The Arab Spring: A Multifactorial Uprising

Chapter 1: The academic intellectual dialogue on the causes of the Arab Spring

There are many factors that are responsible for the Arab Spring. This is not surprising considering the diversity of the nations and movements involved in the Arab Spring. The complexity of the factors is therefore in keeping with the multiple layers of social groups, political groups and citizen movements that were involved in the movements across the region. The factors that are the most linked to the Arab Spring are lack of political inclusion, good governance, job creation, inclusive growth, sustainable economic opportunities, rule of law, and national security. Also important are the poor human development, and violations of human rights that also drove people to protest against their governments and their policies. Indeed there cannot be one common ground for the different movements that were spread across the Arab world. This is noted by Ozekin and Akkas (2014) who point that there was no single driving factor for the Arab Spring and there were actually a “set of longstanding socio-economic and socio-political problems afflicting the Arab world for nearly half a century has constituted a common casual motivation behind the uprisings, whose outcomes have varied from country to country depending on a combination of factors, such as government responses, the role of security forces, foreign intervention, the ethnic and sectarian makeup of the affected societies and the politico-institutional characteristics of state structure” (p. 77).

It is difficult to classify the Arab Spring as a revolution or an uprising because it was not an action by a unified entity; rather, it consisted of different movements and different groups of people, who were fighting against different governments in the same region. Many scholars have tried to uncover the precise causes of the Arab Spring, but there are no clear answers. As noted by one writer:

“The question confronting observers of the 2011 Arab uprisings is how and why, at that particular moment, the socio- economic and political grievances in the Arab world were channelled into such forceful and purposeful collective action. At this preliminary stage, two possible explanations can be suggested, although neither of them is fully convincing. The first is that pre-existing civil society and political opposition groups had prepared the ground for the rebellions and were able, when the time came, to coordinate them. The second is that the unprecedentedly widespread use of social media and other means of communication made the rebellions possible and increased their strength and inclusiveness” (Dalacoura, 2012, p. 67).

It may be argued that instead of looking at causes of the Arab Spring from the unidimensional perspective of either one or the other cause, it may be accepted that the Arab Spring arose not from any one particular cause, but was the response of the people to the myriad of causes and issues that were prevalent in the region at the time. This chapter aims to uncover some of the major issues to which the Arab Spring is attributed in the current literature.

Hussain and Howard (2013) write that one of the principal causes for the Arab Spring was the lack of democratisation, which put the region of North Africa and the Middle East (MENA) at odds with the majority of the world, which is largely democratised. As noted by Hussain and Howard (2013), almost three in every five states had a democratic form by 2010, which was different from the MENA region, which did not have democratisation or even popular democracy movements till the Arab Spring in 2011. Therefore, the region witnessed significant public demand between January and April 2011 for reforms in the political and economic areas (Hussain & Howard, 2013).

Aissa (2012) sees the causes of the Arab Spring linked to the feelings and aspirations of the Arab youth, which has been disillusioned by their governments’ repeated failures to recognise and protect human rights and individual freedoms. Aissa (2012) argues that the principal cause of the Arab Spring was the motivation to change the status quo. The self-immolation by Tunisian street vendor, Mohamed El Bouazizi on 7th December 2010, is described by Aissa (2012) as the kickstarting of the domino effect.

Ogbonnaya (2013) blames the governments of the region, especially the North African region for their failure to respond to the growing demands of political inclusion and good governance, which led to the people taking to the streets in response to the prevailing conditions. An example can be seen in protests in Syria, which were started in mid-March 2011, when a group of teenagers in Dara’a, posted anti- government graffiti and demonstrated against the regime of President Bashar al-Assad (Ogbonnaya, 2013).

AlSayyad and Guvenc (2015) have argued that Social Media played an important role in helping formulate a new model of protest based on virtual communications, as well as a spatial model of mass demonstration. This seems to put Social Media at the centre. On the other hand, Wolfsfeld, et al. (2013) make an interesting argument in that they say that in linking Arab Spring to the Social Media, political conditions precede the advent of Social Media, in the analytical sense so that instead of studying the role of Social Media in the creation of the conditions for the revolution or uprising, it would be better to analyse the role of politics in driving people to use Social Media in an attempt to find a resolution to the political issues. The basis of the argument is that social networking was prevalent even before Social Media came into being and the extent to which Social Media played a role in the Arab Spring also depends on the local contexts of the region (Wolfsfeld, et al., 2013).

