Responsibility To Protect Principles And Debates

Introduction

This essay will discuss principles of Responsibility to Protect (R2P). It will examine its core principles of protecting states, assistance, and reactive actions in respect to the collective international responsibilities towards security.

This essay will examine the existing debates around the effectiveness and usefulness of R2P and will touch upon the efficacy of its implementation. It will examine whether there is a collective view or divided view questioning the existence of R2P while considering variable political factors.

This essay will consider the question of whether R2P should be retained, removed or replaced in particular consideration to its implementation. Conclusions will be addressed at the end of this essay.

R2P: Driven by political interests?

At the 2005 World Summit of the United Nation, all its members endorsed the Responsibility to Protect (R2P) (Strauss, 2016, p.316). Paragraph 138-40 of the Outcome Document of the Summit, which was adopted by the General Assembly, provide for individual states to protect its population from key issues of genocide, ethnic cleansing, war crimes, and crimes against humanity. The global community has to use appropriate humanitarian, diplomatic and other peaceful means to protect populations from these issues. The members need to support the Special Advisor to the Secretary-General on the prevention of Genocide. According to the UN Secretary General, Ban Kimoon, there are three pillars of R2P. Firstly, it is protecting responsibilities of the state. Secondly, it is the international assistance and capacity-building. Thirdly, the response has to be timely and decisive (INTERNATIONAL COALITION FOR THE RESPONSIBILITY TO PROTECT, 2009).

R2P has been the subject to considerable debate. In the 2009 Secretary-General report, most governments raised concerns on the abuse of the system. Phillipines stated that the abuse may result from expanding the application of R2P to situations outside of the four key areas. R2P may undermine sovereignty of states instead of empowering the. There may be chances of unilateral action. The debate raised a point that regional areas, for example the African Union, should play greater role and implement stronger provision in regard to the four keys concerns (INTERNATIONAL COALITION FOR THE RESPONSIBILITY TO PROTECT, 2009). The concerns were not incorrect. There is a widely shared concerned particularly about its selective implementation. This is in special regard to the sentiments of the Arab countries on the case of Palestine. They hold the view that the interpretation of R2P is allegedly biased. For example, as per Egypt in 2012 Rwanda, Lebanon, Syria and Gaza highlighted the shortcoming of R2P highlighting its inability to end Palestinian’s suffering bearing testimony to the fact that the system is subservient to political interest as well as imbalances (Azzam & Hindawi, 2016, p.453). Another perspective to the debate could be that of Algeria’s withdrawal from R2P. They cited that the system is a sign of weakening sovereignty of states, and that it is a distraction from major issues such as poverty. Also, there has been instance of member states supporting some issues and neglecting others in regard to the implementation of R2P. Arab countries have the official view Lebanon is refereed twice to the military intervention in Libya as part of R2P. Likewise in the early 2010s, debate on R2P was absent from official statement of the Arab countries (Azzam & Hindawi, 2016, p.455). This reaffirms the argument that the implementation of R2P is political in nature subject to political interests and thus fails to live up to the expectation of the 2005 summit, if in case the purpose and expectation were aligned to protection global community and not to advance individual interest.

If one looks at the level of commitment of the EU, it could be considered that EU has been proactive in advancing the principle pillars of R2P. In general, its member states have shown proactive involvement in discussing initiatives in other areas of development as well, the creation of peace-building commission and many more (Franco et al., 2016, p.394). They have releases official statements, for instance the 2003 EU Security Strategy, which conforms to adherence to concerned international norms of the R2P. However, do these systems reflect on the implementation? It has been not so. The implementation has been arguably weak. For instance, the 2010 implementation of R2P report, Germany mentioned about the system, but more of a note that the system is a sound political basis subject to further discussion regarding its operation. Even the UK mentioned it in its 2008 national security strategy, but did not in the 2010 strategy and 2011 building stability overseas strategy (Franco et al., 2016, p.395). Even in the UN, the Security Council has allegedly failed to take its own resolutions seriously or that member states do not comply with UN norms. Further, there has been a reported failure of will among many of its largest contributing countries to support reform effort in the area of financing issues and others as well. Members states of the UN and also that of the EU are unconcerned about (Bolton, 2010).

