China's Unique Foreign Policy in Africa

Introduction

Literature indicates that Chinese engagement with Africa involves distinct and unique policy features, like non-interference, and avoidance of tying of aid with political conditions made by China (Ashan, 2009); Chinese approach is distinct from the western approach. This makes Chinese foreign policy an interesting study in the context of African engagement. What also makes Chinese foreign policy relevant in terms of Africa is that Chinese engagement with Africa has grown exponentially; China is one of the biggest trade partners and investors in Africa (Gu, 2009). China also remains one of the most substantial donors to Africa. Therefore, there are multiple levels of engagement between China and Africa, three of the most important are through trade, investment and donation, making foreign policy approach of China to Africa very relevant. This chapter discusses the background of the research, lists the research questions and explains the research methodology of this research.

Background

Chinese policy in Africa is usually looked at through a prism of China’s economic interests in Africa in many studies as pointed out by Sun (2014) who argues that the scholarship on this subject is overwhelmingly focused on the economic angle of the Chinese interest in Africa, the role of the Chinese public and private sector in Africa and the economic and social impacts of Chinese activities in Africa. Eisenman (2015) too has revealed that there are different factors at play in contextualising the foreign policy of China in Africa and economic reasons are not the only factors driving the Sino-African relationship, for instance, China’s foreign policy in Africa is also driven by the need to formulate a certain international image for China and to achieve certain political gains, such as, support on its position on Taiwan through its Africa policy. Therefore, there are nuances in the Chinese approach to formulating its policy on Africa, which deserve further exploration. Barnett (2019) notes in the preview of his book that despite studying Chinese foreign policy for three and a half decades and writing a number of books on the subject, he still does not know clearly how foreign policy is made in Beijing. The reason for this is that there is little information available in the public domain about policy making, which makes it necessary for the current research to be undertaken from a secondary and not a primary research methods perspective. While primary documents may not be easily accessible, there is however a significant amount of literature on foreign policy making in China, including from writers like Barnett (2019) which is based on interviews with government officials and review of government documents in China. The same issue is related to an important part of this dissertation, which is foreign aid to Africa. Dreher, Fuchs, Parks, Strange, and Tierney (2018) have noted that “China does not systematically publish project-level data or even aggregated bilateral flow data on its official financing activities abroad” (p. 185), which is why they have used AidData’s Chinese Official Finance to Africa dataset in their own research to understand the way Chinese aid to Africa may be tied to economic interests that China has in Africa. Considering the difficulties faced by other researchers as well in gathering primary data from Chinese public domain, it is only possible to conduct this research using secondary data which can help this researcher get more insight on the foreign policy that drives China’s relationship with Africa. The primary focus of this research is on the foreign policy and the reasons for the way Chinese foreign policy in Africa is structured as it is.

Research questions

The overarching research question in this dissertation is related to China's role and agenda in Africa. The related research questions are as follows:

How does China approach policy making in context of Africa?

What are the reasons for China’s interest in African engagement?

Is the Chinese foreign policy in Africa solely driven by the economic agenda or are there other factors that are also responsible for the formulation of the Chinese foreign policy?

Has the Chinese foreign policy in Africa evolved over time? What are the crucial changes in this policy?

Research methodology

The dissertation seeks to explore the nuances in the way China and Africa mutually engage with each other with an emphasis on the agenda that drives China’s actions in Africa. This is a secondary research. The choice to use secondary sources to conduct this research as opposed to primary sources was made because of the lack of primary data in China, where government policies means that primary governmental data is not accessible in the public domain. The research is in the nature of a descriptive research, which would allow the researcher to obtain information but not test or verify the same as the researcher accepts the information in the secondary sources as it is (Monsen & Horn, 2008). This approach is aligned to the positivist research philosophy, which is based on the premise that the researcher accepts certain assumptions about the way he views the world (Collins, 2010). The research method adopted is qualitative method, which is based on the qualitative and non numerical data collected through methods, including literature review method (Creswell, 2013, p. 44). Qualitative research method can be adopted in a positivist framework, although qualitative research is generally associated with interpretivism (Collis & Hussey, 2009, p. 46). Secondary research methods will involve a library research, with the researcher searching for data manually and electronically (Sevilla, et al., 2007, p. 92). The dissertation is structured in the form of a literature review as it is based on secondary data, which will be analysed by the researcher as per a thematic analysis method. For the purpose of analysis of this secondary data, the researcher will identify the common and recurrent themes in the literature related to China’s foreign policy with respect to Africa. The findings of the research will be presented in a thematic manner. The next chapter in the dissertation discusses the historical development of the Chinese relationship with Africa. The focus is on the post colonial period in this chapter so as to understand the engagement between China and independent African nations. The chapter after that discusses the specific aspects of Chinese engagement, including economic diplomacy and the policy of non-interference. The findings of the discussion are summarised in the conclusion chapter.

