Exploring Illegal Mining in Indonesia

Chapter 1 – Introduction

The problem of Illegal mining has been occupying a grave political, regulatory, economic and social concern for Indonesia. The country has not been able to curb this problem and put in under control since 1997. The distribution of and conflict involving financial and power distribution between the national and the regional governments has been one major factor for survival of this problem. This problem has caused tremendous economic loss to the country and on equal intensity, social and economic exploitation of the local miners and residents. This dissertation aims to explore the extent and incidence of the problem of illegal mining in Indonesia. It aims to analyse the effectiveness of police strategy in enforcing the mining laws by identifying and explaining mining laws in Indonesia. The rationale behind these aims is because illegal mining has major negative impacts not only on significant environmental degradation, but it causes several health and safety issues and economic issues. Most important is the abuse of laws and regulation that affect the welfare of labour class, but enrich those in power. The dissertation aims to review Indonesian police strategy on enforcing mining law in Indonesia with an objective to finding some regulatory recommendation to draft effective strategies in reducing illegal mining crime.

Research Question

Primary questions:

Q1. What is the extent and nature of the problem of illegal mining in Indonesia?

Secondary questions:

Q2: What are the current legal systems, policies and regulations in tackling illegal mining?

Q3: Which of these practices are likely to be most effective in reducing illegal mining in Indonesia?

Methodology

This dissertation will employ desk-based research. This method will involve critical evaluation of the research questions in hand. It will involve reviewing data from secondary sources, including books, journals and reports. Thus, it will review various written records from the journal, books, policies, law, and relevant websites in exploring the research question. By adopting this desk-based research methodology, the researcher aims to adopt a critical approach to the research questions in hand with an objective to derive some relevant recommendations that could facilitate relevant future strategy in tackling illegal mining in Indonesia. This dissertation has employed qualitative method, which is more of a deductive approach (Saunders, Lewis, & Thornhill, 2012). This method comprises two kinds of approach: inductive and deductive approaches (Kumar, 2010). In the former approach, the researcher adopts a bottom-up approach and comes to the conclusion. In the latter, the researcher analyses generic data, which is then use to arrive at a particular conclusion. It follows a top-down approach (Hardy, 2009). Qualitative method is descriptive in nature (Supino & Borer, 2012). It emphasises on building theories (Ahmed, Opoku, & Aziz, 2016). In this current research, the researcher explored the aspect of illegal mining covering political, regulatory, economic and social concern in Indonesia. The researcher explored existing literature and other data and information concerning legal, administrative and political framework and other concerns, with particular focus on policing strategy governing mining activities in order to evaluate the sufficiency of policing and policy framework. This research has, thus, employed a deductive approach to analyse the available data and answer the research questions. While the researcher used a desk-based research methodology, the researcher approached the research questions in a critical evaluative manner in order to derive recommendations that could guide current and future policing and administrative strategy. In order to analyse the data properly, the researcher use appropriate methods to that effect, which included a thematic method to analyse the qualitative data. This enabled the researcher in recognising patterns and themes (Miles & Huberman, 1994). It enabled the researcher in organising the qualitative data and presenting the data in themes (Thomas & Harden, 2008).

Chapter 2 – Understanding Illegal Mining and Indonesian policing strategy to deal with illegal mining

2.1. Illegal Mining and its impact

Illegal mining constitutes extraction of minerals without any legal title to the prospect. Generally, illegal miners target the high unit value minerals, which have a prospect of high returns. Such minerals may include diamonds, gold, and coloured gemstone. Kambani (2003) states that small scale miners in developing countries produce most of the gold and gemstones. The target may also include low value minerals. High unit value minerals do not demand an elaborate transportation infrastructure, which may be the reason why many illegal mining operate at sites that lack basic infrastructure. They require a minimal processing technology, which favours illegal miners (Kambani, 2003). Kambani (2003) pointed out are a few major factors that contributes to illegal mining. The lack of access to mineral rights is one major factor. This indicates that the state exercising excessive control over the mining operations. It was a common feature in economies of developing countries to see state control and direct ownership over production and marketing facilities, including mining activities. This was seen in nationalisation of the gemstone mining in Myanmar in 1963. It was also seen in Zimbabwe, where the Mines and Minerals Act, Chapter 165, s319 concentrates the mining activities in the state and excluding others. The states also impose challenging and complex procedure of obtaining licenses that leads to the exclusion of small private miners from mining entitlements (Kambani, 2003). Existence of weak institutional framework, which is unable to provide support, also leads to illegal mining. The non-transparent and inefficient way to provide mineral rights and the lack of control and monitoring, such as the uncontrolled gold mining in Zimbawe rivers or helpless police forces due to powerful mining racket as the Phillipines armed groups, and safety and environmental measures contribute to the problem (Kambani, 2003). Economic policies that do not accommodate the welfare of the labour class might also have contributed to activities of illegal mining. This might be the reason why illegal mining thrive. It is observed that illegal mining constitutes an appealing alternative to those workers facing long hours of work, poor pay and very harsh working conditions that are the norms in legal mining industry. Even in the legal mining industry, there are reported cases of miners engaging in stealing resources (Beare, 2012, p.106). Illegal mining has been shown to produce major negative impacts including excessive environmental degradation, for example prime land degradation in Lusaka; health and safety issues, such as physical and environmental health concerns due to exposure of miners to mercury emissions; leakage of tax revenues, for example Brazil in 1990 saw undeclared 50% of gold annual output; law and order problem, including crime in high density mining areas. One of the major contributors to the negative impact is the large number of small scale miners, and their widespread distribution. This is caused by excessive control that state had on mining operation. In many developing countries, the operation was under the control of the states. This left out artisans with no option other than to mine illegally in areas where there was no government control. This eventually led to wide distribution of such illegal mining, which made it difficult to police the numerous illegal miners (Kambani, 2003). Illegal miners are exposed to risks of harassment, forced labour, and other human rights abuse. Their Sometimes, their families reside at the location of the mining, exposing to violent threats (Beare, 2012, p.106). A 2016 UN rapporteur states that there is widespread multiple forms of bonded labour in countries such as Congo, Zimbabwe, Malawi, etc. (Reichel, 2019, p.46).

Illegal mining also fuel activities of criminal organizations. It is also a product and a fuel for civil conflicts. For example is the case of conflict diamonds that is related to crimes out of international conflict, such as those in war torn countries, like Angola and Sierra Leone. Lack of governmental regulation has also benefitted illicit mining operations. Resources like diamonds and gemstones are high value units that appeal to international criminal organizations. Illegal mining and illicit trading of the resources have attracted international attention (Beare, 2012). The UN took a 2000 General Assembly resolution in order to develop effective methods to end illicit sale of diamonds including actions such as certification systems or sanctions against groups that are enriched from illicit conflict diamond industry (Beare, 2012).