Social Media and Information and Communication Technologies (ICT) provided an impetus to the development of the democratisation movements across the MENA region in a way and with a speed that has not been seen before (Hussain & Howard, 2013). The proliferation of the technologies like mobile phones and the Internet provided a strong base for the social communications that also spurred the movements (Hussain & Howard, 2013). The Arab Spring saw people build extensive networks, which also led to the activation of collective action movements for political change (Hussain & Howard, 2013).

The proliferation of Information and Communication Technologies and Social Media and the role that it played in the Arab Spring, have led Hussain and Howard (2013) to argue that “distribution of outcomes suggest a need to take information technology seriously as a potentially causal factor: the two Arab Spring countries in which dictators were deposed relatively quickly, Tunisia and Egypt, had the most tech-savvy civil society and largest internet-using population in the region; the two Arab spring countries in which dictators were deposed only after months of protracted civil war, Libya and Yemen, had no such character” (p. 50). This suggests that Social Media and Internet played an important role in the outcomes of the Arab Spring and the countries that showed quicker results in favour of the movements were those where people were better able to organise networks. These technologies were also useful in helping people to share citizen journalism videos and blogs, which were important sources of news about the movements across MENA and the government responses to the same. Civil society groups and political groups, some of these which were banned, such as the April 6 Youth Movement and the Muslim Brotherhood, were also able to use these technologies for organising and building their capacities over time (Hussain & Howard, 2013).

One of the factors that led to the Arab Spring can be linked to the economic conditions of the better part of the Arab world. Aissa (2012) links the lack of economic stability in the Arab world with the effects of the failed economic models implemented by the Arab world, which were worsened by the policies of the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and World Bank, and the immediate economic conditions after the 2008 economic crisis. The lack of sustainable and competitive economies in the Arab countries is stated as one of the reasons for the Arab Spring (Aissa, 2012). The Arab world’s over dependence on hydrocarbons and lack of a strong and competitive private sector is also blamed for the lack of employment opportunities for the youth, which was the driving factor for the Arab Spring (Aissa, 2012). This is also supported by the findings of other research, which indicates that lack of job creation and policies of inclusive growth also played fundamental roles in mobilising the people into protests against the government. Ozekin and Akkas (2014) argue that despite poverty and relatively low economic growth rates, these cannot be the principal economic reasons for the Arab Spring, which can be blamed more on the complex and longstanding structural economic problems that are endemic to the Arab world and which became more prominent by the year 2011. This argument gains strength when the growth rates of the countries are considered. Egypt and Tunisia were in fact witnessing relatively higher economic growth rates and Yemen and Egypt also achieved better growth rates of real GDP before the Arab Spring (Ozekin & Akkas, 2014). Therefore, there were better growth rates for this region in the period before 2011; on the other hand, structural economic problems remained constant, and these were related to rising unemployment rates, unequal wealth distribution, and non-competitive economic structure (Ozekin & Akkas, 2014, p. 79).

The Arab Human Development Report of 2009 has noted the growing issue of human security within Arab states, which complicates human living conditions creates by the failure of the governments on the region to fields of education, health and nutrition (Aissa, 2012). The youth in particular, are impacted by the lack of employment opportunities, and the resultant lack of quality of life, which seems to have motivated large numbers of young protesters in Egypt and other parts of the Arab world (LaGraffe, 2012). In Egypt, demographics seems to have played an important role in the setting of the uprising as the youth surge of Egypt and its intersection with security, and the Arab Spring played a role in the success of the Arab Spring (LaGraffe, 2012).

The economic conditions of the MENA region are also central to understanding how such widespread protests and uprisings were motivated, especially by the youth. Abdelbaki (2013) has noted that in order to understand the Arab Spring and its causes, new theory will have to be developed by scholars, as merely economic factors cannot explain the reasons why the Arab Spring happened in the first place. He proposes a new theory based on interpreting the active role of technology in the field of communication and social networking on the Arab Spring revolutions (Abdelbaki, 2013).