Chapter 1: Sino-African historical engagement

Relations between China and Africa in the postcolonial period

Larkin (1973) wrote more than 4 decades ago that although at the time China had shown an interest in Africa, particularly after the African countries were no longer closed due to European colonisation, relations with Africa were not as important to China as its relations with other countries including then Soviet Union and the United States. However, he also predicted that “in time Africa will probably become a more important political force in its own right than it is today; there are strong reasons to expect that China will increase the share of her attention given to African policy” (Larkin, 1973, p. 1). Therefore, Larkin (1973) believed that China would increasingly give more attention in its foreign policy to Africa. China had come close to Africa due to some of the policies adopted by the African countries beginning in the 1970s; one of this was the TanZam (Tanzania-Zambia) railway, which was constructed in the 1970s (Lanteigne, 2019). China was involved in the project and provided aid and development support to the project, which was considered to be remarkable at the time when China itself was a developing economy with limited financial resources (Lanteigne, 2019). However, China developed a policy to engage with Africa at this stage by providing medical aid, loan assistance, and also by supporting liberation movements in the region (Lanteigne, 2019). The 1970s were a crucial time for China’s engagement with Africa, although for the two decades after the 1970s, the engagement with Africa dwindled as China turned inwards to construct the nation after the Cultural Revolution. In the 1990s, Africa once again became a focus for the Chinese foreign policy driven by three key factors. First, the Tiananmen Square incident had brought much international censure to China and the engagement with Africa, particularly in the context of aid and development projects was seen as a way to repair its international image. Second, there was a growing interest in China as well as Africa for joint development of African commodities and energy resources. Third, China and its policy makers were increasingly getting more confident about cross-regional diplomacy and wanted to engage more with regions outside of Asia-Pacific region (Lanteigne, 2019). Therefore, the foreign policy involving Africa appears to have first developed in the 1970s with the development of certain projects, forgotten for almost 20 years after mid 1970s, and then picked up again in the 1990s due to the three reasons discussed just before. At this time, Chinese foreign ministry has two departments with African focus, one being the Middle East and North Africa department, and the other being the Sub-Saharan Africa department (Barnett, 2019). The postcolonial period has seen an increasing interaction between China and Africa, which one commentator puts it in the terms of the “alignment of Africa’s natural resource endowments with China’s core economic interests” (Rupp, 2009, p. 65). This is an interesting insight into China’s developing relationship with Africa in the context of the latter’s postcolonial development. Rupp (2009) writes that in the first decade of the twenty first century, “China is likely to succeed in securing economic and political ties to African nations that rival if not displace relations that Euro-American nations have dominated over 150 years of colonial rule and neo-colonial influence” (p. 65). What is interesting in China’s engagement with Africa in the post colonial context is that like European and American influence in Africa being at times termed as neo-colonial, similar allegations have been made about Chinese engagement in Africa as some commentators have criticised Chinese approach to African nations as being neo-colonial (Mohan & Power, 2008). Rupp (2009) on the other hand, suggests that the Chinese engagement with African may be amenable to a different characterisation as opposed to colonial or neo-colonial. Chinese engagement with Africa has been suggested to be pragmatic with an emphasis on mutual benefit of both China and Africa. China needs resources and Africa needs socioeconomic development and the engagement of Africa and China is aimed at securing to each these objectives. The critics of Chinese engagement with Africa are mostly European and American, and they see Chinese engagement with Africa as being predatory; they argue that the Chinese activities in Africa are focussed on profiting China, displacing African industry and markets, and make African nations dependent on China in a way that is reminiscent of colonial practices (Rupp, 2009, p. 65). Indeed, some of these questions are also raised now in African public discourse, where the anxieties of the African countries with regard to Chinese activities in Africa are sometimes portrayed; this can be illustrated by the warning of South African Thabo Mbeki, who in 2006 stated that African nations should guard against entering into colonial type relationships with China (Rupp, 2009, p. 66). However, as Figure 1 below indicates, the Chinese and African trade has grown tremendously, with the period between 2000 and 2010 seeing increase in both imports and exports from and to China and Africa from less than $ 10 Billion to more than $ 60 Billion.

Nigeria remains the top destination for trade with China within Africa as the Table 1 below demonstrates. With 404 projects in 2018, Nigeria was way ahead of South Africa with 280 projects.

The above data also shows how China is involved in trade with African nations with 20 nations having 60 or more projects with China.

Chinese approach to Africa in its foreign policy

Conceptualising Chinese approach in Africa in a simplistic manner would be ignoring the nuances that are involved in the Chinese approach to Africa. Eisenman (2015) writes that the methods that Beijing employs with respect to its African engagement can be grouped into different categories that include "soft approach", agricultural and technical assistance, investment and economic support, military patronage and peacekeeping, and diplomatic support. China employs soft approach through humanitarian, cultural, and educational projects that provide aid and development to the African countries and also help promote a positive image of China in these countries (Eisenman, 2015). China has a larger strategy in the context of its international engagement, which includes cultivating political support, acquiring energy and natural resources, and securing commercial interests; these interests are also involved in the Chinese strategy in Africa (Eisenman, 2015). China has also found an opportunity to engage with Africa in the period after the end of the Cold War, when Russian policy became largely indifferent and the United States became increasingly preoccupied with engagements in the Middle East and Northeast Asia (Eisenman, 2015). The interest in Africa is largely driven by the energy and resources needs of China as the growing economy has gone from being an exporter or raw materials to an importer of steel, cement and copper, among other commodities (Carmody, 2017). At the same time, Africa has experienced stagnation in the post-independence era of many African nations, but since the 2000s some African economies have emerged as the fastest growing in the world, with China as the major trading partner of many of these economies (Carmody, 2017). Historically, China has been giving aid to African nations for many decades (Chaponnière, 2009). This can be explained by reference to the theory on foreign aid in political theory. Morgenthau (1962) noted that there are six types of foreign aid: humanitarian, subsistence, military, bribery, prestige, and foreign aid for economic development. Considering the nature of foreign aid that is given by China to Africa, it would clearly fall into at least four of these: humanitarian, subsistence, military, and foreign aid for economic development. While Morgenthau (1962) argues that foreign aid is a controversial area for political theory because it is difficult to comprehend what foreign aid is trying to achieve in foreign policy, Lumsdaine (1993) argues that countries give foreign aid to poorer nations because of the ethical and moral concern and desires for long term peace and prosperity. Some theorists have also spoken about the ‘big push’ theory with respect to foreign aid, which is based on the premise that aid would lead to global growth and initialise an upward path to economic development; however, Abuzeid (2009) argues that this is not borne by the evidence from the aid flows to Sub-Saharan Africa which despite having attracted substantial amounts of foreign aid over the years, has not seen the upward trajectory of growth because aid actually links to erosion in good governance. As China is one of the biggest donors of aid to this region, a question that may arise is whether Chinese aid actually leads to loss of good governance as there is an increase of institutional corruption in Sub Saharan Africa. This may also point at the difference in the worldview on aid to Africa from the perspective of African and Chinese writers. For instance, Hong (2008) writes about the significance of Chinese aid to the development of Africa in the positive sense. Foreign aid can also be seen as a way for improving the international image of China in the same way as Japan improved its image by providing significant amounts of foreign aid to countries in Asia, Africa and Latin America (Zhou, Zhang, & Zhang, 2015, p. 247). Shimomura and Ping (2013) do write that the Chinese policy makers have developed their own distinct foreign policy but also followed what other donors have done. Therefore, there can be some truth in the argument that China also develops its foreign aid policy in Africa as a matter of prestige. While Chinese writers may view foreign aid in Africa from a generally positive outlook, African writing on the subject does indicate some variance. One of the important links as pointed above in the work of Abuzeid (2009) is that of aid and governance in Africa; this is also supported by the findings of Bräutigam & and Knack (2004) who write that “in many of the countries with poor governance records, aid continues to contribute a very high percentage of government budgets” (p. 255), thus revealing a link between how governments in African countries may be subverting their own duties in economic development by using aid. This link between aid to African countries and bad governance has also been called an institutional trap (Birdsall, 2007). While one aspect of Chinese foreign policy in Africa relates to aid, another aspect relates to trade. Trade theory can be used here. Eisenman (2012) writes about the new anti- Chinese resistance narratives in Africa due to the trade patterns of China in Africa that are aimed to access markets in Africa and access to Africa’s abundant natural resource endowments. The disenchantment with China in some African scholarship may be due to the growing understanding of the negative impacts of trade with China; such negative impacts include challenges to African longer term objectives to diversify its economic and trade structure and ensuring industrial development of African countries as trade gets more and more focussed with China (Ademola, Bankole, & Adewuyi, 2016). China on the other hand, appears to be gaining more from the trade in Africa as demonstrated in statistics on GDP growth in Africa and China (Ademola, Bankole, & Adewuyi, 2016). Evidence also suggests that while increase in trade imports from China initially broadened access to trading for poor people and created short-term improvements in livelihoods, this benefit did not last as competition drove down profit margins (Lyons & Brown, 2010). A case study on Ethiopia suggests that based on evidence, there are clear winners and losers in Ethiopia in context of trade with China: “consumers, commercial traders who bring manufactured consumer goods from China for sale in Ethiopia, entrepreneurs engaged in establishing small scale factories and service centers by buying machineries from China” are the winners and the “small scale firms engaged in clothing and footwear sectors and their employees; traditional suppliers and contractors in the road, electric power and telecommunication sectors of the economy, which are invariably firms from industrialized countries” are the losers (Geda & Meskel, 2010, p. 30). Similar effects on local business and industry is seen in Nigeria where Chinese exports forced many textile factories to close down (Adisu, Sharkey, & Okoroafo, 2010). Moreover, as Chinese businesses in Africa choose to hire Chinese labour, this also has negative impacts on the labour sector of Africa, with local labour losing out to the Chinese (Anshan, 2007). Indeed, one of the key criticisms against Chinese companies in Africa is their tendency to use Chinese labour instead of African (Anshan, 2007). This is not just limited to infrastructure projects as even in agricultural production Chinese labour is being used (Brautigam, 2015). There are also some instances of extreme measures taken by Chinese employers against local employees, for instance, there is a case involving Zambia where in the copper belt of Chambishi, Chinese supervisors sprayed gunfire on protesting employees (Trofimov, 2007). These are some of the areas that do spark concern in the context of Africa and China relations.