2.2 Illegal mining in Indonesia

Illegal mining in Indonesia became beyond control after the 1997 crisis and the post Soeharto reform era (Erman, 2005). President Soeharto ruled over Indonesia for thirty two years. He attempted to bring a New Order to strengthen the Indonesian economy and to encourage Western investment. His policy went against his totalitarian regime practices and his elite group of supporters who accumulated all the wealth and power. The New Order created alienation of and discontent amongst the supporters. The Asian Economic Crisis triggered collapse of the country’s economy with civil riots occurring the country. President Soeharto resigned on 21 May 1998. A new era of reform took place where executive’s intervention in judiciary was reduced; there is no exercised of unilateral authority by the President; the President came under the jurisdiction of the Constitutional Court. However, the era of reform was not able to contain the corruption in the judiciary itself. There was decentralization of financial and power distribution to the regional governments. Local regions were given scope to raise revenue. This led to the local or regional government looking for ways of raising revenue. Thus, in regions where natural resources are abundant, illegal exploitation of natural resources were common. This led to rise in illegal logging and also illegal mining, such as what occurred in West Sumatra (Crouch, Political Reform in Indonesia After Soeharto, 2010). Illegal mining has been part of Indonesia since a long time. Under the regime of the New Order, the official illegal mining was recognised with the activities in Lusang Gold Mining Company. In the early 1980s, this company illegally extracted gold in Lebong Tandau, Bengkulu (Erman, 2005). Illegal mining is also known by the name, Penambangan Tanpa Izin (PETI), which means mining without permits (OECD, 2015). Illegal mining activities duly extended to coal, diamonds, tin and mixed minerals. The activities most occurred on the periphery of the legal mining operation in West Java, West Sumatra, North Sulawesi and Kalimantan (Erman, 2005). Under the 1980s New Order regime, illegal mining activities were confined to those mining activities, particularly the small scale operations, which involved using traditional equipment and methods without any government licences. Other than this type of mining without license, another category is that of mining personal mines, which involves traditional mining by local people without license on their own land. Erman (2005) pointed out that the modern time mining is on a large scale by large legal mining companies, which also conduct illegal mining activities outside the concession areas or operate without licence. Also, entities from outside the countries are conducting small scale illegal mining activities. The licences procured by the outside entities were not from the proper government agency (Erman, 2005). Illegal mining operation covered gold, tin, coal, diamonds, and other mixed minerals. 16 provinces were affected as reported by Jakarta Post in 2011. Erman (2005) pointed out that there were roughly 68,000 illegal miners in the country. The high number of illegal mining was due to the effect of the 1997-1998 economic crisis and that it became financially appealing. Illegal mining generated lots of income for the illegal miners and mining products were paid in dollars, which proved profitable for miners as the country currency depreciated. Activities of illegal mining gave huge return as it was backed by many sponsors (Erman, 2005). Paddock (2019) stated that illicit gold trade is estimated at $5 billion a year (Paddock, 2019). This presents a financial outlook different from what it was a decade ago when illegal mining was not considered lucrative (Crouch, Political Reform in Indonesia After Soeharto, 2010). During that period, illegal mining employed up to a million people and operating in around 77,000 mining sites. Further, there was immense production. For instance, in South Kalimantan illegal miners extracted around 9.4 million tons of coal annually. The production was funded by large business networks that funded large scale production involving large trucks and other machinery, such as smelters and ships with illegal stockpiles at the ports for shipping (Aspinall & Klinken, 2010). This was also supported by reports of IBP, Inc. IBP, Inc. (2015) reported that activities of illegal mining are carried out in large scale by private entities. For instance, PT Arutmin, subsidiary of BHP located in South Kalimantan used illegal miners, who used a fleet of about 200 trucks and 16 excavators. This indicates that much of the illegal output from the province comes from this subsidiary, which accounted for 4 million of the 22 million tonnes of coal mined (IBP, Inc., 2015).

Widespread illegal mining activities in Indonesia are still prevalent in recent times. According to VOA News (2019), data of the Ministry of Environment and Forestry shows the existence of 8,663 unlicensed mines located at 352 sites in Indonesia. They cover an estimated total of 500,000 hectares and out of these 25% are gold mines (VOA News, 2019). As per the Indonesian Forum for the Environment (Walhi), one of Indonesia’s biggest green NGO, the country has still many active mines. The district of South Solok, along the BatangBangko River has six active mines and 22 abandoned ones. It has 33 excavators inside the Batanghari Protected Forest (Putra, 2020). This kind of data reports brings the attention to the deep rooted existence of illegal mining despite regulatory measures in place. They highlight the issues of complexities with obtaining mining licence, state’s control over mining, the loss of tax revenues, degradation of environment, and most important the moral dilemma in closing the mines that would take out the source of sustenance of the miners (VOA News, 2019).

2.2.1. What are the factors that contributed to illegal mining in Indonesia?

The earlier sections contribute to understanding the characteristics of illegal mining activities, their type and the extent, the actors involved in them and the political, economic and social factors. Illegal mining in Indonesia represents a complex web of competing interests and stakeholders touching upon the social, political, financial and administrative environment. As seen earlier, the activities of illegal mining picked up aggressively after the 1997-1998 economic crisis. One main factor that led to this position was the involvement of the regional government authorities in exploiting natural resources sponsors (Erman, 2005). Klinken (2007) observed that there is an involvement of private entities and regional authorities and local illegal mining bosses in illegal mining activities (Klinken, 2007). This is a testimony to the observation of why illegal mining is deeply embedded in the political and social set up of the country. It might also be the reason for the way illegal mining has been carried out in an organised fashion. Private entities have a strong presence in illegal mining activities. They have been able to thwart off any effort of the local authorities to control illegal mining (Erman, 2005). Thus, this may have encouraged the illegal miners to carry out mining activities. Erman (2005) said that even the miners were against any such efforts of curbing illegal mining as they claimed the activities gave them a source of financial sustenance during the economic crisis. Because of this reason, protests by the illegal miners were common. As an example, in 1998, around 200 miners protested in front of the mayor’s office in Sawahlunto against the authority’s plan to cease illegal mining. Their concern was that mining is their means of survival during economic crisis (Erman, 2005). Lack of political will to enforce regulatory measures contributed to uncontrollable illegal mining activities. In 2001, the Law, 22/1999 was enacted with the aim to reduce problem of restrictive access to miners. As mentioned earlier, excessive control of the states restricted access to local miners to mining activities. This resulted in illegal mining. The Law aimed to reduce such restriction. Erman (2005) pointed out that the implementation of the Law created a reverse outcome. Concerned authority stated issuing numerous permits. There were reported nexus between the issuing authority and the companies being issued the permits. Given this situation, it should have been controlled and permits should have been regulated by the authorities, which unfortunately did not happen. The lack of regulated actions seen with the issuance of mining permits was also seen with KUDs, the village unit cooperatives created to financially support small scale mining activities and finally to bring the miners under KUDs. However, KUDs faced administrative challenges and they created a new problem. Under the KUD framework, illegal miners were meant to work in concession of PTBA-UPO (a state-owned company). The new KUDs system increased production of PTBA-UPO much beyond the yearly target. KUDs supplied more than half of PTBA-UPO’s production. The issue was that all the production was bought by PT Semen Padang on credit and thus PTBA-UPO could not pay the miners. Erman (2005) stated that KUDs then got mixed with illegal miners who used KUDs as their front for illegal minings. He observed that Preman (extortionist) and cukong (perpetrator of illegal logging) got involved and they could not be stopped. Many of them became members of KUDs. The conflict between them and the companies continued with the companies facing inability to deal with their involvement (Erman, 2005). The above mentioned paragraphs established that factors such as corruption, subsistence, poverty, organised crime, unregulated local authorities are themselves the cause as well as the outcome of illegal mining.

