Housing Authority's Duty Under the Housing Act 1996

Housing Authority's Duty Under the Housing Act

The Housing Act 1996 provides that a housing authority has the duty to provide accommodation to Mark if Mark is eligible (s189B(1)(b)), homeless (s189B(1)(a)), in priority (s189) need and not intentionally homeless (s193).

In this respect, this advice is for Mark in order to determine whether or not he is homeless and is eligible to access housing care by the local authorities.

• Whether Mark is homeless and eligible for housing assistance?

The first issue is to determine whether or not Mark is homeless.

A homeless person is a person who has no accommodation for his occupation, even where he is entitled to occupy.

If the person cannot secure to enter his own accommodation or it is not reasonable for him to occupy the accommodation, he is rendered homeless.

Even where he has a moveable accommodation designed for habitation, if he does not have a place to park it and reside in it, he is rendered homeless.

If he is threatened to become homeless in 28 days’ time, he is considered to be threatened with homelessness.

Given the circumstances of Mark, he does not have any of the accommodation as provided above. He has one week of stay in his parents’ house and hence, Mark is homeless or threatened with homeless, according to the Act of 1996.

The issue of homelessness is multi-faceted and it encompasses a wide range of experiences, including rough sleeping, hidden homelessness where people sleep in night shelters and unstable arrangements such as sofa-surfing with family and friends. Hidden homelessness is also homelessness. It is characterised by shared and concealed households.

Mark has undergone such experiences from the age between 16 and 23, where he had no permanent address, lived in squats, slept rough and sometimes stayed with friends in unstable arrangements, such as when he stayed in with Annie in her living room.



In the current case, Mark has one week time to stay at his parents’ house. The local authority will consider such future event that may impact upon the determination of whether or not it is reasonable for Mark to continue to occupy and whether or not he is homeless. If there is no reasonable means to continue to occupy, the local authority must consider the duration of the short term that would be reasonable for the applicant to continue to occupy.

The local authority, given this future event, must note that Mark cannot reasonably continue, or has no reasons to continue occupying his parents’ house.

If the accommodation is not reasonable for him to occupy, it cannot be suitable for him. In this case, Mark does not have any licence to stay at his parents’ house. Further, considering the history of his parents’ problem with drinking that affected him and made him moved out of the house, that house cannot be considered suitable for Mark to stay.

Given the laws and the circumstance, Mark is a homeless person and is eligible for housing assistance.

• Whether Mark has priority need?

Mark must have a priority need in order that the local housing authority provides him accommodation.

Section 189 of the Housing Act 1996 provides for certain conditions to be met to be in priority need for accommodation. Mark’s situations must meet ‘other special reason’ as provided in s189(c).

In relevance, Mark must pass the single composite test of institutional reasons as provided by the Homelessness (Priority Need for Accommodation) Order 2002. He is vulnerable due to institutional backgrounds. He is over 21 now, and is in a vulnerable position as he has been looked after, accommodated or fostered. This is supported by the fact that since the age of 11 until 16, he had spent his life in a series of foster care placements and in residential care.

It could also be argued that Mark could be vulnerable, but he could still ‘fend for himself’. This reason was given by the local authority. However, according to the Court of Appeal ruling in R v Camden LBC, for claiming vulnerability, Mark must have lesser ability to fend for himself than an ordinary homeless person in case of homelessness. He will not be able to fend for himself in case of an injury or detriment to him like a less vulnerable man who could cope without harmful effects.

In relevance, it must be noted that the local authorities can act as ‘gate-keepers’ and give a narrow definition of vulnerability. They may employ such definition, in context to social rented stock that is under extreme pressure, so as to limit their responsibility towards people they owe duty. In that context, the justification seems to be driven by this rationale and not by a legal rationale as what the Supreme Court held.

The court held that vulnerability is a comparative concept. It must be determined comparing the situation and ability of the claimants such as Mark and ordinary homeless person. Mark must be more vulnerable than the average ordinary homeless person.

Whether or not Mark is vulnerable would be determined by the extent of his ability to cope with homelessness and if his ability would be less than that of an ordinary person that would result in injury or detriment to Mark.

Based on the ruling of Lord Neuberger in Panayiotou v Waltham Forest LBC, Mark must be ‘significantly more vulnerable than ordinarily vulnerable’ to be rendered homeless. In Panayiotou, the court held that it is a qualitative test whether an applicant is significantly more vulnerable. Based on the ruling, if Mark is made homeless, the consequence would put him to suffer or risk suffering harm or detriment, which would otherwise not be if an ordinary person was made homeless.

The ruling in R v Kensington and Chelsea RLBC Ex p. Amarfio upheld the claim of vulnerability, arising from the claimants’ complete absence of resources, under ‘other special reason’.

In the current case, the local authority denied priority need of Mark by stating that his ability to take medication means that he would be able to fend for himself. It cited the case of Guiste v Lambeth LBC, where it was held that every person taking medication cannot be straightforwardly treated as in priority need.

It must be noted that medication, and particularly the dosage has been used as an assessment tool for vulnerability. Such assessment should be objective and be supported by medical assessment evidence.

In Mark’s case, his record of previous drug use had severely affected his health that he has to takes daily medication to support his liver and kidney functions. In this light, an objective medical assessment would demonstrate that his condition is severe. This will further demonstrate that he would be significantly more vulnerable than an ordinary homeless person exposing him to suffer or risk suffering harm or detriment.

• Whether or not Mark is not intentionally homeless?

In the current case, it needs to be determined whether or not Mark is intentionally homeless.

According to Section 191 of the Housing Act 1996, Mark would be intentionally homeless if he deliberately did or failed to do anything because of which Mark ceased to occupy an available accommodation and it would have been reasonable for Mark to continue to occupy.

