Globalization Has Improved The Capabilities

Introduction:

Globalisation has rather changed channels and means for the exercise of power. There are certain spheres in globalisation that support terrorist life cycle and increase the effectiveness, global reach and lethality of terrorist groups. This essay will discuss these spheres of globalisation that strengthen terror activities and groups. Globalisation enables ideological and operational leadership in terrorism, which in due course becomes an area of globalisation to be understood from a global terrorism perspective. Such leadership has helped the leaders of terror groups to frame the group’s sense of reality. These groups are strengthened and fueled through numerous funding mechanisms, which keep the terror activities alive. The groups seek safe havens in weak or failed states where they conduct training and other activities that causes operatives and future correspondence and planning. In modern time, terror base does not hold much importance as with the advent of globally advanced technology, terror groups develop ability to adapt and to employ critical technologies enable the group to acquire, weaponise and/or destructive weapons. The threat risk of terror groups acquiring military robots and drones is a reality. Moreover, globalisation brings free or easier movement of person or goods increasing the ability of terror groups to cross-border movement exploiting flaws in global controls, such as means in immigration controls, cross-border travel and pervasive and intrusive information technology. This essay will discuss these global aspects that impacts activities of terror groups or terrorism, which in turn globalises terrorism. For those studying these intricate dynamics, seeking politics dissertation help can provide valuable insights and support.

Globalisation enhances capabilities of terrorist groups

It is observed that globalisation has rather changed channels and means for the exercise of power, but not radically changed fundamental aspects of international relationships. In fact, power has been the key independent variable that shapes modern international relations. Globalisation serves a manifestation of new means, which enable exercised and distribution of power. It has become a complex character, which thus requires a reassessment of the meaning of power from the perspective of international security (Kay, 2004). There are five capabilities and processes in counter-terrorism strategy that support terrorist life cycle and increase the effectiveness, global reach and lethality of terrorist groups. These five areas are The major challenge facing LMEs is lack of homogeneity in business systems and models of employment relations adopted by various countries. Although the US, Australia and the UK are all LMEs, they have different business systems. For example, Australia has had a long history of

products of globalisation that have tremendously improve capabilities of terrorist groups, which have ability to conduct such life cycle processes can grow, adapt as well as was effective global terrorist campaign (Kumar et al., 2017). These areas can effectively transform a homegrown terrorist group, or localised or marginal threat into global terrorist group or can bring global threat. These capabilities of and processes adopted by terrorist groups could produce measurable strategic effects against the groups. Intelligence support operational defense and can give an insight into how terrorist groups exploit globalisation and its reams (Treverton & Agrell, 2009). Firstly, ideological and operational leadership is the source for recruitment and indoctrination. It comprises the top tier leaders who drive the planning, training, preparation, tradecraft and targeting (Kumar et al., 2017). Terrorist groups have a clandestine nature. They comprise members who are like-minded culturally and ideologically. This enable them develop cohesion, loyalty, trust and very strong social bonds themselves (Price, 2012). The realm of globalisation has helped the leaders of groups to frame the group’s sense of reality. The extent of the underground activities of the group enables the leaders to enforce themselves as the only source of information (Price, 2012). Such clandestine nature and intense bonding between the members opens high opportunities to groupthink (Price, 2012). From what it appears, it would not be directly stated that ideological and operational leadership is one area or a product of globalisation, but it is true to a large extent to state that globalisation enables ideological and operational leadership and in due course it becomes an area of globalisation if understood from a global terrorism perspective. It is observed that the deeper the terrorist groups go underground and the more the social bond amongst the group members intensifies, the less is the chances of defying the leaders’ decisions. This may inhibit organisational learning amongst the group members and produce poor decision making (McCormick, 2003). But, this limitation is ignorable given that terrorism has become a global threat, with its source not only traceable to Islamic countries, but also homegrown Muslim communities. The effect of globalisation has led to global terrorism and it is true vice versa where global terror has led to globalisation of terrorism. If one remembers how Al-Qaeda operated, there was a lethal combination of ideologies and advance communication technologies with sophisticated and far-reaching media network and mobility of manpower. All these realms of globalisation have enhanced offensive potential of the terrorist groups. The result of such globalisation of terror is evident with new regional centers in Africa, Asia or even in Western countries. There has been a transport of extremist

