, or even procuring/attempting suicide. In order to be considered that that offence is indeed committed, there ought to be an intention of aiding, counselling, abetting, or even procuring an actual suicide or attempted suicide, or there was an encouragement by the defendant’s action to actually commit suicide or even attempt it. On the other hand, the second offence posed as an offence, which was pursuant to Criminal Attempts Act 1981, section 1 (1) of attempting to aid, counsel, abet, or even procure suicide or suicide attempt. For students seeking clarity on such legal intricacies, seeking law dissertation help can offer the most valuable insights and guidance. In order for an offence to have been committed as stipulated under the Criminal Attempts Act 1981, it should be noted that the defendant must have committed an act that was merely preparatory towards aiding, abetting, counselling or even procuring suicide or even suicide attempt, yet no suicide or attempt to suicide was required for committing the offence. It is clear that substantive criminal law does not make any difference between a malevolent and benevolent intention. As such, regardless of an intention, which a person helping another in ending their lives has, they are open to prosecution, which may bring forth a possibility of a 14-year imprisonment in maximum. Precisely, this paper purposes to determine whether Suicide Act 1961, s. 2, should be reformed, to allow physician assisted suicide. In this regard, the paper will first provide the position of this issue in law. Thereafter, it will determine whether it is necessary for Suicide Act 1961, s. 2, to be upheld or reformed.

Position in law

The Coroner and Justice Act (2009), section 59 that came into effect on 1 February 2010 purposed to simplify the existing law through replacing the aforementioned offences by a

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1. Curtice, M., & Field, C. (2010). Assisted suicide and human rights in the UK. The Psychiatrist, 34(5), 187-190.

single offence. It is evident that it covers a significant behavior, which has initially been caught by the Suicide Act 1961, s. 2 and the offence stipulated in the Criminal Attempts Act (1981), which significantly fails to apply to the offence in the 58th paragraph of section 21 of the Coroners and Justice Act (2009). Additionally, it is evident that in accordance with the recommendations of the Law Commission, the wordings of the offence have been changed, thus making it more it easily accessible to the public. Notably, section 59 (2) is applicable in an instance where a person (physician) acts in a way that is capable of assisting or even encouraging another person towards committing or attempting to commit suicide. Notably, as stipulated in Suicide Act, s. 2(4) no offence prosecution for an offence as provided in section 2 (1) can be brought forth, except with or even by the approval of the Director of Public Prosecution (DPP). The ruling of the House of Lords In the case of R v DPP, it is notable that the DPP was needed to give out an offence specific policy that identified facts, and also circumstances that would be taken into account whilst deciding to give consent to a given prosecution that has been brought forth under the Suicide Act 1961

Clearly, in accordance with the policy, a prosecution would normally be followed and this would be otherwise only if the prosecutor were certain that public interest factors, which are against prosecution purpose to outweigh those that are in favor. It is significant that the policy is concerned with public interest factors that are against or for prosecution. As such, there exist 16 factors, which are in favor of prosecution and 6, which are against. In this regard, of the factors that are in favor, 8 relate to victim vulnerability, whilst others are concerned with unscrupulous defendants that include where defendants had been action in a given professional capacity, and such professionals include either doctors or nurses. It should be

2. Griffith, R., & Tengnah, C. (2009). Assisted suicide: increased support for a change in the law. British journal of community nursing, 14(8), 356-362.
3. Powell, D. (2009). Assisting Suicide and the Discretion to Prosecute Revisited: R (on the Application of Purdy) v DPP [2009] UKHL 45. The Journal of Criminal Law, 73(6), 475-479.

noted that factors, which act against prosecution often relate to the victim’s autonomy, which depicts that the victim had arrived at a voluntary, clear and also a settled informed decision that focuses on committing suicide. On the other hand, the other factors do relate directly to the defendants and their motivations, whilst considering whether they had been motivated wholly by compassion.