The test here is not whether the homelessness was deliberate. It is whether Mark had done a deliberate act or omission, which led or caused him to be homelessness. In Wandsworth LBC, the Court of Appeal held that the local authority must not refuse housing to a homeless person if they are not able to make ends meet.

In context to the fact of the case, Mark’s act of stealing the money from Annie could be considered a deliberate act. When he turned 23, he got the support of a local charity that enabled him moved into a private. He was taking medication and lived in tenancy for a year in that flat until he moved in with Annie. His act of stealing money and then moving in with his parents is a sign of being desperate, which may be because of not being able to meet ends meet. The act of stealing money from Annie led him lose his accommodation with Annie. This is the causal link between the act and homelessness. This shows that he is not able to meet ends.

Homelessness is caused by reasons, including the ending of an Assured Shorthold Tenancy, where tenancies are for an initial fixed term of six or twelve months. The landlord can choose whether or not to renew at the end of the fixed term. They can evict tenants by issuing ‘no fault’ possession notice. In Mark’s case, he was made to leave the private rented sector by the landlord after a year of stay.

It must also be determined whether or not Mark had reasonable living expenses. In the case of Samuels (Appellant) v Birmingham City Council (Respondent), the Supreme Court addressed this question. It conducted an objective assessment of Article 2 of the Homelessness (Suitability of Accommodation) Order 1996, which provides that the local authority must take into account whether or not an accommodation is affordable.

Accordingly, it must consider Mark’s financial resources, including his social security benefits, and his other reasonable living expenses.

According to paragraph 17.40 of the Homelessness Code of Guidance for Local Authorities 2006, if Mark’s residual income after the costs of accommodation would be lesser than the income support allowance, his accommodation would not be considered affordable. Such situation was seen in the case of Samuels v Birmingham City Council where it was held that it was not reasonable for the claimant to continue to occupy the property as it was not affordable because of a shortfall between the rent and the housing benefit per month.

• Whether Mark has a prospect of success?

Mark has a good chance to succeed. Based on UK Housing Act 1996, s175, he is a homeless person. He has experienced all the kinds of homelessness. He is in a threatened homelessness now as his stay in his parents’ house is for a week after which he does not have any place to move in.

Mark is in priority need of accommodation. His condition comes under ‘other sufficient reason’ under Section 189 of the Housing Act 1996. His priority need is based on the fact that he is vulnerable due to institutional backgrounds and based on Panayiotou, Mark is ‘significantly more vulnerable than the other ordinarily vulnerable homeless people.

His claim of vulnerability could also be supported if he demonstrates that his financial resource of sustenance has run out. Further, his severe health problem due to which he takes daily medication also supports his claim for vulnerability, which makes his need for accommodation priority.

In regard to the local authority reasoning that stealing the money from Annie supports their view of intentional homelessness, it was a deliberate act that caused him to lose the accommodation. This is an evidence of his inability to make ends meet, as based on Wandsworth, the local authority cannot refuse him a housing.

Further, the end of the shorthold tenancy in private rented sector was caused by the landlord and not by him. This led him to move in with Annie. In that regard considering the issue of affordability, if his financial resources or income support allowance cannot meet the accommodation costs, he cannot afford.



The Homelessness Reduction Act 2017 imposes duties on local authorities to provide homelessness services to all persons those in ‘priority need’ and also those affected.

Hence, it will be hard to see on what basis the local authority would up held their decision when Mark is eligible for housing assistance, homeless, in priority need and not intentionally homeless.

Bibliography

Legislation

The Housing Act 1996

The Homelessness (Priority Need for Accommodation) Order 2002

The Homelessness Reduction Act 2017

Cases

Ali v Birmingham City Council CA, Bailii, [2009] EWCA Civ 1279
Guiste v Lambeth LBC (2019) WECA Civ 1758
Hotak v Southwark LBC [2015] UKSC 30
Panayiotou v London Borough of Waltham Fores (2017) EWCA Civ 1624
R. v Camden LBC Ex p. Pereira (1999) 31 H.L.R. 317
R v Camden LBC, ex p Pereira (1998) 31 HLR 317, CA
R v Kensington and Chelsea RLBC Ex p. Amarfio [1995] 2 F.C.R. 787; (1995) 27 H.L.R. 543
R v Wandsworth LBC, ex p Hawthorne (1994) 27 HLR 59
Safi v Sandwell MBC [2018] EWCA Civ 2876
Samuels (Appellant) v Birmingham City Council (Respondent) [2019] UKSC 28

Books

James Cartwright and Lígia Teixeira, Using Evidence to End Homelessness (Policy Press 2020)

Journals

Bretherton J, Caroline Hunter and Sarah Johnsen, ‘You can judge them on how they look…’:
Homelessness Officers, Medical Evidence and Decision-Making in England’ (2013) 7(1)
European Journal of Homelessness accessed 
https://core.ac.uk/download/pdf/287531153.pdf accessed 17 February 2021
Loveland I, ‘Affordability and intentional homelessness: Terryann Samuels and Birmingham 
CC [2015] EWCA Civ 1051.’ (2016) 2 The Conveyancer and Property Lawyer 146-157

Reports

Fitzpatrick S et al, ‘The homelessness monitor: England 2013’ (2013) The homelessness monitor
https://www.crisis.org.uk/media/237040/the_homelessness_monitor_england_2013.pdf
accessed 17 February 2021
The House of Commons Communities and Local Government Committee, ‘Homelessness’
Third Report of Session 2016–17 
https://publications.parliament.uk/pa/cm201617/cmselect/cmcomloc/40/40.pdf
accessed 17 February 2021.