Chinese foreign policy towards Africa has been very consistent, even where its foreign policy towards other countries has changed over time (Ashan, 2009). Chinese foreign policy on Africa can be divided into three periods: first, 1949-1977, which is called as the period of normal development; 1978-1994, which is called as the period of transition; and 1995 to present, which is thought to be a period of rapid development (Ashan, 2009, p. 22). The earlier precept of the economy and diplomacy was economy serving diplomacy, but it was later changed to diplomacy serving economy (Ashan, 2009, p. 22). This shift in the foreign policy was also reflected in the engagement between China and Africa. Ashan (2009) writes that the first change in the way China formulated its foreign policy towards Africa was seen in the shift from the emphasis on forming alliance against superpowers to one fostering exchange and dialogue based on the common ground while also reserving differences between the two (Ashan, 2009). Therefore, the earlier emphasis of African and Chinese engagement was that of anti-imperialism and anticolonialism, but later the emphasis shifted to areas that would mutually benefit China and Africa. This is also in keeping with the changing stature of China, its shift from an anti-American approach and ultra-leftist approach to a more centred approach, which also impacted its engagement with Africa. However, the postcolonial interaction between Africa and China has also been seen by some western countries as a neo-colonial approach by China towards Africa.

Chinese engagement with Africa: neocolonial or mutually benefiting

Rupp (2009) argues that Chinese relationship with Africa is neither colonial nor neo-colonial, rather the engagement between the two is based on mutual interests of the ‘states’ and that China is taking advantage of the African political and economic systems to advance the interests of both Chinese and African states, “often at the expense of the ordinary Chinese people” (p. 66). The perception that there may be neo-colonial practices at play in this engagement may be due to the fact that there is an economic imbalance between China and Africa, with the former being the more economically powerful of the two, which makes it easier for their relationship to be characterised as neo-colonial. Indeed, Ashan (2009) also writes that the relationship between China and Africa has remained for the most part that of mutual dependence. The Beijing Summit of the Forum on China-Africa Cooperation (FOCAC) is cited as an example of how the engagement between China and Africa remains one that is driven by the needs of both sides (Ashan, 2009). Ashan (2009) like Rupp (2009) write that those who take a more critical view of Chinese engagement with Africa, are writing from the western perspective. Chinese foreign policy as depicted in the 12th Assembly of Communist Party of China in 1982, which recognised the principle of “independence, complete equality, mutual respect, non-interference in others’ internal affairs” (Ashan, 2009, p. 23). Indeed, the 12th CPC Assembly is seen as a turning point in China-Africa relations marking two ideological shifts that have defined later China-Africa relations: a greater emphasis on its own economic development by China; and an independent and peaceful foreign policy (Moradi, 2019). China even stopped using ideology in framing its relations with other countries around this time, which has allowed it to reach out to African nations that are not communist; this is a change from an earlier approach which saw China only engaging with countries with leftist approach (Ashan, 2009). This suggests that China does not adopt an interfering attitude in its foreign policy, which also impacts its relationship with Africa. Over a period of time, Chinese government has engaged with African nations without any ideological precondition, which may support the argument that China does not seek to interfere in African affairs. Then the question arises as to the framework of the Chinese African engagement: is it all based on mutual benefit, or is China really involved in a neo-colonial practice in Africa? Rotberg (2009) notes that the relationship between China and Africa is not so entrenched that China cannot prosper without Africa and Africa too needs China for subsistence. Their relationship is therefore one that is mutually reinforcing and beneficial. With regard to the possible colonist tendencies of China, Rotberg (2009) argues that “China hardly wants to colonise, but it does have immense mercantilist ambitions” so that it can get raw materials like petrol, timber, cobalt, platinum, copper, and diamonds (p. 1). Instead of seeing this as a colonial ambition, Rotberg (2009) like the other authors discussed above, sees China’s engagement with Africa as one that mutually benefits them both, as China receives raw materials from Africa, and Africa too receives benefits of the trade and investment from China. In return for the trade with Africa, China invests in infrastructure projects, supplies equipment, and builds national industrial bases in African countries (Rotberg, 2009). China also supplies African countries with military equipment, and training (Rotberg, 2009).