deologies. Such ideologies and violent practices spread from the Middle East towards westward and eastward. The ideologies feed on weaker and vulnerable sympathies to support their aims and objectives. In the process, there is intense indoctrination followed by operational activities. The way the ideologies spread globally has changed the demography, geography of terror activities (Gunaratna, 2008). It was observed from the jihadi terrorism activities in Indonesia that leaders of the groups operate using social ties of jihadi terrorists. Such relational trust employed by the operational leaders occupies a significant role in the social networks amongst terrorist groups. They occupy the central role and have higher degree of centrality than those of the ideological leaders, since they possess stronger social ties. The groups operate in a cell system with low density and social connectivity where operational leaders are involved (Milla et al., 2020). This very well indicates that the ideological leaders have left the role to operational leaders to create and maintain bond amongst the members of the groups. However, the global network created by the terror group leadership, such as Al-Qaida where there is global network of people and communication, is vulnerable to intelligence penetration. It is easier to identify these arrests and arrest them. The strategy of applying a bottom-up and top-down approaches is effective in this case where low level operatives are activated and orders are executed coordinately across agencies (Jones & Libicki, 2008, pp. 125-126). Secondly, financial sources and infrastructure enables the processes and channelising collection, money transfer, and disbursement as well as the methods of obtaining sponsorship and supporting fund (Kumar et al., 2017). There are numerous ways and channels terrorist groups are financed. Unlike the traditional funding of state and private sponsors, the existence of numerous funding mechanisms poses challenges to prevent terror financing. Such mechanisms are possible and efficient terror attacks are possible because of sophisticated terrorist support networks, use of low capability weapons, and less expensive terrorist acts. For example, in the recent acts in Barcelona or Paris, terrorists used a rental vehicle to target pedestrians. This easy self-funding act demonstrates the loopholes in or irrelevance of counter-terrorist financing legislation. In modern times, particularly since 2001, there have been a numerous illegal mechanisms, such as kidnap for ransom, drug trafficking, or sale of conflict diamonds (RYDER, 2018). Al Qaeda, Hamas, Hizballah, and Lashkar e-Taiba used Internet primarily for financing-related purposes. They raise funds and launder the funds to support their terrorist activities. Internet offers a wide reach and it produces efficiency and importantly anonymity and security (Jacobson, 2010). Most popular :

is fraud, including benefit and credit card fraud, sale of counterfeit goods or identity theft. This technique of funding via credit card fraud was used by the Al-Qaida, as was noted by the Financial Action Task Force. In the UK, similar self funding method can be seen. The conviction of Yahya Rashid is a proof of it. He utilised his student loan and other grants to travel to join Islamic State. Another example is suicide bomber Salman Abedi who used taxpayer student loans to finance the Manchester Arena attack. One of the fraud techniques is funding through charitable donations. It was reported that post the 9/11 attach, there was an estimate 30 per cent of al-Qaeda finances being obtained from misapplied donations to charities. This technique is used by Boko Haram across Africa as well (RYDER, 2018). The advent of advanced internet technology led to computerised financial systems that enable money transfer and financial aids. This is also facilitated or facilitates communication amongst the groups or members of the groups globally (Shay, 2017). The IS is a source of inspiration and it encourages, finances and supports radical Islamic movements. They have developed their own channels and their own organisations to spread and export extreme Islamic ideologies across the globe. Some of the channels are in the form of cultural institutions, mosque and Islamic charities. There are also specific committees, such as the Al-kuta’a Al-Gharba which is the western sector committees, which was responsible to carry out terror activities in Israel. Similarly, under a designated leader, a row, local advisory council is created that is responsible to activate multiple units or committees that are assigned roles of communications, security, finances, operations and many more specific tasks (Shay, 2017). The way the terrorist groups are organised and a network is formed to carry out their objectives, similarly strategies are also adopted by governments and agencies. Example here is the 2006 National Strategy for Combating Terrorism. They focused on dissemination of economic, diplomatic and legal enforcement and distribution of intelligence, finance, information and military. Preemptive actions were taken against terror groups and sponsors (Perl, 2007). The Global Coalition was thus formed in 2014 to handle ISIS threat. They developed a network comprising local partners; built international cooperation; severed ISIS’ funding, ceased extremist recruitment, and neutralised ISIS narrative; and adopted several collective measures to diminish financial resources, weakened leadership and military capability, diminish on-line influence and territorial gains (U.S. Department of State, 2017). Thirdly, the existence of safe havens in the form of a piece of real estate, provided by willing states or states that failed and are too weak to counter the groups enables these group to find sanctuary in them where they conduct training and other activities that causes operatives and