2.2.2. How has illegal mining impacted Indonesia?

As seen earlier, illegal mining has been distributed widespread. Involvement of private entities has led to large scale illegal activities. OECD (2015) also recognised the negative impact of illegal mining. It observed that the vast spread of illegal mining without any license of permits from the concerned authority has negatively impacted environment government tax (OECD, 2015). For instance, much of the illegal output from South Kalimantan province comes from PT Arutmin, which accounted for 4 million of the 22 million tonnes of coal mined. This represents significant loss of output (IBP, Inc., 2015). It is not only economic and financial loss, but illegal mining also caused tremendous environmental damage. While examining the operations of two large coalmining companies, PT Tambang Batubaa Unit ProduksiOmbilin, a state owned and PT Allied Indo Coal, a joint venture, in the city of Sawahlunto and district of Sawahlunto-Sijunjung, it revealed that the mining activities caused environment and health hazards (Erman, Illegal Coalmining in West Sumatra: Access and Actors in the Post-Soeharto era, 2005). In recent times, the situation remains the same. Take the case of West Sumbawa where wildcat miners have been operating for many decades on the Indotan concession. They have established permanent communities, which functioned as an industrial-scale village. Amman Mineral, a private mining company, alleges that the continuous and long time use of liquid mercury to process gold ore has reportedly poisoned the environment and caused health issues arising from such mercury poisoning (Paddock, 2019). In the process of the activities in mining, it is the miners who have been the most affected. The social, economic and health conditions of the local miners have been the worst hit. For example, coal mining has caused many miners death in 2000 – 2002 and many got injured and disabled. Miners do not have access to proper medical assistance. They have been exposed to threats from the local mine leaders (Erman, 2005, pp. 207-209). Also, miners have been exposed to physical threats to their lives. A recent 2019 accident occurred in an unlicensed gold mine in North Sulawesi, which collapsed killed 16 miners out of the 34 victims. In 2018, in North Sulawesi, a mine collapsed and killed 6 people and in the same year in West Lombok, 13 gold miners were killed due to carbon monoxide poisoning (VOA News, 2019). Activities of illegal mining have been causing conflict between the competing stakeholders, including miners, locals residents, government and entities (OECD, 2015). Protest of locals against illegal mining occur because of risk to the lives of locals exposed by activities of private entities that have caused unresolved deaths of residents, and after-affects such as abandoned mining pits, which have claimed lives of children (Gokkon, 2019). Characteristics of mining activities, both legal and illegal, represent an unregulated system. The absence of regulatory measures and the way the existing law not been properly implemented has led to a diverse negative impact. This has caused damage mainly to the environment, social well being of the miners, and the economy of the regions. Due to the involvement of various actors and their different level of involvement, the outcome is an entanglement of various competing interests.

2.3. Policing tactics and other regulatory measures

As seen in the earlier sections, development related to illegal mining in Indonesia could be categorised into two phases. The first phase could cover the post 1998 period when illegal mining was officially recognised and there was widespread distribution of illegal local miners. This phase also covers the developments involving private entities covering large scale legal and illegal mining activities. The second phase would cover the recent developments, when local protests erupted against mining activities carried out by private entities, along the line of central government assertion of control over mining rights across the country. Taking these phases of development into account, this section will explore the role of the police and other regulatory measures in place in tackling illegal mining activities. Literature review has not found active role of the police in curbing illegal mining in the country. Since 1998, the role of the police has more or less been an executive role carrying out orders of the state. The role of the police did not seem to be clearly defined. Post the 1998 crisis, the central government was weak and the start of the New Order had distributed powers to regional authorities and political system. The result of this situation is exposure of the police to the stronger power of the local cukong, who took advantages of the weak government in Jakarta. During that time, the military and the police were separated. Police were given more powers by the government after the 1998 democratising measures. However, the separation led to conflict between the police and the military. Military supported local mining bosses (Klinken, 2007). The case of Freeport’s ties with the military is a testimony to this. Kent (2006) cites the example of PT Arutmin, a mining company in South Kalimantan, which sought help from the military when it faced illegal mining in its concession areas. Army cooperatives acted as intermediary to facilitate reduction of illegal mining activities by local residents. The organised local miners and ensured the miners delivered coal to mining companies. The Army then earned profit through resale. There were reported cases of Army taking bribes to allow black market sale of coal and exploiting and using violence against the miners. One example is that of Puskopad B, an Army cooperation in South Kalimantan who resorted to exploitation and use of violence against the miners (Kent, 2006). In such a situation, what action the police might have taken is a question to be considered. Kent (2006) stated that there were the military cooperatives and the police cooperatives that were connected with controlling illegal mining. As a counter measure to the Army involvement in illegal mining, the police did not show its consensus with the tactics of the Army cooperatives of issuing permits to miners. The police did not give recognition to these permits and as such they arrested miners operating with such permits. In that way, the police played their law enforcement roles (Kent, 2006). Kent (2006) cited few cases where few police authorities showed their opposition to the police involvement in illegal mining. One example is that of the then police Chief for South Kalimantan, who in 2005 ordered the police cooperatives in Puskopol to suspend any involvement with mining activities due to concerns that it became a cover for illegal mining activities (Kent, 2006). Crouch (2010), however, points out that this does not mean that police cooperatives were not involved in activities related to illegal mining. Police protection was also provided to such nexus and deals in return for huge deal protection payments (Erman, 2005). The police like the military also earned huge amount of extra funds throughout the country. Illegal mining are given protection by the police as well as the army. However, it was not considered lucrative. There were other illegal activities such as smuggling of vehicles, logging, subsidised products. Crouch (2010) stated that the police system was faced with dire financial status, which served as the key reason for their involvement in illegal activities, including illegal mining. Police preventive role was limited because of state’s inadequate budget allocations (Crouch, Political Reform in Indonesia After Soeharto, 2010). Another reason for lack of direct policing tactic may be because of the involvement of the regional governments in activities of illegal mining, as was seen in the illegal coalmining in West Sumatra (Crouch, 2010, p.101). All these factors might explain the absence of any policing strategy or even preventive measures in place to tackle illegal mining. In some cases, police even took control over illegal mining operations in South Kalimantan areas. Given these circumstances where the enforcement agencies are themselves involved in illegal mining crime, what measures could be expected in policing activities of illegal mining. Will a new legislation change the accountability of these agencies and ensure they do their jobs in controlling or preventing the illegal activities? The literature review did not provide sufficient information on the police strategy in preventing illegal mining. This may stand obvious to the fact that the agency has been involved in the activities, directly or indirectly. However, the review found certain legislative measures taken up by the government, which will be reviewed to understand if there was any effective strategy to curb illegal mining. Earlier sections have shown the complex intermingled factors that have contributed to activities of illegal mining. The weak financial and social position of the miners, strong presence of private entities and involvement of enforcement bodies such as the police might have led to failure of implementation of preventive measures. The complexity of the problem might have resulted to state’s policy structuring with lesser focus on policing tactics. For example, Erman (2005) pointed out that locals resisted against tactic of the local authorities to curb illegal mining activities. This led to change in tactics from preventing illegal mining to managing irresponsible mining (Erman, 2005). This was seen in the establishment of KUDs, village unit cooperatives by the mayor and the District Head of Sawahlunto in order to financially support small scale mining activities. KUDs will act as agents for the sale of coal (Erman, 2005). The tactic included training miners about safety measures in respect to accidents and soliciting agreement from the miners not to mine in prohibited areas. Local cooperatives enable the miners to supply mining commodities to the companies at a price that could cover the overhead costs of labour, extraction and transportation. The existence of these cooperatives was a way that legitimised the illegal coalmining in Sawhlunto (Erman, 2005). This tactic, however, does not show any kind of involvement of the police. It was focused more on changing the attitude and practice of the illegal miners. It represents an policy tactic rather a policing tactic, which is aligned with observation of Erman (2005) that KUDs were meant to reduce illegal mining and to put cukong out of business by formalizing and legitimizing illegal mining activities (Erman, 2005). The government adopted a mix of policy framework such as the creation of KUDs and the legislative framework in an attempt to control illegal mining. It is observed that the financial and other damages that illegal mining has caused the country have led to new laws being enacted to govern the illegal mining activities, private entities, and the local governments, which were involved in the activities. For example, a 2007 law was also passed under which license will replace existing government contracts, separating the relation between the Government and private investors. A license company requires settling any disputes with the land owner. Minerals are not classified into groups, other than those identifiable as radioactive, non-metals, metals or coal. The mining industry requires processing mined ore or concentrates to metal in Indonesia alone. Such new laws apparently indicate that the government has been attempting to separate itself from private players in a bid to bring some control over their operation (US Department of the Interior, 2007). In order to monitor regional governments, regional governments were subject to Law No. 22 that required their regulations to conform to existing national laws and not contradict public interest (Crouch, 2010, p.101). Here, IBP, Inc. (2015) states that public interest is paramount and any illegal activities should be held against public interest. In this regard, regional government should ensure protection of the natural resources, which is a public interest issue. However, the laws were contradictory that do not define the objectives clearly. The Law No.22 contradicts with the Decentralisation Law 22/1999 that has transferred authority and responsibility to the regional governments from central government. The latter has led to issue of numerous permits being issued by the regional governments. Many of the permits recipients were unauthorised businesses with the objectives of earning quicker revenues. This resulted in increase of illegal mining since the central control reduced (IBP, Inc., 2015, p.126).