The Chinese policy towards Africa has been encapsulated in the policy document entitled China’s African Policy (2006). This document also indicates that China’s engagement with Africa has shifted towards multi-channel engagement rather than political contact only (Ashan, 2009). This opens up the possibility of both public and private engagement between China and Africa. This is also relevant to understanding the assistance that has been given by China to Africa, beginning 1977, even when the Chinese economy was not as strong as it is today. Assistance has by and large been in the nature of economic aid while China has also been involved in deepening its trade with Africa over the years (Ashan, 2009). In the early 1970s, Chinese aid to African amounted to $ 1.2 billion, which was more than the aid given by the Soviet Union in the same period of time even when the latter was a bigger arms exporter to African nations (Ashan, 2009, p. 25). Other assistance given by China to Africa was in medical assistance, with the former sending medical teams to the latter. The principles of African policy formulated in the 1980s, particularly in the policy formulated by Premier Zhao Ziyang in 1982 termed as the ‘Four Principles of the Sino-African Economic and Technical Cooperation’, which was based on the earlier stated ‘Eight Principles of Economic and Technical Aid’ put forth by Premier Zhou Enlai in 1963-64 (Ashan, 2009, p. 26). The difference in Ziyang’s principles was that it focused on cooperation while the earlier principles were focused on aid. In the transitional period of 1978-1994, China and Africa developed their relationship further, but the difference as can be noted in the emphasis on the word cooperation in Ziyang’s ‘Four Principles of the Sino-African Economic and Technical Cooperation’ marks a shift in Chinese approach to Africa, with a new focus on the need for Chinese projects in the region to show economic results, efficiency, and profits (Ashan, 2009, p. 28).

Chapter 2: Chinese foreign policy in Africa today

Motivations behind Chinese foreign policy in Africa

One of the key questions regarding Chinese foreign policy in Africa relates to its motivations in devising of foreign policy: is China driven by economic interests in Africa; is it driven by neocolonial ambitions; or is it driven by a political agenda? Different commentators have written about Chinese motivations and what drives its foreign policy in Africa on these lines. In the last two decades or so, the economic motivations of Chinese foreign policy have been generally thought to be the ones driving the Chinese foreign policy in the region (Ashan, 2009; Liu, Wang, & Huang, 2018; Rupp, 2009; Rotberg, 2009). It is argued that China’s increasing role in the African nations should be seen in the light of the growing needs of the Chinese nation to energy resources and other resources for its fast developing economy (Rotberg, 2009). It is argued that China’s foreign policy is not driven by ideology or security considerations, but rather that the policy makers are driven by the need to provide Chinese industry with the resources that it needs for its development (Rotberg, 2009; Rupp, 2009). Mohan and Power (2008) write that the role of China in Africa has to be seen against the background of global energy politics where the US, India and China are among the key players that are competing with each other for security of supply of resources. China is one of the fastest developing economies in the world and it has to secure the supply of resources against competing countries, which is one of the reasons why it has developed a specific foreign policy with relation to Africa (Mohan & Power, 2008). However, it is also argued that it is not possible to represent the motivations and opportunities for both China and Africa in terms of their mutual relations, because there is no uniform set of motivations that can be used to explain the China-Africa relationship (Mohan & Power, 2008). Within Africa, there are different agendas that are at work and which define the relationship with China, whereas within China there are different agendas within the public and the private sector, which define the relationship with African nations (Mohan & Power, 2008). The argument that there are different agendas at work in Chinese foreign policy in Africa is also supported by the findings of Gu (2009) who writes about the proliferation of China’s private investment in African countries apart from state-owned investments (Gu, 2009). China’s policy to look beyond itself and even Asia for investments has meant that there is a significant amount of investment done by Chinese private sector in Africa. One of the aspects of Chinese policy making therefore, is also to safeguard the interest of the private investors in Africa (Gu, 2009). Within the context of the China-Africa mutual relationship, one of the concerns is the absence of an effective mechanism to bridge a gap between China's African Policy and its implementation in terms of private sector engagement (Gu, 2009). Since 2005, there has been an increase in the economic exchange between China and Africa, which is fuelled by a combination of private sector and public sector investment in Africa (Gu, 2009). Therefore, it can be noted that a nuanced approach to understanding the agenda of China in its development of foreign policy approach to African nations is required because China has a multifaceted engagement nature with African nations. The key motivation factor for the Chinese engagement in Africa remains however, the economic one, with Chinese state increasingly wanting to safeguard its interests in African resources as well as the investments that are made in Africa (Ashan, 2009). However, it has to be noted that China also is one of the biggest donors in terms of aid given to African nations, particularly in the Sub Saharan African region. This angle of Chinese diplomacy is not just understood in terms of the Chinese economic interest, although some western critics of Chinese engagement with Africa do argue that Chinese aid it tied to its own economic interest as noted by Liu, Wang, and Huang (2018). Although this is discussed more in detail in the later part of this dissertation, at this point, it may be noted that it would be simplistic to say that Chinese aid is tied to its trade motivations because China has given aid to African nations even when it did not have much trade with them, and continues to do so in areas of social development (Liu, Wang, & Huang, 2018).

Based on the brief discussion in this section, it may be noted that the Chinese motivations behind their foreign policy towards Africa cannot be understood in a simplistic way or explained in reductionist terms. The Chinese engagement with Africa is much too complex and multi-layered to be explained in terms only of economic motivations. Some of the discussion in the next sections will clarify other aspects of Chinese motivations for the development of its distinct foreign policy in African context.

