Statutory Powers of Entry, Search, and Seizure

Q. 2

The statutory duty of a police constable to enter, search and seizure is given under the provisions of PACE, 1984 as it has been recently amended by the Serious Organized Crime and Police Act, 2005. According to such statutory duties as has been ensured under this Act, the police administration of the United Kingdom has the power to enter and search a property if the action has been justified for the purpose of attaining peace and the same act is subjected to several other subclauses as well under the PACE, 1984 as amended by the 2005 Act herein.

However, the power is not absolute in nature and for the purpose of justifying an act of ‘enter and search’, a Police Constable is needed to provide a special reference as to whether he had an implied license to enter a property or not. As it has been mentioned under the famous case of Halliday v Nevill, for the purpose of assuming an implied license, a particular person or persons must have a legitimate purpose herein. In the case of Wiltshire v DPP, it was held that as suspected accused were hiding in a private property, it can be said that under the PACE, 1984, the Police Constable had the implied license to enter the property and a search warrant was not needed as well. Hence, in order to deal with an actual or assumed breach of peace as mentioned under the PACE, 1984, it was the duty of the police constable to have the implied power to enter a property. In the case of McLeod v Metropolitan Police Commissioner, it was held by the courts that a for the purpose of applying the power of entering and searching a premises, the police administration must show that there has been an apprehension of breach of peace under the ground mentioned in section 8 of the PACE, 1984. Prima facie, it can be said that the police can assume the power of ‘entry, search and seizure’ under the clauses and subclauses of section 8 of the PACE, 1984, given that there has been an apprehension of breach of peace.

a. In the first scenario herein, PCs Cribb and Thackary have been sent to an address which was reported by the neighbor and it was alleged that screaming and shouting was coming inside of the house. When the owner of the property resisted the PCs from entering, the police constables assumed an implied license and entered the house premises. Herein, the question remains whether the reports made by the neighbor was of enough evidence to understand and apprehend the nature of the breach of peace and as the owner of the property had answered and explained the reasons for the neighbor’s complaints, the police had no reasonable apprehension to force an entry into the property as when they reached the scene, they did not hear any screaming an shouting of any nature. From the limited fact that has been presented in the given case, it can be said that if the Police Constables had the immediate and reasonable belief that an offence has been committed on the very premises which is arrestable under the PACE, 1984 and from the neighbor’s complaints it was clear that a human life might be in danger as well. Also, from the limited fact herein, the sister who was mentioned by the owner was not called at the door to confirm the situation of the house and had the PCs asked for the occupant’s sister to come at the door and confirm the situation therein and the occupant denied to do so, the PCs can apply their power of implied license and assume that an offence of arrestable nature might have been committed against a human body and they could search the premises by force.

Hence in the first scenario, it can be said that there was enough apprehension of breach of peace and apprehension that a serious offence of arrestable nature has been committed by the PCs to force an ‘entry and search’ of the premises and as such the PCs has not violated the rights of the occupant of the property.

b. In the second scenario, based on an alleged suspicion of drug-dealing, Oleg has been arrested and PCs Holmes and Watson forcefully enter into a private property where Oleg was seen for the last time. Upon conducting and concluding a conversation with the occupant of the given house, it was gathered that Oleg did not live at the house and he only came there for limited purposes. In the case of Entick v Carrington, it was held by the court of Common pleas that for the purpose of conducting a forceful entry into a premises and therefore curbing the rights and privacy of the individual living on that particular premises, it was necessary for the police administration to show that there had been enough grounds for such invasion of privacy. In the case of R (on the application of C) v The Chief Constable of ‘A’ and ‘A’ Magistrates Court, it was held that forceful entry in a private property without having a search warrant and without having any apprehension of breach of peace of any other provisions is a gross violation of right of privacy of the occupant and it should be restricted by the Police Constables. Also, in the case of Bhatti and others v Croydon Magistrates’ Court and others, it was held that just because a person has been arrested under a certain crime such as fraud or drug-dealing, it does not become the immediate and absolute right of the Police Constable to force an entry on the properties of the defendant herein and on any other premises which was suspected under the same as well. For the purposes of the same, a search warrant is to be issued by the Police Administration prior to the entry and that search warrant shall also be in terms with the PACE, 1984 i.e. a search warrant shall be used once under a month time period for the reason that has been mentioned in the warrant according to section 15 of the PACE, 1984.

Further, in the consultation paper presented by the Labor Government on 2004, the importance of article 8 of ECHR was taken into consider and the provisions of PACE, 1984 was therefore amended by section 114 & 115 of Serious Organized Crime and Police Act, 2005 to protect the human rights of the netizens herein. Hence in order to enter a premises in the present scenario, the PCs needed to provide for a justification under section 8 of the PACE, 1984 that there had been apprehension that “indictable offences have been committed on the premises” or any other reasons mentioned under section 8(1) of the PACE, 1984 as amended by Serious Organized Crime and Police Act, 2005 herein.

Hence, considering the situation and the scene of the second scenario, it can be apprehended that as Oleg was already arrested by the Police Constables, there had been no apprehension of searching the premises Nadia for any reasons under the section 8 of the PACE, 1984 amended by the Act of 2005 and the forceful enter and seizure of a shotgun which was apprehended by the police to be unlicensed, it can be said that the forceful entry of the police in the premises of Nadia was unlawful in the eyes of law and it was a gross violation of right of privacy of Nadia under the Human Rights Act, 1988 and ECHR under article 8 herein.

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BIBLIOGRAPHY

Journal

• Miller, Joel. “STOP AND SEARCH IN ENGLAND: A Reformed Tactic or Business as Usual?” (2010). The British Journal of Criminology, vol. 50, no. 5, pp. 954–974

Legislations

• Police and Criminal Evidence Act, 1984
• Serious Organized Crime and Police Act, 2005

Case Laws

• Bhatti and others v Croydon Magistrates’ Court and others, [2010] EWHC 522 [2011] 1 WLR 948; [2010] 3 All ER 671
• Entick v Carrington, (1765) 19 St Tr 1030
• Halliday v Nevill, (1984) 155 CLR 1
• McConnell v Chief Constable of Greater Manchester Police, [1990] 1 WLR 364
• McLeod v Metropolitan Police Commissioner, [1994] 4 All ER 553
• Robson v Hallett, [1967] 2 QB 939
• R (on the application of C) v The Chief Constable of ‘A’ and ‘A’ Magistrates Court, [2006] EWHC 2532
• Wiltshire v DPP, [2014] EWHC 4659

Reports /others

• Hazel Blears MP (forwarded by), “Modernising police powers to meet community needs foreword (2004)”, Minister of State for Crime Reduction, Policing and Community Safety