future correspondence and planning. Safe havens indicate two dimensions. The first is state-centric that sees terrorist safe havens from static and territorial dimensions. The second is from a social order perspective where social space is subject to internal dynamics that impose constraints for actors. Such subjugation opens a series of opportunities for terrorist groups at transnational networks. These groups take advantage of these opportunities and develop new constraints and opportunities ensuring local actors form alliances with them (Campana & Ducol, 2011). Safe haven is one key way where global terrorism evades controls. One reason enabling creation of safe havens is existence of safe havens. Terrorists groups seek safe havens in failed states, which are outside controls of recognised governments. As such, no military offensive proves effective against such states. Economic reforms may work, but there is no significant connection between economic poverty and terrorism. In such a situation, conflicts are bound to continue. Globalisation has brought in global trade of small arms (Collier & Dollar, 2002). This fuels further conflicts and a repeated cycle of conflicts. Effective remedy on the existence of market, which financially fuels the illegal arm force could curb the conflict. For example, one source of finance for such conflict is trade in diamonds or cocaine such as in Colombia. Market regulations can reduce this market (Collier & Dollar, 2002). The presence of the conflicts indicates the poverty of the countries acting as safe havens. Chances of civil wars breed opportunity of terrorism making it easier for terrorist groups to recruit members. Sometime, certain acts of terrorism are business-like, which enriches the leaders. It could arguably be stated that the resulting vast gap between rich and poor polarises the society bringing instability to a region (Moghadam & Eubank, 2006). Globalisation creates opportunities that further terrorists’ objectives. Existence of weak states is one example of such opportunities, where richer countries take political and economic advantages pushing them deeper to crisis. Weak states cannot afford to defend themselves to terrorist activities including using the state’s space as safe haven (Moghadam & Eubank, 2006). Fourthly, the ability to adapt and to employ critical technologies enable the group to acquire, weaponise and/or destructive weapons. It has three stages of acquisition, weaponisation, and deliver technologies (Kumar et al., 2017). This shows that there is a technological dimension to global terrorism. Globalisation has brought revolutionary changes in information. The advancement in Internet based tools, such as social networking websites, has changed the way the terrorist life cycle functions. Terrorists groups utilises technologies and its innovations to maintain and increase their activities, tactically and strategically. Thus,

globalisation has, directly or indirectly, improved technical capabilities of terrorist groups and has effectively given them global reach (Kumar et al., 2017). The new age technology techniques of genetic engineering have led to creation go mass destruction. It enhances transmissibility of naturally occurring pathogens. This creates absolute threat of terror groups acquiring such pathogens that have enhanced the capability of terror groups in carrying out terror activities. Advanced technologies enable evasion of diagnosis and/or detection through established methods. It enables creation of biological weapons (Miller, 2018). Similar advancement creates threat risk of terror groups acquiring military robots and drones (Springer, 2013). But the problem is that despite the terror groups continuously working to develop weapons, such as WMDs, which have ability to cause widespread destruction, there is the largest deterrent of the inability of the terror groups to effectively weaponise these weapons (Diaz et al., 2004). Fifthly, the ability of the groups of cross-border movement of personnel and materials, exploiting various engines, which are result of globalisation, such as means in immigration controls, cross-border travel and pervasive and intrusive information technology (Treverton & Agrell, 2009). There is a global mobility regime that could be derived from analysing globalisation from a sociological framework perspective as comprising systemic processes of closure and containment. Such a mobility regime actively seeks to contain cross border and within the border social movement. Terrorism is one of the threats, which is conflated by the pervasive “paradigm of suspicion” on which the mobility regime is based (Shamir, 2005). The ability of terrorists to travel borders has been a contact challenge for authorities to tackle. The ability to pass immigration formalities holding valid passport and cross border is one such flaws in the free movement policies that enable terrorist attacks, such as horrific attacks in the US, or terrorist activities such crossing U.S. border for training or fraudulently obtaining a student or a work visa (By United States. Congress. House. Committee on Homeland Security. Subcommittee on Border and Maritime Security, 2015). Example of Yahya Rashid, who used his student loan and other grants to travel to join Islamic State, as discussed earlier, shows the advanced strategy and invasiveness of terror groups. Indonesia’ new strategy to monitor movement of terrorists within Indonesia shows the extent of the terrorists ability to execute their movements (By United States. Congress. House. Committee on Homeland Security. Subcommittee on Border and Maritime Security, 2015). This increasing international migration and global mobility enable expansion of transnational organizsed crime and terrorism. Globalisation has failed immigrant integration and social

alienation of certain vulnerable individuals, which may set stage to join terrorist organisations (Koslowski, 2012).

Conclusion

Globalisation is inevitable and it has shrunk boundaries, so is global terrorism. Terrorism is widespread geographically. It now thrives on selective ideology. Globalisation with its core feature of free movement of person, technology and material creates expansive and intrusive opportunities to terror groups. It decreases cultural boundaries between countries and this has helped terrorist groups develop in less time and take varied forms and activities. Terrorism has become a political tool now. Therefore, countermeasures should have policies that balance goals in respect of global risk and mitigating awareness around emotional experiences or vulnerabilities desired by terrorism.

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