Distinct nature of Chinese foreign policy

Chinese foreign policy in Africa is considered to be distinct from the other nations, as it takes an approach that may be different in key respects from western states in particular; for instance, as opposed to the Washington Consensus approach used by the EU and North America, China has traditionally adopted a non-interventionist approach to their foreign policy (Alden & Large, 2015). This is an important aspect of Chinese foreign policy in Africa because it indicates how China has sought to create and develop relations and engagement with Africa without trying to interfere in the latter’s internal affairs. It is also interesting from an ideological viewpoint, because China has managed to develop relations with African nations irrespective of their ideological differences with China. China has engagement with communist as well as non-communist African nations, which indicates that it has managed to engage with nations outside its own ideological framework. This also suggests that Chinese engagement may be more driven by economic purposes and may have a strong component of a resource driven agenda. In other words, China may be willing to overlook its ideological differences with countries in Africa and engage with these countries without trying to interfere in the internal affairs of these countries. This is discussed in more detail below, but at this point it may be mentioned that China considers its foreign policy to be distinct from the western nations’ approach to engaging with Africa. China considers that its distinct approach to foreign policy or developing state diplomacy will increase mutual trade and help fight poverty and underdevelopment (Lanteigne, 2019). Originally, China’s comfort zone as far as foreign policy was concerned, was in Asia-Pacific region, however, over a period of time, China has adopted a cross-regional approach to foreign policy as it becomes more poised in engaging with the international system (Lanteigne, 2019). Thus, China has over the years become proactive in its diplomatic efforts with Africa. In this region, China has won much goodwill from African countries but continues to face a number of challenges and obstacles as it gets involved in some cost-ineffective projects as well (Wang & Eliot, 2014). Nevertheless, the fact that Africa is rich in resources has made China invest heavily in the region, which puts it in direct competition with the west over African resources (Wang & Eliot, 2014). Indeed, Flint and Xiaotong (2019) use a space-time matrix to suggest that the period between 2009-2039 is likely to see the growth of the competition between the United States and China In Africa as well as Latin America. These are some of the aspects that provide a background of how and why the diplomatic engagement with Africa has developed over time and what are the foreign policy approaches adopted by China in African context. The distinct nature of Chinese foreign policy in African context can be summarised as a non-interventionist approach to engagement and a deliberate effort to disengage foreign policy from ideological framework. However, as the next section will discuss, this aspect of the Chinese foreign policy has also been controversial to a great extent, particularly in western scholarship, which has seen its non-interventional approach as problematic as China continued to engage with countries and governments that were controversial.

Controversies related to Chinese foreign policy in Africa

Despite China’s important role in Africa, there are also some controversies attached to its role, particularly from some western countries who have viewed Chinese policy in Africa for its non-interventionist approach (Lanteigne, 2019). In particular, Chinese policy in Sudan and Zimbabwe was criticised; in Sudan, the government was involved in civil conflict in the Darfur region, and in Zimbabwe, the governance was taken over by the authoritarian dictator Robert Mugabe. In both these countries, there was criticism of Chinese role in engaging with the governments which had otherwise faced considerable international censure for their domestic policies (Lanteigne, 2019). An important aspect of the Chinese engagement with these countries is the policy of non-interference that the Chinese have adopted with reference to its African foreign policy, and which has come under some criticism from the western nations (Lanteigne, 2019; Alden & Large, 2015; Aidoo & Hess, 2015). The other aspect is the economic angle of the engagement with China engaging with countries that are rich in oil and resources. Thus, when South Sudan broke away from Sudan in 2011, China had to engage with both Sudan and the new state that broke away from it, in which case much diplomatic balance had to be achieved by China (Lanteigne, 2019). China’s policy of non-interference may then come to its aid because it is able to engage with governments and states in Africa even when other western nations (who follow the Washington Consensus approach) may not be willing to engage with those countries. These are two aspects of the discussion to be conducted in this section with respect to the Chinese foreign policy. The other aspects are the nature of trading and infrastructure related interests of China in Africa and the related foreign policy development in China. Rotberg (2009) explains Chinese strategy in Africa, which may provide a glimpse into the reasoning why China does not want to interfere too much into African internal affairs while also maintaining an active engagement with these countries. He writes that “China is not interested in territorial conquest, in exporting its own surplus nationals, or necessarily in gaining converts for a Chinese model of development” (p. 2). In other words, China does not want to follow a model of engagement with Africa that was followed in the colonial period by the western countries. Nor does China want to push through its ideological agenda in Africa, which explains why it has engaged with all kinds of polities in Africa, including both communist as well as the non-communist. Indeed, China’s policy towards Africa is much different from how many European and western countries deal with Africa wherein China deals with Africa at the highest level of diplomacy as compared to the others who still treat African nations like “second-rung players” (Rotberg, 2009, p. 2). China has its embassies in most of the states in the Sub-Saharan region as compared to the western nations that still are not as diplomatically engaged with these countries (Rotberg, 2009). China’s conscious effort to decouple foreign policy from ideology or to not tie trade and aid with interference into the affairs of African nations is definitely distinct from the policy adopted by the western nations that have tied aid to certain countries with the intent to pursue a liberal political agenda in those countries (Rotberg, 2009; Rupp, 2009). For China, the justification for this approach has been in the need to not interfere with the sovereignty of other nations and the need to link economic development with social development where aid is provided without focusing on the political development of these states (Ashan, 2009). This approach has allowed China to pursue its engagement with states in Africa even when other western countries may have avoided such engagement due to problematic or controversial political issues in those countries like Sudan (Ashan, 2009). For China, the reward of this approach has been that it has been able to develop good will in these countries as well as become a bigger stake holder in the resources of these nations as compared to the western nations who have avoided engagement with these countries or have tried to tie their engagement (be this in the nature of trade and investment or aid) with political conditions to be put on the nations receiving aid (Ashan, 2009). Because China did not tie its trade and investment or aid related engagement with African nations to any conditions to be followed by these countries in the political or social contexts, it became easier for these countries to engage with China than with the western nations (Ashan, 2009). Eventually, this has meant that China has a competitive advantage with respect to the resources in those countries. Another important advantage to China of this engagement has been political in nature, particularly with respect to Taiwan and its recognition by African states. Chinese engagement with Africa has meant that the majority of the African states have supported Chinese claims with respect to Taiwan (Ashan, 2009). Therefore, there is also a political angle to Chinese motivations in Africa where it gets support for some of its political positions, particularly with respect to Taiwan. To summarise the findings of this chapter, it can be said that China’s motivations in formulating its foreign policy towards Africa cannot be reduced only to the economic advantages of the policy, although the advantages in this context are weightier. China does have a greater advantage with respect to the trade and investment in Africa; it also has a competitive advantage over many countries with respect to the access to African resources. However, there are important political advantages to the Chinese engagement in Africa. Moreover, China also gives a lot of aid to African nations, without tying this to any political conditions. This is controversial because China engages with countries where the political conditions may be problematic, but it also has the advantages of such engagement with regard to economic and resource related benefits.