One of the interesting features of MENA’s economic condition is that despite some economic development in this region since the 1960s, the sustained demographic dynamic has meant that there has been inferior growth rate of GDP per inhabitant (Ansani & Daniele, 2012, pp. 1250013-3). To make it more complicated, there is also unemployment in the region, as well as inequalities between the rich and the poor. Therefore, there are structural economic issues that are also relevant here.

It is difficult to classify the Arab Spring as either revolution or uprising, because the Arab world cannot be seen as a unified entity (Dalacoura, 2012). Nevertheless, scholars have applied different terms to describe the Arab Spring, as ‘revolution’, ‘uprising’, ‘revolt’ or even ‘crisis’ (Dalacoura, 2012, p. 63).

Arab spring has been compared to popular revolutions in the communist states in the late eighties and early nineties of the twentieth century, and sometimes with the messy revolutions of Europe in 1848 (Salih, 2013). One of the reasons why the Arab Spring may be likened to the messy and chaotic European situation in 1848 is because in Europe then, as in Arab world now, revolutionaries in difference countries had different goals (Salih, 2013).

On the other hand, the Arab Spring has also been compared to uprisings; for instance, Ogbonnaya (2013) has termed the Arab Spring as “a pro-democracy uprising” (p. 5). Similarly, Ozekin and Akkas (2014) note that “sets of socio-economic and socio-political factors that have been deeply rooted in the region for more than half a century and which have driven (and continue to drive) a wave of uprisings across the region commonly labelled as the ‘Arab Spring’” (p. 77). That Arab Spring was an uprising by the people against their governments can also be seen in the popular slogan of the people of the Arab world, “ash–shabyuridisa at an–nixam (the will of the people is to bring down the regime)” (Ogbonnaya, 2013, p. 5).

Scholars have also pointed at the possibility of preference falsification playing a role in the unpredictability of the Arab Spring as well as the speed with which the Arab Spring caught on and was able to unseat the dictators and sitting governments (Goodwin, 2011). Preference falsification may have played a role in the Arab Spring because in countries with strong dictators, there is a possibility that popular perception of the strength of the rule is created, and people may be scared to reveal their own preferences for government as was the case in Tunisia under Ben Ali, Egypt under Hosni Mubarak, and Libya under Gaddafi (Goodwin, 2011). Therefore, for political scientists, it would be difficult to predict that there can be a revolution in a country or a demand for regime change when the choices of the individuals are not that closely known or understood (Goodwin, 2011).

Another factor that may be responsible for the revolution in these countries may be the youth bulge in these countries. In Egypt, the youth bulge may be important as argued by LaGraffe (2012), as there was a ‘youth bulge’ in Egypt during the period of revolution. A youth bulge is a large cohort of people in the age groups of fifteen and twenty-four and it may lead to a shortage of jobs if the economy is not developed and acute problem of unemployment, poverty, and social unrest resultant of the gap between the population and the scope of employment (LaGraffe, 2012). In Egypt, youth bulge has been considered to be one of the causes for the revolution because the rising unemployment and poverty in the country coincided with the increase in the population of the young people in the country (LaGraffe, 2012). Due to this link between youth bulge and revolution, it has been suggested that there should be greater focus on youth engagement (LaGraffe, 2012).

The literature considered in this chapter points at a variety of causes and not a specific cause for the Arab world. Therefore, it may be reiterated that there is no one specific cause of the Arab Spring and there are complex factors that were at play and which led to the multi-layered movements of protests against Arab governments.

Chapter 2: The Revolutions of Tunisia and Egypt and Libya as examples of political theories

Introduction

Anderson (2011) writes:

“The important story about the 2011 Arab revolts in Tunisia, Egypt, and Libya is not how the globalization of the norms of civic engagement shaped the protesters' aspirations. Nor is it about how activists used technology to share ideas and tactics. Instead, the critical issue is how and why these ambitions and techniques resonated in their various local contexts” (p.2).