Evidently, one of the significant principal theme, which emerged, whilst putting into consideration, the aspect of public consultation, was concerned with various factors that are victim-based against prosecution. A good example is inter alia, which is whether a victim (patient) had a fatal illness, or had attempted to commit suicide previously. In this regard, it can be deduced that the attributes or behaviors of the victim ought not to be considered to be matters that the public was to regard as influential to the decision-making process. In itself, it causes some difficulty, owing to the opinion that the only mitigating factor, which is victim-related that stands is for the fact that the victim significantly arrived at a voluntary, clear, informed, and also settled decision on committing suicide. However, it is clear that there exists no guidance on how this ought to be established. Notably, some mitigating factors that are victim-related mitigating had been omitted from the ultimate policy when they have been taken cumulatively could significantly help in finding out whether a victim had purposed to achieve the above criteria. For instance, in an instance where it is not relevant individually, clearly, the fact that a person is suffering from a fatal illness and had initially attempted suicide and is as such, assisted by a physician may be regarded as an act of helping in demonstrating that the victim had significantly made a voluntary, settled, clear, and also informed decision. Notably, the difficulty can as well arise when determining whether the defendant had acted wholly and out of compassion. Finally, some other factor when taken

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4. Clarke, R. V. (2017). Suicide: closing the exits. Routledge.
5. Draghici, C. (2015). The Blanket Ban on Assisted Suicide: Between Moral Paternalism and Utilitarian Justice. European Human Rights Law Review, (3), 285-295.

cumulatively could assist in providing evidence. However, there is no clarity from the policy on exactly what such kind of factors would be, and as well the weight, which those factors attribute, in order to be considered to be relevant. It is significant noting that it is difficult for prosecutorial public interest guidelines to be accessible and also clear, owing to the fact that the clarity could result in over simplification and also a significant reduction of the a concept to a significant single line, where a provision of a more detailed explanation could be of great significance. In this regard, it is evident that lack of clarity depicted in the policy implies that there would be more reliance on the DPP discretion, and this may result into public confusion. Overall, it should be noted that the appropriateness of factors, which need to be considered whilst determining whether to prosecute physicians or not of their actions in accordance with Suicide Act 1961, s. 2, is vital on to the confidence that the public is capable of having in their prosecutors.

Reasons for the law to be upheld

Owing to the conclusion that though the policy assists in providing clarification of when prosecution ought to be brought forth in cases involving assisted suicide by individuals such as physicians, it is evident that there are still some areas that require more clarification and as such, this may result into legal challenges. It is then necessary considering whether the existing law (Suicide Act 1961, s. 2,) requires a comprehensive reform.

It is evident that the policy fails to be applicable to euthanasia, and as such, it is only specific to cases that involve assisted suicide. Although, there exist other cases, which are hover ambiguous, and thus, lie on the borderline between murder and assisted suicide. Clearly, the

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6. Mishara, B. L., & Weisstub, D. N. (2016). The legal status of suicide: A global review. International journal of law and psychiatry, 44, 54-74.
7. O'Sullivan, C. (2015). Mens rea, motive and assisted suicide: does the DPP's Policy go too far?. Legal Studies, 35(1), 96-113.

law existing in this sector is noted to be a hit and miss, as it focuses on controversial areas involving life and death. This is owing to the opinion that there is a lot of discretion held by the Crown Prosecution Service (CPS). As such, by reforming the law, in order to allow voluntary euthanasia, in line with clear, as well as rigorous safeguards, it is worth noting that the absence of clarity would significantly be improved. Notably, a survey that YouGov conducted in the year 2008, which purposed to survey 2000 individuals indicated that 70 per cent of the individuals had the opinion that the law ought to be changed. Moreover, 60 per cent of them indicated that they would prefer assisted suicide for themselves in case they were suffering from a fatal or terminal illness.

This paper is of the opinion that Suicide Act 1961, s. 2, should be upheld and not reformed. Lord Lane provided his rationale for offences that resulted owing to assisted suicide and thus, noted that the parliament had put into consideration, the potential scope for malpractice, as well as disaster, especially in circumstances where individuals involved are elderly, inform and even easily suggestible people would wish themselves dead as presented in R v Hough (1984). In this regard, the House of the Lords made it clear that changes in this law would be open to misuse, in an instance where Suicide Act 1961, s. 2, could be reformed to permit physician assisted suicide. It is also evident that as Claire Ward, provided in the House of Common’s debate, in relation to assisted suicide, they noted that many of the individuals opposing changes that have been made to the law are concerned, for a fact that the changes may weaken the aspect of law protection, especially to vulnerable individuals in the society. In this regard, they had the belief that no significant safeguards, which are stringent, would ever purpose to eliminate all the existing possibilities that vulnerable individuals in the society could feel the pressure, be it real or imagined to put an end to their lives by the aid of physicians. They also made it clear that the existing criteria for permitting assistance, as well as safeguards towards the protection of vulnerable individuals could easily be manipulated, in order to fit various circumstances as required.