Chapter 3: Economic diplomacy, non-interference and agenda setting in China’s Africa policy

This chapter concerns the specific aspects of economic diplomacy, the policy of non-interference in African affairs, and the ways in which agenda is set and driven in the Chinese engagement with Africa. Some of these aspects were touched on in the previous chapter, but a more detailed analysis is provided in this chapter taking that discussion forward. An important question in regard to Chinese engagement with Africa is whether China has an upper hand in setting the agenda of engagement as compared to Africa because the former is the partner with more economic strength and is also a donor to the latter (Liu, Wang, & Huang, 2018; Mohan & Power, 2008; Rupp, 2009). One of the criticisms against China is that it has the upper hand and it uses it to practice neo-colonialism in Africa. This is discussed in detail in this chapter.

Economic diplomacy

Chinese foreign policy in Africa has involved the former making diplomatic inroads through the use of trade and cooperation agreements and use of diplomatic tools like the regularly held Sino-African Summits that are used by the two regions for their engagement with each other (Lanteigne, 2019). China’s approach to engagement with Africa can be characterised as one that is driven by trade, investment, and aid (Rotberg, 2009, p. 3). In this, China is engaged on an economic level with Africa. China is an important economic partner to African countries and also a major source of loans and funding to these countries; China is also a diplomatic partner to the African countries (Lanteigne, 2019). China is Africa’s largest trading partner and has close diplomatic ties with many countries in the African continent (Yun Sun and Africa Growth Initiative, 2015). In the Sub-Saharan region, countries are now known to be critically dependent on the aid and investments provided by China (Rotberg, 2009, p. 4). China is one of the most important importers and exporters from African region (Rotberg, 2009). The diplomatic relations between China and Africa can be gauged by the fact that there also exists the Forum on China Africa Cooperation (FOCAC), which serves as an important forum for China and Africa to engage with each other. The FOCAC also serves as a space where financing commitments by China to Africa are regularly assessed and reiterated; for instance, China has been committing to Africa since 2006, when it committed $5 billion; in 2009 the commitment stood at $10 billion; and in 2012, it stood at $20 billion (Yun Sun and Africa Growth Initiative, 2015, p. 10). China increased the credit line to Africa by another $10 billion in 2014 (Yun Sun and Africa Growth Initiative, 2015). One of the areas in which China has been actively engaged in the African region is infrastructure development. This is partly in response to the negative publicity encountered by China due to the perceptions that it was traditionally focussed on natural resources (Yun Sun and Africa Growth Initiative, 2015). Major infrastructure development projects like the 461 framework on China-Africa economic cooperation and the three networks program focussed on the development of high-speed rail network, highway network and the regional aviation network have been promoted in the recent decade, which has sought to shift emphasis on the natural resources angle in China-Africa engagement to infrastructure development (Yun Sun and Africa Growth Initiative, 2015). Any ideological dimensions of the Chinese and African engagement that there may have been before, have been replaced by economic considerations for the greater part as Africa has become a major recipient in the wake of the Chinese policy increasing investments and going out business strategies (Lanteigne, 2019). Africa was also a place of interest for China given its potential for agribusiness, which has met with some criticism and concern in the west where it is believed that China is seeking to colonise Africa by buying swathes of agricultural land; such claims have been found to be unsubstantiated in literature (Brautigam, 2015). While some writers have noted that there is possible neocolonialism in the Chinese approach to its engagement with Africa, others argue that this is a wrong characterisation of the engagement between the two and that there is a mutual benefit angle to their engagement (Ashan, 2009; Liu, Wang, & Huang, 2018). One of the reasons why this criticism of Chinese engagement with Africa is made is that foreign aid to Africa is tied up to foreign trade (Liu, Wang, & Huang, 2018). In order to consider this criticism of China’s engagement with Africa, Liu, Wang and Huang (2018) deployed and compared data of China, EU and 30 African countries that receive aid from both China and EU between 2003 to 2013. The results demonstrated that while trade effects of China and EU are different, trade motivation is an important determinant in both China and EU aids (Liu, Wang, & Huang, 2018). In other words, the motivation to increase trade with Africa is neither the unique feature nor the solely motivation for China's aid to Africa (Liu, Wang, & Huang, 2018). Therefore, this research indicated that the claims that China is trying to colonise the African countries by tying up aid with trade is unfounded (Liu, Wang, & Huang, 2018). An important point is made by Dreher, Fuchs, Parks, Strange, and Tierney (2018) who write that although Chinese aid to Africa is a point used to criticise China, as many policy-makers, journalists, and public intellectuals argue that this aid it tied to the political and material aims of Beijing, this is a wrong characterisation of Chinese approach, which can be distinguished between China’s Official Development Assistance (ODA) and commercially oriented sources and types of state financing; both of these are used by China in Africa. The researchers used a new database on China’s official financing commitments to Africa in the period between 2000 to 2013, and found that the allocation of Chinese ODA was driven by foreign policy considerations and economic interests better explain the distribution of less concessional flows (Dreher, Fuchs, Parks, Strange, & Tierney, 2018). Therefore, China is using different strategies for aid and trade and both cannot be equated. The problem with the way come western critics view Chinese engagement with Africa is that they are using westers style measurement which is not appropriate to understanding China’s unique foreign policy decisions in reference to Africa (Dreher, Fuchs, Parks, Strange, & Tierney, 2018). China is also one of the biggest donors to African countries, which makes its policy on how it ties its aid to Africa, interesting. One research, which utilised data on aid given by China to African nations found that grants from China constitute only about a tenth of total financing to Africa and loans represented 86 percent of financing (Dreher, Fuchs, Parks, Strange, & Tierney, 2018). The same study found that there were some interesting variations in the sectors in Africa that benefit from Chinese aid, with the social sector (education, health, and government infrastructure) having a significant share in the aid whereas the corresponding financial value of these projects is significantly smaller; on the other hand, the corresponding financial value of transport and energy infrastructure was significant, yet the Chinese have given aid in areas of social sector where economic interest is not as significant (Dreher, Fuchs, Parks, Strange, & Tierney, 2018). The results of this study have supported the argument that Chinese have a distinct approach to aid and economic activity in Africa and the two are not necessarily tied together.