The transfer of power by the central government to the regional powers has apparently taken precedence over any kind of enforcement measures. National government’s assertion of mining rights through legislative and policy measures was not sufficient in curbing illegal mining. The lack of police intervention being a part of policy and regulatory intervention demonstrates two observations. First is that the regional government were more focused on its abuse of power with total disregard to public interest in relation to responsibility to curb mining activities. Second is that while the central government passed the law, it did not define how the provisions could be enforced, such as the use of police forces in curbing illegal mining activities. As observed earlier, post the separation of the military and the police, police were given more power to enable assertion of control by the national government over regional mining activities. These laws did not place any responsibility or accountability upon the police to enforce the law. Taking into account the then existing circumstance, it could be stated that there has been an apparent loss of priority on the part of the national government over employing the police forces in appropriate direction of preventing illegal mining. Although it enacted laws and regulation to control mining activities, both legal and illegal, it did not have any enforcement framework in place, including the proper use of the police forces in curbing the illegal activities of the miners, private entities and the regional governments.

2.4. Other Jurisdictions

The position of illegal mining and the involvement of the police in Indonesia bear similarity with those in countries like Zimbabwe and Philippines. Protection of illegal miners by local authorities and the police could also be found in other jurisdictions as well. In Zimbabwe in Shurugwi and Mazowe areas, small scale illegal mining activities were widespread with gold panners registering claims in Mazowe areas. There were many cases of land seizures and increasing activities in all sectors of mining. Direct police involvement could be seen in 2006 in Chiadzwa where diamond mines were and police gave protection by guarding the area. Most of these police officers were bribed or got their shares (Sadomba, 2011). In Zimbabwe, there was use of excessive force. The biggest perpetrator of violence against illegal miners was the state. Name of police operations, for example “Operation Hakudzokwi” known as “no smuggler will return alive” that took place on 2008 in Chiyadwa indicates the use of brutal police force. It was considered as the brutal clampdown on diamond mining. Army and police considered such operation as “shock therapy” to reassert authority. The Police and the Military joined hands to conduct these operations killing many miners, arresting them, and suffocating them by administering tear gas in mining tunnels (Moore & Mawowa, 2010, p.330). This tactic is extremely different from the tactics used in Indonesia, which used more of legislative and policy measures, such as the Law No.22 or the creation of KUDs. Whatever police intervention seen in Indonesia was not up to the extent of brutality employed in Zimbabwe. In Zimbabwe, the military and the police worked together. Moore & Mawowa (2010), however, argues that the use of excessive force masked the involvement of the elite community in mineral smuggling. One thing is common between Indonesia and Zimbabwe regarding policy around illegal mining, which is that the policies were contradictory. On one hand, operations were conducted to clamp on illegal mining and on the other hand, it was allowed where the elites were involved through a formal legal set up(Moore & Mawowa, 2010, p.330).One way or the other, it is evident that the state along with the involvement of companies desires to assert control over mineral resources and mining activities excluding small scale miners. This looks like a regular feature in all jurisdictions where illegal mining activities take place. Indonesia’s national government attempted to separate relation between the Government and private investors through a 2007 law operation (US Department of the Interior, 2007). Similar kind of segregation is seen in Philippines as well. The abuse of power by the regional parties, the strong influence of the private entities and local mining bosses and subservient and non-definitive role played by the police, as seen in Indonesia, could also be seen in Philippines. The Mining Act, 1995 mandates private mining firms that apply for permits, called the Environment Compliance Certificate to prepare and also implement environmental plans to avoid or mitigate negative effects of mining. They need to seek social acceptability of large scale project with the local communities by holding public consultation and their hearings.(Morris-Jung & Min (2018) observed that these mandates were avoidable as they were vulnerable to strategies driven by money. This happened with the Bicol Rapu-Rapu Polymetallic Project claimed to have had been the largest project. During the two public hearings for this project, it was reported that the firm had brought the crowd that favoured mining and hired barangay officials. They also sought the Local Government Units to speed up the social acceptability requirements. Local civil society groups expressed fear and concern that the firm could influence the hearings and decision making (Morris-Jung & Min, 2018, pp. 261-262).The inefficiency of the law and that of the regulatory agencies of this kind could also be seen in small scale mining operations. The People’s Small-Scale Mining Act, 1991 governs the small-scale mining operations. The authority is with the local government to authorise and approve small scale operations. However, the same flaw exists at this level with many mining deals used local rent seekers, or surface land claimants and mining operators to access mining sites and operate at a seemingly large scale. Despite the law capping the mining limit, small scale operators could extract more than the permissible limit (Morris-Jung & Min, 2018, p. 262). In regard to the role of the police, it could be stated that having a defined role of the police and laying down definitive policing tactic would have enabled enforcement of legislative and regulatory measures. If the laws that were passed by the Indonesia national government had also defined authority to the police, the situation of police, which has been playing a subservient role in the political system concerning preventing illegal mining, would have been different from what has been seen in the earlier sections. Like it is seen in Zimbabwe, the military and the police worked together in curbing illegal mining. Police operations, such as Operation Hakudzokwi, were possible only through an administrative and legislative transfer of power to the police. Unfortunately, the tactics, whether regulatory or policing, serve the higher needs of those in power, the regional governments, private entities or the elite community involve in legal or illegal mining activities.