The law should not be reformed, based on religious, as well as moral reasons, which dictates that it is wrong for physicians to assist other people in taking their lives. Notably, such similar beliefs systems often lead many people into believing that abortion cannot be justified or the opinion that suicide ought to be to be treated as immoral, or illegal, and thus, equivalent to murder. It is evident that these kind of individuals can never welcome any form of reform to the section 2 of the Suicide Act 1961, even when much pressure has been put to stress that the law on assisted suicide in unprincipled and as such needs reform. It should be noted that dignity defines what being human is, as it defines the individual autonomy depth throughout life and at death most certainly. In this regard, usurping a mentally competent and incurably the ability of ill individuals to make suicide decisions and aiding them to perform the act s like a violation of the fundamental rights of the individual to exercise human dignity, even in an instance where the individual consented to it.

Moreover, it is worth noting that Suicide Act 1961, s. 2, should not be reformed, owing to the opinion that killing, or helping die, or even letting die is a concept that lacks a legal logic. In this regard, the need of upholding the principle that aiding another person to commit suicide, even when they give their consent and when it is in their best interest cannot be justified in any way. This is owing to the fact that it makes the law to abandon its consistence, especially when faces with some difficult medical facts, and this is profoundly unprincipled.

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8. ibid
9. Chalmers, J. (2010). Assisted suicide: jurisdiction and discretion. Edinburgh L. Rev., 14, 295.
10. ibid

Much significance should also be laid on the fact that courts are incapable to make the reform in Suicide Act 1961, s. 2 (1), as effective as required. Significantly, it is evident that the application of the basic principles, which is the fact that the parliament makes the law whilst courts are obligated to merely interpret them and also apply them implies that any attempt driven towards attacking the core statue principles in courts is bound to fail. Moreover, it is a fact that courts have constitutionally become unable to make significant changes, which are required in bringing the law to be in line with morals, as well as legal principles, which serve towards illustrating the need for the parliament in taking necessary and significant steps towards reforming the law.



Conclusion

Based on the provisions above, it is worth noting that whether the law (Suicide Act 1961, s. 2) regarding assisted suicide needs reform direly, it continues to be one of the most debatable legal issues. This is owing to the fact that there are individuals who believe firmly that people should be granted the right to die, and also to be assisted in committing suicide by physicians without having the fear of their physicians being prosecuted. On the other hand, there are other individuals who have the belief that if the law is reformed, there would be no sufficient safeguards, which would significantly be strong enough in protecting the elderly, as well as well infirm from certain unscrupulous defendants. Notably, it is then arguable that the guideline, which the DPP provides leave many unanswered questions, which may consequently bring forth a legal challenge. However, it is evident that the policy dictates clearly that it does not in any way decriminalize the offence of assisting people in committing suicide. Moreover, it hopes to provide a clarification on instances when prosecution is suitable and also ensures that the existing law has a stand and serves its primary purpose in

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11. ibid

terms of protecting the elderly whilst providing significant deterrent to the individuals seeking to manipulate various individuals in the society.

Bibliography

Chalmers, J. (2010). Assisted suicide: jurisdiction and discretion. Edinburgh L. Rev., 14, 295.

Clarke, R. V. (2017). Suicide: closing the exits. Routledge.

Curtice, M., & Field, C. (2010). Assisted suicide and human rights in the UK. The Psychiatrist, 34(5), 187-190.

Draghici, C. (2015). The Blanket Ban on Assisted Suicide: Between Moral Paternalism and Utilitarian Justice. European Human Rights Law Review, (3), 285-295.

Griffith, R., & Tengnah, C. (2009). Assisted suicide: increased support for a change in the law. British journal of community nursing, 14(8), 356-362.

Mishara, B. L., & Weisstub, D. N. (2016). The legal status of suicide: A global review. International journal of law and psychiatry, 44, 54-74.

O'Sullivan, C. (2015). Mens rea, motive and assisted suicide: does the DPP's Policy go too far?. Legal Studies, 35(1), 96-113.

Powell, D. (2009). Assisting Suicide and the Discretion to Prosecute Revisited: R (on the Application of Purdy) v DPP [2009] UKHL 45. The Journal of Criminal Law, 73(6), 475-479.