Non-interference

China has followed a practice of non-interference in African affairs although it has close diplomatic and trade engagement with Africa. One of the criticisms of this approach is that while China has a deep stake in aid to Africa, it does not have a contribution to building peace and security in Africa (Moradi, 2019). China chose to apply a policy of non-interference in Africa even when many African countries had complex political and security issues, this had some benefits for China as well as Africa as noted below: “China’s implementation of non-interference has significantly boosted African sovereignty. By refraining from interfering in the internal affairs of African states, and affording them the opportunity to take agency over their own security processes, China has enshrined the idea of an independent and sovereign Africa. China, in attempt to uphold the idea of sovereignty has almost exclusively interacted in a state-to-state fashion, at times even when the situation demanded a more regional approach” (Moradi, 2019, p. 157). China, by implementing a non-interference approach in Africa, was able to achieve the objectives of having a high level of engagement with African countries while also increasing trade and investment in the countries, especially in Sub-Saharan region, where problematic political and security issues had made many western countries refrain from closer ties. The policy of non-interference was developed by Chinese scholars and policy makers in the context of Africa with four very specific features. First, that stability, development and harmony would be more worthy of attention from China rather than democratic freedoms linked to market economics; second, that indigenous African solutions should be identified and pursued and Africa should take ownership of the resolution process as per its own needs and desires rather than have other nations use opportunities to intervene in what those solutions should look like; third, economics has a more important role to play as compared to political or military interventions and therefore, instead of China intervening in African affairs, be these political or military oriented, it can contribute in a more meaningful and effective way by responding to needs such as food, security, housing and freedom of poverty in African nations; and fourth, that state sovereignty is vital and cannot be interfered with (Moradi, 2019). With respect to the last, it has been considered in Chinese policy making circles that it is more important for China and Africa to protect and enshrine state sovereignty. In Africa, the last idea may be even more important because of the post colonial nature of most African states, which were once subjected to the suzerainty of European nations. Instead of interfering in African affairs, even when such interference was to the economic interests of China, the latter has for the most part sought to avoid linking its trade and aid to African nations with any ideological or political push. In the context of security in Africa, China is engaged in development of norms on security by playing a key role in redefining the contemporary international approach to the management of security dilemmas in Africa (Alden & Large, 2015). China’s gradual policy building in the African security context has become increasingly aligned to principles and core interests as it has gone beyond a policy of non-interference in domestic affairs that it followed earlier and which prohibited its involvement in security issues in Africa; instead China has begun to play a more substantive role in security in Africa (Alden & Large, 2015). China’s role in the security issues of African countries is based on its presence in many of the fragile and conflict-ridden African countries and till recently, China used an approach of non-interference in security affairs which allowed it to finance investments in these countries in the resource sector. China also had led infrastructure projects in such countries and provided support to and firms based on these countries even when much of the western donors and investors ignored these countries or adopted a more cautious approach (Alden & Large, 2015). This has allowed China to establish itself in a significant position in sectors and markets in countries like Angola, Ethiopia, Liberia, Sierra Leone, Chad, Sudan and South Sudan, which are post conflict countries (Alden & Large, 2015). At the same time, these post conflict countries in Africa have presented Chinese investments with challenges in a fragile and unstable political environment (Alden & Large, 2015). This has meant that China has not always been able to apply an approach of non-interference in Africa. Moreover, its position as a permanent member of the UN Security Council has also exposed it management challenges that arise from post-conflict countries in Africa from time to time and it has been involved in the process of addressing these problems as a permanent member of the UN Security Council (Alden & Large, 2015). Chinese policy makers have also been concerned about the lack of a cohesive policy in fragile and post conflict state engagement; in recent times, policy makers have concerned themselves with being involved in more norm-making. As noted by Alden and Large (2015) China has evolved from being a norms taker to becoming a norm maker in the context of African security matters, which can be seen as a part of the wider policy making approach within China to shed its ambivalent non-interference approach to a more assertive foreign policy. This approach is the most visible in Africa where China has invested heavily in infrastructure in post-conflict nations. The findings of Alden and Large (2015) with regard to the evolution of the Chinese foreign policy are also similar to Aidoo and Hess (2015) who also write that the non-interference policy adopted by China earlier has come under scrutiny as its relations with Africa grow and deepen. China’s policy of non-interference has been a contrast to the policy employed by the European Union and North America, as China has given economic aid and investments without any strings attached instead of the conditional giving and investments under the Washington Consensus that is employed by the western countries (Aidoo & Hess, 2015).

Setting and driving of agenda

China has traditionally taken the lead in the setting and the driving of the agenda of the China-Africa engagement; in part this is due to the role of China as the financier of the projects (Yun Sun and Africa Growth Initiative, 2015). Because China has been the party which is investing and also assisting in providing loans to African countries, it has been able to drive the agenda so far. At the same time, the loans that have been given by China for the funding and infrastructure projects in Africa are given under a model where the loans are backed by collateral in natural resources (Sun, 2014). His raises questions about the motivations for the Chinese actions in giving loans as well as the concerns of sustainable development in Africa (Sun, 2014). However, in the recent time, there has been some shifts in the China-Africa relationship with reference to the setting of the agenda. China, which has conventionally viewed structural reform and capacity building as important but secondary, has shifted focus to viewing it as an essential aspect of the “mutually beneficial” cooperation between itself and Africa (Yun Sun and Africa Growth Initiative, 2015). The emphasis on mutual benefits is also driven by the need to address some of the negative publicity received by China in its African engagement, where it is seen as the principal negotiator of the agenda of the relationship. This emphasis on mutual benefit is manifested in the willingness that China has shown to let African demands to define the agenda of the relationship between itself and Africa. As China has been blamed for a “mercantilist” approach toward Africa, there is a shift in the way China approaches its relationship with Africa in recent times (Yun Sun and Africa Growth Initiative, 2015). The earlier mercantilist approach was based on the Chinese focus on resources and economic aspects of the engagement with Africa. Although resources still drive much of China’s foreign policy development approach towards Africa, there is also an effort made to engage with Africa in a way that allows the latter to play a role in the setting of the agenda as is seen in the recent Summits between the two regions (Yun Sun and Africa Growth Initiative, 2015). China’s going global strategy, which is manifested in the ambitious One Belt One Road Initiative (OBOR), also has a regional focus on Asia, Europe, and Africa (Abegunrin & Manyeruke, 2020). Africa remains an important focus in the context of the OBOR and China has already prioritised its relationship with China with the FOCAC, meaning that more resources have been made available to Africa because it is recipient both under the FOCAC and the OBOR (Abegunrin & Manyeruke, 2020, p. 188). Countries in East Africa are considered to be of especial importance to China’s OBOR project because of their location. Similar infrastructure projects are being taken up on the west side of Africa and to connect these areas inwards so that China is able to transport resources towards the coast and finally to China (Abegunrin & Manyeruke, 2020). There is some criticism of the OBOR on the ground that China is using Africa for resources and the improved road link is also aimed at ease of access to African resources (ZiroMwatela & Changfeng, 2016). On the part of China, it is argued that China’s trade with the rest of the world is much higher as compared to its trade with Africa, which it seeks to improve through the OBOR (ZiroMwatela & Changfeng, 2016). To summarise this chapter, it can be said that the Chinese engagement in Africa is not driven solely by an agenda that is set by China. FOCAC is a good example of how mutual benefit is one of the driving forces behind the setting of an agenda in this engagement between the two partners. China does give a lot of aid to Africa but it does not tie this to any political conditions. It uses the principle of non-interference to guide its policy of engagement with Africa instead. At the same time, it is possible that this policy of non-interference is shifting or will shift because as Chinese interests and investments in Africa increase, it will be more concerned about the safeguarding of these interests.