2.5. How effective are the tactics?

Observing the events and developments so far relating to illegal mining, it seems that there is an un-expressed permission to continue activities of illegal mining. The involvement of local public officials, particularly providing a system to take advantage of flaws in the law or protection to the activities is a testimony to the non-existence of a strict intention to enforce prohibitive laws on illegal mining. The continuing prevalence of illegal mining in Indonesia is a testimony to the fact that there have been not enough enforcement resources or optimal usage of existing resources to deal with illegal mining. This was also the case with Philippines, where most of the mining activities fall beyond government regulation and also supervision and the Government lacks human resource to conduct supervision. The regulations and existing framework focus only on small scale activities (Morris-Jung & Min, 2018). The weak national government in enforcing regulation against illegal mining contributes to inability of the police system to conduct any preventive act. This was also seen in Philippine where weak centre power and the loyalty of officials towards the local politicians and government led to the inability to police actors in relation to illegal mining (Camba, 2018). Similar scenario could be seen in Indonesia as well. For example, Indonesia has the Government Regulation No. 55 of 2010 that regards the development and control of management of mineral and coal mining. However, it requires the concerned ministry to guide the provincial government and regency and city governments in implementation of management of mining operations. The requirement of regional governments in implementing the regulation might have created the problem of lack of policing reforms (Goodpaster, 2007). Goodpaster (2007) observes that despite the existence of relevant laws, the legal system of Indonesia seems to have fallen to corruption. It has resulted in loss in governance capacity, social disaffection, and economic loss. The military and the police’s failure led to continue illegal activities, including illegal mining. Goodpaster (2007) further states that the corruption existing in the country is structural with the military, judiciary, public officials and the police enforcing it. This also resulted to defiance to legal reforms (Goodpaster, 2007). Only a few instances were found where the police department also sought government policy intervention to curb illegal mining. The then Indonesian National Chief of Police, General Sutanto wrote to five ministers with respect to curbing illegal tin mining (Perdana, 2006).However, such one of instance interventions may not be able to curb the illegal mining that has been ongoing for a long time with political and enforcement agencies involved. Directorate of Mineral Resources Inventory, Feraco, PT. (2005) provides that the strategy in eradicating illegal mining involves stage wise and case by case action and it involves persuasive nurturing and repressive actions if necessary. However, the challenge in implementing the strategy lies with the uncoordinated efforts amongst institutions, including the police (Directorate of Mineral Resources Inventory, Feraco, PT., 2005). Literature review has revealed that there have been more of regulatory and legislative measures in place. The shift of power to the regional government with strong role played by private entities is an obvious testimony to severe lack of enforcement action including police action and tactics. For instance, the national government took certain steps, such as issuing warning against buying illegal output and prohibiting use of government roads to transport commodities of illegal mining. Tighter environmental laws, such as the 2009 Decree PP18 passed by the Environmental Protection Agency, were passed to impose stricter standards governing waste discharge (IBP, Inc., 2015). This Decree PP18 imposes stricter standards on discharge of waste. It also reserves very large areas of water catchment and also limits any new mining activity in those areas. This was not to restrict established exploration and mining agreements. It was aim to encourage mining companies to improve coordination with local environmental bodies to improve environmental related strategies (IBP, Inc., 2015). However, the literature review did not find any breach of the regulation and most important any enforcement action being taken against breaches. Unfortunately, literature review did not reveal any role played by the police in enforcing the decree. Also, the Decree appears a national government measure to assert control through regulation. Such assertion could also be read into the May 12, 2020 bill that limits the size of mining operations. It now permits automatic permit extensions up to 20 years. This bill is argued to be against the environment as more mining would be carried out. Jong (2020) states that this bill would arguably benefit seven major private companies in Indonesia. It does not arguably address issues of abandoned mining pits, which are safety hazards, and does not address accountability of the companies responsible to rehabilitate the abandoned mining sites (Jong, 2020). The lack of defining police role and control over the mining activities appears to be a smaller issue when compared with undefined policy framework. PWC (2019) reported that Indonesia has been facing the issue of inconsistent policies and regulations in the Indonesian mining sector (PWC, 2019). This may cause continuance of the activities of illegal mining. This is understandable considering the connection of most of the enforcement agencies, including the police forces, with illegal mining, as is seen so far. The testimony of the failure of the efforts to curb illegal mining is the existence of illegal gold mining as of the end of 2019, despite the reported expanded efforts of the authorities to shut down illegal gold mining, for instance in Sumatra. The root cause of the failure may be the reduction or absence of monitoring efforts by law enforcers (Putra, 2020).

A positive law in regard to curbing illegal mining is the Act No. 4 of 2009 on Mineral and Coal, which makes an offence criminally liable. Based on this Act, mining is set in mining area. The central government has appointed a mining region, where mining areas are categorised into radioactive, coal, metallic minerals, non-metallic and rock. There is a region Mining License (WIUP) and a Mining Business License (IUP) granted for locations designated WIUP. Those who do not hold mining permit holder are allowed to take a mineral in their concession area and cannot exploit other minerals in that concession. Violation of the rules is a criminal offence (Daeli & Suharto, 2018). However, the limited literature review on police preventive measure and policing tactics has found no instances of police action implementing the laws and regulation. The general understanding derived from the literature review so far is the severe lack of defining police role and hence the lack of police action and tactics in curbing illegal mining.

Chapter 3 – Findings, Discussion and Recommendation

After the 1998 democratising measures, when the military and the police were separated, and after the local cukong took over the reins of the illegal mining, neither regulatory or policing strategies worked in governing the activities. The lack of implementation of laws and regulatory enforcement measures has caused the still prevalent cases of illegal mining. This establishes the gap between measures and the ground reality. The facts on the ground contradict official declaration of effective measures the government declared implemented. For instance, despite the authorities’ declaration in 2014 about the eradication of illegal mining in Sumatra, artisanal miners were reportedly increasingly operating throughout the province, even in the protected areas. Also, the lack of interest of the authorities or the abuse of the system by local mine owners that degrades the environment is seen in the proliferation of the pit mines (Putra, 2020). There has been inconsistency in policies and regulatory measures governing activities of illegal mining that started expanding the illegal activities. Situation of illegal mining became out of control at the late 1990s (Erman, 2005, p. 206).

3.1. Police, a beneficiary- spectator with no ability to mitigate risks related to illegal mining

According to Putra (2020), the existing position remains the same with the same actors involved in illegal mining since the beginning (Putra, 2020). They are the miners, officials in the local council and the police. They have formed network which law enforcement cannot pierced through and touch the miners. The local mining bosses have nexus with the regional or local authorities (Putra, 2020). Local bosses have been occupying a position of power since the time when the police and the military separated. As pointed out by Klinken (2007), this was a reason for conflict between the police and the military as the military supported local mining bosses (Klinken, 2007). The story seems to remain the same. Police appears to be still protecting activities of businesses involved in mining. In the Southeast Sulawesi province, PT GemaKreasi Perdana was accused of operating without environmental permits. Police have had arrested protestors. Reportedly, mining activities have caused environmental damage concerns and have also been involved in issues of land conflicts. Not only have these entities caused reportedly unresolved deaths of local residents, their activities have also caused after-affect such as abandoned mining pits, which have claimed lives of children (Gokkon, 2019). These incidents show that police has contributed, directly or indirectly, to continuation of illegal mining through a more formal setup unlike in the earlier situation where they were directly part of the illegal mining activities protecting them and gaining in huge returns. Their involvement seems to have taken a more formal setting. In recent times, there has been a tremendous shift in locals’ mindset towards illegal mining where they have formed watchdog groups to protest against private entities. Police have performed their formal responsibilities of carrying out executive order. The last quarter of 2019 saw massive anti-mining activists and opposition by residents. They have been facing backlash from the police. Mining firms, such as PT GemaKreasi Perdana, located in Southeast Sulawesi province, are accused of operating without environmental permit. Student residents protested against its activities (Gokkon, 2019). Another reason of protests by the local residents is deprivation of their livelihood against the private entities. They demanded closure of iron ore mines operated by PT Jagat MahesaKarya and PT IntanLianda Mandiri. Residents alleged that the mining activities threaten their livelihoods. They also alleged that some operations are illegal. This demands of this group of locals conflicted with those of the watchdogs. For example, one of the watchdog is Murdani, the head of the West Nusa Tenggara chapter of the Indonesian Forum for the Environment (Walhi). Assailants barricaded him inside his own house and set the house on fire. He survived the arson attack (Gokkon, 2019).This attack also shows the conflict between watchdogs and illegal miners. Murdani has been reportedly protesting against illegal sand mining and seeking suspension on issuing permits for new mines (Gokkon, 2019). Erman (2005) observed that such issue of permits for new mines is a flaw in implementation of the Law, 22/1999 in 2001. The numerous permits started being issued demonstrated a nexus between the issuing authority and the companies being issued the permits (Erman, 2005). Taking into account the events and the conflict between competing interests in the form of the national government assertion of control, the abuse of power by the regional government, the influence and involvement of the private mining entities, conflict between the locals and the miners, it could be observed consistently that the police has been a beneficiary spectator, which gain illegal proceeds and only operated under influence form those in power. Thus, the question of whether policing and regulatory tactics to mitigate risk of illegal mining is mute.