What Anderson (2011) seeks to point out is that despite the obvious significance of the aspirations of the protestors to bring civic engagement into the political structures of their own nations, as well as the obvious significance of the use of Social Media, and other forms of communication technologies to spread the message across, there is an even bigger and important aspect of these revolutions. This message is that of the issue of civic engagement and the use of technologies was in local contexts. Tunisia, Egypt and Libya presented different demographics and this was reflected in the way the protests were conducted and carried out in these three different countries. In Tunisia, there were demonstrations that moved from the most rural of areas of the countries towards the capital of the nation, finding scores of people along the way for whom the message of the revolution resonated despite different social and economic backgrounds of the protestors (Anderson, 2011). Therefore, Tunisia saw widespread protests in which people from different regions of the country participated with a common cause in mind and the revolution saw the participation of both the rural as well as the urban populations of the nation. This was not the case in Egypt, where the uprisings were by and large organised by urbane and cosmopolitan young people from major cities (Anderson, 2011). There was little participation in Egypt by the rural populations. Libya presents a different case altogether, where protests were led by bands of armed rebels in the eastern provinces (Anderson, 2011). There was a definite tribal influence in the Libyan protests and this revealed the differences between the urban and rural and tribal belts of the country at the time of the protests (Anderson, 2011).

As the brief overview above demonstrates, there were significant differences between the three countries in how the protests were carried out and by whom the protests were carried out. There were also some crucial differences in the demands of the protestors in the three countries, as these demands were localised, although the common thread of civic engagement and demand for responsive government remained visible in the revolutions of the three different nations (Anderson, 2011). The differences in the demands were mostly related to differences in economic grievances and social dynamics of these regions.

This chapter discusses the political theories that are involved in explaining causes for social unrest and revolution. These theories have been considered in the contexts of the revolutions in Tunisia, Egypt and Libya.

Tunisia

At the time of the Arab Spring, Tunisia was the Arab nation with the best educational system, the largest middle class, and the strongest organised labour movement (Anderson, 2011). Considering these achievements of the Tunisian autocratic government, it would be somewhat surprising to be faced with the prospect of a revolution in the nation. Had Tunisia been poor or shown a vast difference between the rich and poor classes like in Libya, one would be able to understand the economic reasons why the Tunisian revolution took place. Yet, Tunisia was one of the first nations in Arab world to rise up in the Arab Spring. The reasons for the revolution in Tunisia were obviously not economic, but there were political in nature. The Ben Ali government of Tunisia had managed to facilitate the right conditions in Tunisia for educational development and economic prosperity; however, the government also maintained a strict restriction on free speech and expression and development of political parties (Anderson, 2011). Thus, while on the face of it Tunisia presented an image of a modern country that was advanced in education, tourism development, and labour rights, there was a different Tunisia as well, where the rights of free speech and political engagement were strictly controlled.

In the political context, it may be noted that the government of Tunisia was also controlled by Ben Ali’s family, as many higher posts of the government were occupied by the members of Ben Ali’s large family (Anderson, 2011). Therefore, there was nepotism in the government itself.

In Tunisia, one explanation of the revolution is that of rational calculation of risk, which may have led people to join the demonstrations in large numbers once the first incidents of social uprisings were reported (Bellin, 2012). Reports suggest that there were calls to join the protests that were made in down town Tunis, and people responded in large numbers to these calls.

Egypt

However, in some respects Egyptian experience also shows the importance of free speech rights, which were largely protected in Egypt even under the Mubarak regime prior to the revolution, but which would be unheard of in Tunisia in the pre revolution stage. The Egyptian revolution was marked by the wide-ranging debates by the protestors on how they thought of reshaping Egypt, which were tolerated in Egypt under the “unusually high tolerance for free expression in Egypt (by regional standards) prior to the revolution” (Anderson, 2011, p. 4). The Egyptian revolution was initiated after the killing of blogger Khaled Said, and there was a campaign to honour his death, which proved to be the catalyst for the uprising (Anderson, 2011). Such campaigns at the start of the revolution were rare in Arab region and point at the free speech rights enjoyed by the Egyptians in a way that Tunisians did not. This may be one of the reasons why Egypt’s revolution was seen to be disciplined, sustained and citizen oriented. As Anderson points out:

“Egypt has a culture of deep communal bonds and trust, which manifested itself in the demonstrators' incredible discipline: their sustained nonviolence, their refusal to be provoked by thugs and saboteurs, their capacity to police themselves and coordinate their demands, and their ability to organize without any centralized leadership” (p.5).