Principle of R2P is not independent of international law. R2P cannot be devoid of legal content aim. It has two sets of legal responsibilities. Firstly, the states owe responsibilities towards its population, which is an established international customary law. Secondly, states owe responsibilities to populations in other states. In this light, R2P does not create any new legal duties, because states have already existing international legal responsibilities (Reike & Bellamy, 2013). This corresponds to the second pillar of R2P, as stipulated by Ban Kimoon. However, the legal responsibilities that it represents are unclear in that it does not create any new legal obligation on the member states. This can be connected with the argument that R2P has not contributed much of substance or prescriptive merit. It may have changed the ways global community treat humanitarian intervention, or widen its interests, however, there is certain hollowness attached to R2P (Hehir, 2010). Even the general endorsement of R2P in the 2009 General Assembly could be argued as being largely superficial. The practical utility of the system may be termed limited (Hehir, 2010). This presents the conflict or gap between the norms and principles and the reality regarding their functions and effectiveness. The norms and principles are of course need to bring new changes. However, in respect to the commitments of states to R2P, the gap between them and the reality in respect to atrocity crimes has increased considerably that affect the credibility of the implementation of R2P (Jacob & Mennecke, 2020).

R2P: Remove or replace

The issues in implementation of R2P raise concerns about whether R2P should be removed or replaced. This may not be best option or viable. The strategy should be deliberate, concerted and conscious to prevent the atrocities in order to produce good results. When the global community and organisation place priority on prevention of atrocities, the results are better. The principle suits the global agenda of overall protection and prevention, giving increasing priority to prevention of atrocities. It acts as framework for the global community to consider and respond to the crime. It facilitates debate in the international organisation and involves member states. It brings a balance between sovereigns and its commitments to protect the populations (Jacob & Mennecke, 2020). One of the fruitful examples of this deliberate, concerted and conscious strategy is related to the crisis in Kenya 2007/2008. The violence in Kenya during that time is seen as a model representing the implementation of R2P as an international norm. The intervention was based on humanitarian grounds. The crisis relates to post election turmoil, which started when Mwai Kibaki was sworn in as the president. It led to 1,000 deaths and displacement of 600,000 people. Due to a collective and concerted effort between international and national communities, large scale ethnic conflict was prevented. International mediation efforts were put in place by the involvement of African Union Panel of Eminent Personalities, under the UN Secretary and support of neighbouring donors, civil society and neighbouring states. Resolution was brought in place in the name of R2P. There was no use of coercive measures (Crossley, 2016). Syria is also considered another model of R2P success. However, the crisis and the resolution brought about also demonstrate inconsistency in implementing R2P and that it has not been embedded within the global community to the extent necessary. This is established by the fact that during the crisis, more than 220,000 people were death and over a million got injured, millions fled the country and displaced and millions needed humanitarian assistance. This is a testimony to the failure of R2P in preventing the crisis and the atrocities committed (Crossley, 2016).

It is also observed that there are several legal, political, economic and other geopolitical factors that need to be considered while debating or implementing R2P. Given the response of the Security Council to violent regime in Syria and Libya, it could also be gathered that R2P is intensely impacted by other factors, including the factors mentioned above that influence use or non-use of armed humanitarian intervention. The presence of these factors may demonstrate that R2P principle cannot be considered illegitimate (Cronogue, 2012). In this light, it is appropriate to reiterate that the issue associated with R2P is in its implementation, which is subject to interplay between various legal, strategic, political and other similar considerations. This is reflected in the statement by former UN General Secretary Kofi Annan in regard to the genocide in Rwanda and NATO’s intervention in Kosovo, which highlighted the inability of the global community to reconcile universal legitimacy of the community and effectiveness in defence of human right, which are two equally compelling interests (Steiner et al., 2008, p.838). The inability of the international community could also be found in the crisis in Burma, Zimbabwe, Congo and Darfur. It demonstrates that it is remote to ensuring that national sovereignty does not override human rights. The duty and commitments of the government to protect its human populations takes priority. R2P in this respect could be stated to have failed to establish itself as being a firm international norm (Axworthy & Rock, 2009). The central leadership seems to be missing in its commitment to implement R2P principle. All these factors pointing towards the inability of the global community correspond negatively to the third pillar of R2P, which is timely and decisive response of the international community to crisis. This third principle evokes controversy when it is seen in context of military intervention. The 2005 summit outcome document gives responsibilities to states to intervene in order to protect population of other states. Accordingly, the authorisation of the military intervention by the UN Security Council is an example of this commitment. However, this may go against the sovereignty of the state where intervention takes place. Despite the existence of standard that provides for protection of people, when there are two warring states, this standard do not hold value and the concerned states do not have any consensus in protecting the people. The absence of an enforceable international law fails to hold the warring states accountable (Seybolt, 2016, p.19).