3.2. Police with new defined formal role, but same outcome

It has been the local residents who have been affected, socially and economically. As seen earlier, the local miners were exposed to lack of medical care, abuse and violation of their rights. In recent times, mining has taken a more formal setting with involvement of private activities based on legislative framework. Mining Journal (2020) observes that such involvement has led to reaction from the local residents in the form of armed groups, such as the Free Papua Organisation. Free Papua Organisation seeks freedom from Indonesian rule. They alleged that the government is stealing the region's resources. As a form of their opposition, a police officer was reportedly shot death giant near the Grasberg copper-gold mine run by PT Freeport Indonesia (PT-FI). The government has a majority stake in PT-FI (Mining Journal, 2020). This event shows three things. First is the continuation of the old problem of state exercising control or monopoly over mining right. Second is the government is finally able to govern the private entities and stakeholders by joining hands with them in operating mining activities. Third is that the role of the police is defined now, but more of law enforcer body protecting the mining activities of the entities. These observations for a fact establish that the police functions as per the political demands, whether it was under the regional government earlier or the national government now. The police have been used by both the regional and national government in furtherance of their objectives of control mining rights. For example, PT ANTAM, a state owned mining company, had control on exercise of land rights and activities of mining. They laid down programmes involving local residents to encourage illegal miner to change their activities and to protect PT ANTAM’s mining sites. They used security guards recruited from police forces (Pudjiastuti, 2005). Since the official recognition of illegal mining with the activities in Lusang Gold Mining Company under the regime of the New Order, the policing system has not been a governing body regulating illegal mining. Earlier, it was subject to the power of the regional governments and actors. Recently, it has been under the national government. The recent developments establish that the national government has been able to assert its control over mining operation and rights directly through its entities. This also shows that such assertion does not have direct involvement of the police, but use of the police force for executing its plan. Such observation could be made out the 2016 event related with government plan to assert national control over mineral resources. Accordingly, Amman Mineral acquired the vast land concession and BatuHijau open-pit copper mine from Newmont Goldcorp, a large American company, in 2016. This is in West Sumbawa where wildcat miners have been operating for many decades on the Indotan concession, and have established permanent communities functioning as an industrial-scale village. Amman alleges that the continuous and long time use of liquid mercury to process gold ore has reportedly poisoned the environment and caused health issues arising from such mercury poisoning. Officers from Police Mobile Brigade Corps were used to shut down mountaintop camps of dozens of outlaw miners (Paddock, 2019). This recent event support the three observations made above and the police have a defined role of enforcing the law protecting the mining activities of the entities. It could also be observed that the recent events are driven by the ulterior motive of asserting national control and creating a monopoly excluding individual miners. The motive could be derived from the statement of Mr. Ramlie, Director of Amman: “We can see that if we don’t contain this problem now and it is made known that Sumbawa has a lot of easily extractable gold deposits, this island could be crawling with all sorts of illegal miners and very pervasive use of mercury.” This recent political strategy would be a repetition of the same old story of exercising control, but there is a shift in the tactic. With PT ANTAM, a state owned mining company mentioned earlier, their programmes to change activities of illegal miners were allegedly to control exercise of land rights and activities of mining (Pudjiastuti, 2005). With PT Arutmin discussed earlier, they used illegal miners that contributed to most of the illegal output from the province (IBP, Inc., 2015, p.69). In regard to Amman, the tactic shows a shift. It does not reflect any intend to use the miners or to manage the miners. It reflects an aggressive approach to gather all the control to itself excluding any rights to the miner in alignment with the government assertion of national control.

Observing events earlier, police has a defined formal role, but perform as beneficiary- spectator with no ability to mitigate risks related to illegal mining. It has pushed the local residents to take up the issue on their own hands, organising protests against the entities and illegal mining activities. Thus, it could be stated that it is mostly the residents that are fighting against illegal mining. The role of the Police is not focussed against illegal mining, but in maintaining law and order with the ultimate benefit being achieved by the mining companies. Earlier, as seen in above section, local residents did not organise protests to the extent they did in recent times. From the year 2010 until 2018, 171 recorded cases of violence against activists were recorded. Most of the activists were environmental activists (Gokkon, 2019). As seen earlier too, cases such as those involving student activists like Murdani and the 2019 anti-mining activists and opposition were not seen in earlier times. Police performed as per demands of the government and commercial interests of the mining entities. The detrimental role of the police could be gathered from the concern raised by Muhammad Jamil, the head of legal division of watchdog group, Jatam, “Protests are actually a verbal form of lodging a report by the people to the police, but why it is the protesters who end up being arrested by the police?” The reason could be understood by tracing back to the historical role of the police in illegal mining until the present. Police has been directly or indirectly supporting illegal mining, whether by individual miners or by mining companies. The role of the police in these recent events clearly shows the police’s tendency to act on complaints of the companies and governments. It allegedly ignores the complaints by the residents and activists. Majorly, the protests centre on environmental damage and concerns. There has been violent reaction to protestors. For example, the 2015 murder of Salim Kancil, who was a farmer who organised various protests against a illegal sand mine in East Java or the 2018 attack watchdog group, Jatam’s office in the East Kalimantan province(Gokkon, 2019).