Therefore, Tunisia has better education and economic set up, there were restrictions on political rights; whereas, Egyptians did have more political rights in comparison but were denied basic amenities and had widespread unemployment. These are marked differences in the starting point of the revolutions in the two countries.

An important angle in the Egyptian uprising is the role played by the youth of Egypt. This insight is brought forth by LaGraffe (2012), where he argues that there was a ‘youth bulge’ in Egypt during the period of revolution and this youth bulge played a major role in the political transition that happened in Egypt after the uprising. A youth bulges is a large cohort of people in the age groups of of fifteen and twenty-four, forming a significant proportion of the total population of the country; youth bulges are known to lead to a shortage of jobs if the economy is not developed and if the population growth and resultant youth bulge exceeds the economic growth of the country, there may be an acute problem of unemployment, poverty, and social unrest resultant of the gap between the population and the scope of employment.

The argument that youth bulge in Egypt was one of the causes for the uprising in the country, is based on the demographics of insurgency, which LaGraffe (2012) argues remains constant throughout political uprisings in most places around the world. It is argued that while there are a combination of factors that are involved in insurgencies and uprisings against the government of the day in Egypt, there is an important role played by the demographics of Egypt and also other countries where Arab Spring was witnessed, and this demographic context played a role in leading to the widespread instability that was witnessed in Egypt and other countries at this time (LaGraffe, 2012). LaGraffe (2012) argues that in order to ensure that there are no similar instabilities in the future, countries will have to ensure that there are policies in place that can help engage the youth and provide them with opportunities for work and social engagement. The role that was played by demographics in the Arab Spring can be justified on the basis that demographics often intersect with the other causes of conflict and uprisings, such as, unemployment, poverty, social unrest, declining economic conditions, urbanisation, and lack of engagement with the governments (LaGraffe, 2012). These may be pre-existing conditions in the given society, which may lead to social unrest, but these conditions may be aggravated by the intersection with demographics, which may interact with these conditions and act as "force multiplier" that drive conflict and uprisings in a given society (LaGraffe, 2012). Thus, demographics can often be an intervening variable that may aggravate the conflict, as seen in the context of the Egyptian revolution wherein there was significant unemployment and poverty in the society that led to social unrest, but when intersected with the youth bulge, the situation was aggravated and impacts were felt on the security conditions of the country.

There may be some substance in the argument made by LaGraffe (2012) that youth bulge contributed to the unrest in Egypt and was a major factor responsible for uprising in the country. Egypt like most developing countries in the world, has a young and growing population, without sufficient or adequate avenues for work and employment. This has led to conditions in the economy that see more unemployment and resultant poverty. Literature on youth bulge and poverty indicates that if there is an increase in the youth population of a country, there is a resultant increase in opportunities for conflict and insecurity in the country (Collier, 2007). It may be mentioned that if there is weak economic growth in the state, and low income levels, there is more likelihood of instability in the country (Collier, 2007). Therefore, one of the links between youth bulge and conflict in developing countries is to be found in the increased levels of unemployment and poverty and their contribution to conflict situations as important factors. Thus, demographics can play an important role through intersection with the factors of unemployment and poverty.

Another reason for why youth bulge may be a significant cause for conflict in Egypt may be that youth bulge may be related to social unrest. Literature and commentary on youth bulge and social unrest indicates that there is a higher possibility of crimes being committed by young men who are unemployed (Cincotta, 2005). It is claimed that throughout the world, young men are responsible for 75 percent of violent crimes, and much of the criminal activity takes place in contexts of greed and grievance (Cincotta, 2005). In places that have large youth populations, the recruitment cost is also reduced for the criminal gangs, who have a larger pool of people that are disgruntled or disillusioned by unemployment and poverty and may join gangs or criminal activity. Developing countries like Egypt are also seeing a growth in college-educated population of young men with high expectations from the employment market but lower levels of actual employment which may lead to conditions in which young men are more easily radicalised (Collier, 2007).