A balance approach needed to continue acceptance of R2P?

The debate on significance of R2P and its implementation has changed its course. The global expectation in regard to protecting populations from mass atrocities has significantly expanded. The norms of protection have been debated and reshape, as could be seen with the responsibility to protect becoming responsibility while protecting (RWP). Issues of effective and responsible implementation still remain. However, the general consensus has changed to following a supportive relationship with sovereignty, and taking and privileges action against non-state actors, and not repressive regimes (Kurtz & Rotmann, 2016). While the emergence of the concept of RWP is acknowledgeable, it also seems to have carried the legacy of R2P in respect of its implementation. RWP is particularly related when military intervention is involved while dealing with the issues of collective security and humanitarianism. However, international community here too never sufficiently developed the principle into something concrete and specific proposals. Reforming R2P or RWP seems to be impossible in context to the rigid hierarchy in the international community. For example, the hierarchy separates the members of the UN or its committees or councils. Elected members in the Council do not share information about past agreements with permanent members. They are also excluded from informal negotiations (Tourinho et al., 2016). As such, any debates about monitoring and accountability of use of military intervention are conducted within a rigid hierarchy excluding others members. This results to political disruption of the implementation of R2P or RWP. There is a conflict of interest between those members with privileges that try to maintain them at any cost and those consistently seeking greater access to information and membership. In addition, the lack of regulation by Security Council contributes to challenging reformation of R2P (Tourinho et al., 2016).

For the continuing future acceptance of R2P, it could be emphasised that R2P has high potential to act as a global political platform reinforcing its three pillars of principles and employing a balanced combination of non-coercive and coercive responses. Military intervention alone cannot be the key to success of R2P, but certain reactive responses are also required, such as diplomatic peace-making, political and economic incentives and sanctions, and other peacekeeping methods. The action or reaction is dependent on which principle of R2P is in question (Evans, 2016). For example, intervention could be carried out upon request from the government that is unable to deal with mass atrocity situation which it did not cause. Even though the momentum of the powerful nations may be slower than expected in adhering to effective collective responsibility for collective security, it is a positive sign that there is certain level of willingness to move forward and identify areas of new consensus in respect to R2P issues (Evans, 2016). R2P, as a global political platform, in this regard represents principles of collective security, which provides for effective regulated, institutionalised balancing against aggressors without exclusion of domestic and ideational variables (Kupchan & Kupchan, 1995).

Conclusion

There is no doubt that R2P will be subject to considerable debate. The major factor will be implementation. However, singling out implementation may cloud the root of the problem. It has been observed that political deliberation and concerted and conscious strategy has brought about significant success in dealing with crisis, such as the Kenya 2007/2008 crisis. This also indicates that the lack of political deliberation will hamper efforts of R2P, which is seen in this essay. Example is abuse of R2P principles, undermining state sovereignty through unilateral actions, or lesser role and involvement of regional actors. Advancing further problem is the gap in official polices of states and their implementation on the ground, as seen with EU. In addition to the lack of political deliberation, R2P has also the same old problem attached with international law, which is it does not create enforceable duties and responsibilities. R2P does not create any new legal duties, which would have made states accountable in case of non-compliance. All these issues raise debates about whether to retain, remove or replace R2P. However, it is not like R2P has been a complete failure, as seen in the Kenya 2007/2008. The inability of the global community to give legitimacy of the community and at the same time protect human right may find its root to political interest. The emergence of responsibility while protecting (RWP) and potential of R2P to serve as a global political platform with enforceable non-coercive and coercive responses keeping regard to political and economic interests of the global community driven by core principles of collective responsibility and security will push forward effective acceptance and implementation of R2P.

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