3.3. Competing interests derail preventive tactics

The issue of mining activities in general has involved several competing interests, which concern the miners, mining company, government and enforcement agencies. Such interests have taken the form of political, regulatory, economic and social issues. There has been a constant contradiction between aspects of political system, regulatory enforcement system, and economic system and the social system. In the national government attempt to assert control over mining rights, there were regulatory requirements put in place for mining individuals and companies to comply. For instance, residents could secure the mining permit or IPR under the 2010 regulation to operate mining on an artisanal scale. However, the requirements as set out by the regulations may be impracticable for the resident to comply. They may also not be willing to do so too. In this regard Adhi Wibowo stated that “They find the technical requirements difficult to fulfil, such as a prohibition on the use of heavy equipment and explosives. IPR holders aren’t allowed to operate those two.” This poses the difficult to operate mining activities, which in turn creates the appeal of illegal mining (Prakoso, 2015). Such regulatory requirement imposes a restraint upon or impracticality faced by resident to work under regulation permits. This is reflected in the statement of Adhi Wibowo, the Energy and Mineral Resources Ministry official, who, in 2015, was in-charge of technical and environmental compliance in mining sector. He stated that “small-scale miners would rather work on their own and keep what they find.” For instance, Timah is an Indonesian state-controlled tin miner. He stated that working for companies such as Timaid, “is apparently not an attractive option for them, because they will only get paid for their mining services, whereas otherwise they could be pocketing the profit from selling the ore themselves” (Prakoso, 2015). Kambani (2003) stated that many illegal mining operated at sites that lack basic infrastructure since they require a minimal processing technology (Kambani, 2003). Muslihudin et al. (2020) observed certain factors that could contribute to such mining activities without permission. Activities without permission provide high material benefits. Some of the excavated materials do not need processing and could sell sold directly to the market. The mineral needs of the community are relatively high particularly in urban, suburban and government projects. Some of mining operations are very short in duration than those required in the licensing process. These factors were seen in most mining activities in Banyumas, which continue despite government’s prohibition. These observations reflect a gap between the regulatory measures to prevent illegal mining and economic measures to safeguard financial position of the miners. Muslihudin et al. (2020) observes that illegal mining creates a conflict between the residents and the local government. The local government often faces dilemma between prohibiting of and controlling illegal mining. On one hand, prohibition is called for because the activities are illegal and controlling the activities are needed as the miners do not stop their activities, which pose health and environmental hazards. On the other hand, social aspects should be considered given that illegal mining is also a means to provide economic and social welfare to the miners. On one hand, implementation of laws, such as Law No. 23 of 2014 on local government affected the control measures and after October 2, 2016 when the Law became effective, the local government does not possess any authority over mining activities in areas under provincial government. This has reduced the control, which significantly enables continuance of illegal mining, such as what could be seen in case of illegal gold mining in Banyumas (Muslihudin et al., 2020). On the other hand, giving power to the local government, as seen earlier, did not yield to controlled-mining activities, but instead increased illegal mining activities. Despite several instance of reports and complaints to the government, police or Komnas HAM, the national human rights commission, the protests and the illegal mining activities are still occurring (Gokkon, 2019). The reasons may be in governance incapacity and in the complex web of competing interests covering that of the interest of the mining companies, social and economic interest of illegal miners, local government interest, and passive involvement of the police in solving the problem. As seen earlier that despite existence of legal framework to control illegal mining activities, the legal system of Indonesia seems to have fallen to governance incapacity. This still holds true in the recent times as well. There has been ineffective implementation of criminal sanctions against crime related to mining. Act Number 4 of 2009 on Mineral and Coal under Article 158, Article 160(1) and (2), Article 161, Article 163 (1) and (2) and Article 164 are penal provisions regulating crimes related to unlicensed or illegal mining. The issue is that these penal provisions set maximum threat. It was observed by the Central Java Regional Police region, this maximum limit negatively impacted demands of Public Prosecutor and court decision as the provisions do not set the minimum penalty. Discretion given to the prosecutors and judge may result to low penalty, which may not have any deterrent effect upon the perpetrators of crime. The inconsistencies in policies and regulations seen earlier are still in effect. This is seen in the contradictory laws, such as Article 169 that governs validity of contract of work and Act Number 4 Of 2009 on Mineral and Coal Mining that regulates obligation of business entities and IUPK IUP holders, owned by foreign investors and creates shifting patterns of relationship between mining entrepreneurs and the government (Anwar & Mashdurohatun, 2019).

3.4 Government intervention is the key

Government intervention is the key in enforcing measures to prevent illegal mining. Recognising the degree of damage to the country and to the environment, the national government initiative has led to stern actions early 2020 by the Indonesian police and military against illegal mining, in upstream areas of rivers in West Java province. The reason behind these actions was the events of fatal floods and landslides due to excessive mining activities (The Star, 2020). There are cases of arrest of financers and managers of the mining activities. The direct involvement of the central government office has impacted the enforcement actions on the ground. The actions started after Indonesian President Joko Widodo’s order to close all unlicensed mining firms, whose activities caused deforestation and environmental damage (The Star, 2020). However, for a long lasting progressive result, such kind of actions have to sustain and create far reaching impact to stop illegal mining activities in other sites. Because, despite the order, there are 417 illegal mining sites in the province in West Java Tubagus Nugraha(The Star, 2020). A concerned issue is whether government assertion of national control over mining operation will gain success considering the active role of the local enforcement agencies and government bodies. Whether the power conferred on the police will be sufficient to execute this assertion. History says otherwise. The long time survival of wildcat miners in Indotan concession, West Sumbawa is a testimony to the total failure of the government and enforcement agencies. The continuous use of mercury use that has caused significant environment and health hazards (Paddock, 2019). This also demonstrates that the government is also not enforcing environmental laws, such as the 2009 Decree PP18 passed by the Environmental Protection Agency, which is claimed to be a tighter regulation to impose stricter standards governing waste discharge (IBP, Inc., 2015). The neglect of the government and the lack of awareness of health concerns by the miners were pointed out by (Erman, 2005). The surprisingly thing is despite seeing this environment and health hazards, it did not even prompt the government to issue warnings or enforcement of ban on the use. When such is the condition of the government, with selective actions such as those taken in West Java province, there cannot be any expectation from the police to take independent enforcement action. It seems an impossible task to pin-point the cause that would have enabled finding corrective measures. On one hand, there is lack of concrete government and enforcement agencies’ initiative and on the other miners are pushed to or voluntarily risking their lives. The entire social, political and economic structures are intermingled in a complex web that would be very challenging to unfold. How will the problem be solved when miners are encouraged enough to discard the fear of the police, such as what the wildcat miners in Indotan concession did. Police play a passive role as the issue is more of a political nature attached with social problems concerning the illegal miners.

3.5. Recommendation

Earlier sections establish the issue of illegal mining is an issue comprising contradictory aspects of political system, regulatory enforcement system, and economic system and the social system. Given the circumstances, the following is a list of few recommended measures:

a) Social corrective measures. It has been seen so far that illegal mining in deep rooted in the society. The issue of sustenance in respect of the illegal miners exposed to basic health issues and exploitation in the hands of local mining bosses, private entities and regional governments calls for certain social re-structuring. The same holds true with respect to the police forces, which are also exposed weak financial income condition. The need of sustenance is a major factor contributing to illegal mining. Recommended measure in this regard could refer to the social aspect based argument by Paddock (2019). He talks about competing interests of their right to livelihood and the need to prevent environmental damage (Paddock, 2019). The measure has to balance these interests. Thus, measure such as those taken up by Amman to completely shutting down illegal miners and mining may not work to socially and economically safeguard miner’s interests. The measure of managing irresponsible mining pointed out by Erman (2005) may work better where local cooperatives with strict administrative and governance policies in place could reduce illegal mining. Similar tactic is being followed in Peru. Oxford Business Group (2014) reported that in Peru, the modern strategy has moved from the traditional use of police and military force. Recent steps involve a two year programme with six parts, which is aim to prevent illegal operations by giving a formal set up wherever possible. In the year 2012, more than 70,000 miners declared their intent to formalisation of their activities. This was the first step. Step two was to sign contracts with concession and land holders before they submit EIA and obtain concerned certificate for their respective business and operation (Oxford Business Group, 2014). With introduction of a formal administrative and governance framework, police could be given defined role and accountability to enable enforcement of the policies and programmes that could give economic independence and remove the miners from the social conditions they are currently in.