Chapter 4: Conclusion

The overarching conclusion of this research is that there are different nuances to China’s foreign policy development with respect to Africa and that there is no uniform set of motivations that can be used to explain the China-Africa relationship. The principal drivers for China’s foreign policy development in Africa appear to be the competition over African resources, which are essential to the development of the Chinese economy. However, there are other aspects to the Chinese foreign policy, which cannot be explained by an economic angle. China’s foreign policy is also aimed at developing a narrative about China as a nation that is willing to help and aid other countries in the world. The principal themes that are uncovered in this research are discussed below.

Distinct foreign policy, not like Washington Consensus but also shift in the non-interference policy

Literature review has revealed that China has adopted a foreign policy in Africa, which is distinct from western nations, in that the Chinese foreign policy has traditionally taken a non-interference approach where it engages with the nations and governments in Africa without interfering in their domestic matters. The Western Consensus approach has been rejected by China because it is based engagement that is qualified by conditions (Alden & Large, 2015). Due to the Chinese deliberate disengagement with domestic issues and matters, China has won much goodwill from African countries (Wang & Eliot, 2014). However, there is a slight shift in the policy adopted by China traditionally due to the increased investment in Africa and the attendant risks of the domestic instabilities and problems in the countries where China has investments (Wang & Eliot, 2014). Moreover, there has also been some criticism of the Chinese foreign policy of non-interference, particularly from the western countries and in context of engagement with countries like Sudan and Zimbabwe at a time when these countries’ policies have been controversial (Aidoo & Hess, 2015). China has given economic aid and investments without any strings attached instead of the conditional giving and investments under the Washington Consensus that is employed by the western countries (Aidoo & Hess, 2015).

Approaches to foreign policy in context of Africa

Literature has revealed that there are different categories of approaches that are used by China to engage with Africa (Eisenman, 2015), which include, soft power, writes that the methods that Beijing employs with respect to its African engagement can be grouped into different categories that include "soft approach", agricultural and technical assistance, investment and economic support, military patronage and peacekeeping, and diplomatic support. China has seen its engagement with Africa as an opportunity to drive a narrative of a country that is willing to aid and help develop some of the underdeveloped parts of the world, thus using a soft power approach manifested in a number of humanitarian, cultural, and educational projects in African countries and reinforcing a positive image of China (Eisenman, 2015).

Diplomatic relations driven by aid, trade and cooperation

Diplomatic relations between China and Africa developed after the end of the Cold War, which saw Russia become disengaged with Africa and the United States become increasingly preoccupied with engagements in the Middle East and Northeast Asia (Eisenman, 2015). China saw an opportunity in Africa at the time and since then, its diplomatic engagement with Africa has increased significantly. China has used trade and cooperation agreements as diplomatic measures for engaging with Africa, with the regularly held Sino-African Summits also being used as spaces for discussing opportunities in the area of trade (Lanteigne, 2019). China is a major source of loans and funding to many African countries including post conflict countries (Lanteigne, 2019). China has also helped develop major infrastructure projects like the 461 framework on China-Africa economic cooperation and the three networks program focussed on the development of high-speed rail network, highway network and the regional aviation network have been promoted in the recent decade (Yun Sun and Africa Growth Initiative, 2015). The infrastructure projects development by China are said to be driven in part by the need to shift focus from the natural resources angle in China-Africa engagement to infrastructure development.

Economic relations with African nations are increasingly driven by Chinese interest in resources in the region and competition with western nations over the same resources.

Even if there were any ideological dimensions of the Chinese engagement with African nations, these are increasingly replaced by economic considerations; Africa is the major recipient of investments, both private and public, by China under the Chinese policy of taking business outside (Lanteigne, 2019). African resources, including land, which fuels Chinese interest in the agribusiness sector, is now being seen as one of the major driving forces for the Chinese interest in Africa (Brautigam, 2015). Chinese strategy in Africa is also aimed at acquiring energy and natural resources for its fast developing economy, and securing commercial interests (Eisenman, 2015). The interest in Africa is largely driven by the energy and resources needs of China (Carmody, 2017). China is also in competition with other developed and emerging economies in the domain of energy politics (Mohan & Power, 2008).

Agenda setting

This research finds that traditionally China has taken the lead in the setting and the driving the agenda of the China-Africa engagement. This was due in part to the role of China in Africa as the financier of infrastructure projects as well as the party providing aid and loans to many countries in Africa (Yun Sun and Africa Growth Initiative, 2015). This strategy has shifted in time with Africa also playing a role in the setting of the agenda of the China and Africa diplomatic and trade relationship. China had traditionally used an approach prioritising structural reform, but it has shifted focus to viewing capacity building in Africa as an essential aspect of the “mutually beneficial” cooperation between itself and Africa. China had received some negative publicity due to its role as the principal agenda setter in its African engagement, which may be one of the reasons for the shift. The shift is also seen in the change in the traditional mercantilist approach of China where it focussed on resources and economic aspects to a greater effort to engage with Africa through the agenda set under a mutual benefit framework. To summarise the findings of the study, it may be said that the Chinese engagement with Africa has involved some unique policy making by China which is definitely distinct from the western approach towards African foreign policy. China remains one of the biggest trade partners of Africa, and one of the biggest investors in Africa. It also is one of the biggest donors to Africa. Chinese investment in Africa is both driven by public as well as private projects. All of these are part of an multifaceted engagement approach between China and Africa. China has so far avoided tying its aid to Africa with political conditions. Despite being in a more economically stronger position with respect to Africa, China has co-created diplomatic channels including the setting up of the FOCAC.

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