b) A governing framework. The constant feature associated with illegal mining is lack of a governance framework. This might be the reason why police was not used in enforcement of rules and regulations for the right reasons. It has always been to safeguard the commercial interest of the stakeholders with power. From the local mining bosses and private entities to the regional government and the police and military in earlier times, and from the private entities to the national government in recent times, the lack of a countrywide strong governing framework has led to continuing illegal mining and non-use of the police forces to safeguard the national resources. For example, the modern strategy adopted on Peru did not produce the desired effect. The apparent low successive rate of this formalization process could be gathered from the fact that the government in 2016 extended the deadline for formalisation. The reason may lie in the criticism of the formal companies already in existence against this deadline extension that this will weakened their position that is already under disadvantage of various licensing, tax as well as environmental regulations (Oxford Business Group, 2014). Similar failure could be seen when the regional government started issuing multiple permits without having any governing framework to regulate the permits and activities of mining. In the light of the above observation, the proposed framework should govern all entities and miners, whether they are employed by the government or private entities. There should be a separation between the government role and that of the entities, with the former occupying the role of enforcing rules and regulation in the best interest of the society. The framework should also define the role of the police in specific respect to enforcement of the rules and regulations. While defining the role of the police and other policy measures, it is advisable to understand the deep rooted social reason behind the problem. This reason runs true for the illegal mining problem in Ghana, Peru, Zimbabwe, Philippines or Indonesia, where illegal mining exists. Weak governance has resulted to denying local miners’ needs and demands and creates inequality creating social disputes across any jurisdiction (Oxford Business Group, 2014).

c) Political will to enforce legal framework The lack of political will since the time illegal mining was officially recognised has rendered any preventive action ineffective or produced inaction on the part of the enforcement bodies. This is reflected in argument posed by Banchirigah (2008) that artisanal mining communities are bound to their activities and hence, any corrective or preventive action through either formalisation, or alternative livelihood projects, or military intervention became ineffective. The deep rooted nature of the activities is safeguarded by heavy involvement of traditional leaders, mindsets of miners towards alternative income, multiple ranges of employment opportunities in the mining sector, and level of investment in the operations (Banchirigah, 2008). The continuing inability to curb the problem reflects the political passiveness to deal with the issue. Such passiveness was also seen when private entities could thwart every effort of the local authorities in Indonesia. It was also seen when local miners’ interests were sidelined and they were labeled illegal and big companies such as Newmont and Amman Mineral allegedly acquire lucrative mining concessions. Labelling the miners illegal did not solve the problem as local miners reap benefits, such as those miners located in the Taliwang region illegally mining golds (Paddock, 2019). In such circumstances, strict and proper legal framework needs to be in order. It should be enforced to bring accountability. Such accountability should be political accountability governing concerned government authorities. It should also hold miner and private entities accountable to compliance of the legal system. It should also make enforcement agencies, such as the police accountable for their acts. A glimpse of such accountability framework was seen in implementation and enforcement of the Indonesian President Joko Widodo’s order this year 2020 to close all unlicensed mining firms. Current need demands a political strategy with direct control over regulatory and socio-economic governance with defined policing and enforcement tactics governing mining activities, whether carried out by private or public bodies or organization.

Chapter 4 - Conclusion

This dissertation tackled the extent and nature of the problem of illegal mining in Indonesia. It explored the legal systems, policies and regulations and assessed their effectiveness in curbing illegal mining in Indonesia. The problem of illegal mining has created significant negative impact on the environment, economic and financial loss, and also the lives of the miners. The problem has involved and has also caused conflict between the competing stakeholders, including the miners, residents, government and private entities. What was surprising was the complete lack of policing role. Literature review did not find any active role of the police. The limited preventive role of the police was caused by unclear role of the police, inadequate financing, intrusive involvement of the regional governments in illegal mining, and the involvement of the police in illegal mining. This highlights the complexity of problem with a complex web involving weak financial and social position of the miners, pervasive presence of private entities, involvement of enforcement bodies, including the police also have resulted to lesser focus of the policy structuring on policing tactics. It is not that there were no measures taken to curb the problem. Instances of KUDs and creating of laws such as Law No. 22 attempted to solve the problem by focusing on public interest and holding illegal as public interest. However, the higher control of the regional government than the national government regarding mining failed these initiatives. These initiatives did not define use of police forces in curbing illegal mining activities. Such issue was also found in Philippines, where regional parties abuse power, private entities influenced decisions, and local mining bosses hold stronger power. Definitely, police played a subservient role. However, even in a system that had a definitive role of the police, such as in Zimbabwe, where the military and the police worked together in curbing illegal mining, the concern of the elite group holding decision making power remains constant. This dissertation has found that there is no stricter enforcement mechanism, which indicates that there has been a lack of definite law and strategy and definite power and role of the police. The national government has been weak in enforcing regulation against illegal mining. It has been weak in controlling the regional government and other local stakeholders. It has been weak in given sufficient power to the police, which have been under the governance of the national government, to tackle the problem. On one hand, the national government retains the police under its authority and on the other, the national government gives the power to the regional governments in implementing regulations. This has been the reason why the governance has fallen to corruption, and abuse. It has been found that the structural corruption in the country in the spheres of the military, judiciary, public officials and police enforcing led to the defiance to legal reform. This has also been the reason why irrespective of the relevant laws and regulation, there has been a failure on the part of the police to curb continuing illegal mining. The system has been weak in entirety and it could not put up a coordinated effort amongst institutions, including the police in taking any action or implementing strategy. Testimony to the failure of the system is reflected in the contradiction between what was reported and what was on the field. The findings of the dissertation show this. Even though there were instances where the authority reported eradication of illegal mining in certain areas, the report on the field was otherwise. The example of this is the incident of illegal mining in Sumatra. This finding of this dissertation shows that the problem has been continuing with the same actors in play and the same pattern being followed. The illegal miners, local officials, local mining bosses and the police formed a network that could not be pierced through any enforcement measures. The role of the police has been the same in terms of their objectives. They have been either involved in the activities, protecting activities of businesses, or advancing interest of the elite with power. The last role could be seen when they handled protests by local residence against mining activities for their cause of environment damage. Earlier, the police did not have a formal set up or definition. The current time sees a formal system of police. However, this has not changed anything. Earlier, the police were involved and had their cut from the illegal mining. Now, they carry out the orders of the political masters. Thus, police has been a beneficiary- spectator with no ability to mitigate risks related to illegal mining. The dissertation has found a change in the mindset of the locals, who have organised mass protest against illegal mining. The problem of local residents been affected, socially and economically remain a constant problem. However, the awareness has increased. This has led to proactive involvement of the locals in enforcing the relevant laws and regulations through the formal legal set up. The governments at the national and regional levels are direct competitors now. They are focused on assertion of power, as seen in the incident of PT ANTAM. The subservient role of the police, as seen in earlier times, could also be seen in recent government measures as well. Police has been used by the national and regional government to assert their respective authority at different stages. Their subservient role has directly or indirectly supported illegal mining. They have been acting on direction of the companies and governments. This situation presents a network of competing interests that have been derailing policing tactics. Despite a legal framework, the governance incapacity has failed to prevent illegal mining.

The recent national government initiative in upstream areas of rivers in West Java province demonstrates that government intervention is the key. The direct involvement of the central government with specific role and more important a structured power to the police shows effectiveness of policing tactics. However, selective action and non-continous measures cannot curb the problem on a long term basis. This is seen in the case of wildcat miners in Indotan concession. Therefore, in the light of all the competing factors, the national government should enforce social corrective measures to ensure sustenance to miners. A definite power and role structure under a formal administrative and governance framework, police could be used in holding breaching parties accountable to enable enforcement of regulations. A countrywide strong governing framework that provides a coordinated approach should be adopted to govern all entities and miners. It should separate the enforcement authorities from the entities involved in mining. All these could be effective when backed up by strong political strategy and action, such as seen in the recent action undertaken by the Indonesian President Joko Widodo.

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