The conditions of youth and employment and resultant disillusionment have been prevalent in the developing countries of the Middle East. Most Arab countries have significant populations of people who are under twenty-five years of age (Zakaria, 2010). Zakaria (2010) argues that these conditions are ripe for uprisings and revolutions as witnessed throughout history, where youth bulges have been linked to uprisings or revolutions as he notes: "France went through a youth bulge just before the French revolution, as did Iran before its 1979 revolution. In the Arab world, this revolution has taken the form of an Islamic resurgence" (Zakaria, 2010).

Therefore, it may be argued that in the context of Egypt, large, unemployed, and poor youth population may have had a have a negative impact on security, where such young people, disillusioned by the lack of employment opportunities and rising poverty levels, may have been more inclined to social unrest and uprising against a government whom they hold responsible for their social conditions. As there was rising unemployment in Egypt during the period before the Arab Spring, the young unemployed people who participated in the revolution, would have done so as a lesser opportunity cost and the young population could be involved in prolonged protest activities without incurring an opportunity cost that they would have incurred had they been employed somewhere and had to get back to work. That there was an increased level of unemployment and poverty in Egypt, is also made out in a brief released by the United States Institute of Peace:

"Egyptians saw their real incomes severely eroded in the face of uncontrollable price hikes of basic necessities. The recent global recession made things much worse for many Egyptians, and the population living in poverty rose precipitously. These factors combined to help push Egypt's restless population over the tipping point—many felt that they had little more to lose...[i]n the end, Egypt's youth were buffeted by the 'perfect storm'” (Gilpin, et al., 2011).

It is noted in the observation above that there was a decline in the real incomes of Egyptians in the period preceding the uprising. There were price hikes that must have eroded the real incomes of the people and the global recession must also have had an impact on this. At the same time, there was an increase in the numbers of people who were living in poverty. The young must have also felt these conditions and must have been aggravated by the lack of employment opportunities that could have softened the economic impacts of rising prices and global recession. The statement that the young must have felt that they had little more to lose is telling because it speaks to the lowered opportunity cost for the young people to be involved in a protracted political revolution. It speaks to lack of employment of young people and social engagements.

Libya

Libya presents a completely different scenario to both Egypt and Tunisia, the latter’s revolutions also being successful in that the governments were deposed. On the other hand, Libyan society eroded from within and the uprisings in Libya soon turned into a civil war. A reason why Libyan experience presents such a stark contrast to the Egyptian and Tunisian experience is that the Libyan society was already deeply divided into kin and clan. The Libyan leader Muammar al-Qaddafi had spent four decades consolidating his power by patronage to kin and clan and this had affected the political and social fabric of the nation even prior to the revolution. The principal problems in Libya, which led to the start of the revolution were scarcity of simple consumer goods, basic medical care, widespread corruption, and a cruel and despotic government (Anderson, 2011). When the revolution broke out in Libya, the populations were already divided into clans which made it easy for the revolution to break out into a civil war based on the lack of trust in the government as well as lack of trust in other clans.

The Libyan colonial history is also relevant to understanding the political conditions in Libya during the Qaddafi regime as well as after the break out of civil war. Libya was an Italian colony and had seen the impact of Italian fascism, some features of which were adopted by Qaddafi during his 40 year rule of the country. These features included government extravagance, dogmatism, and brutality by the regime against the citizens (Anderson, 2011). Private ownership and retail trade was prohibited in Libya under Qaddafi, as was free press. Civil services and military were also controlled by Qaddafi government. Therefore, when the Libyan revolution broke out, there was no public-sector bureaucracy or even a well-managed police force in Libya. This made a difference in how the revolution shaped in Libya as different from Tunisia and Egypt.

From the perspective of political theory, there are certain areas related to the revolutions, which raise interesting questions. This is the reason why some analysts were surprised by the events of the Arab Spring (Dupont & Passy, 2011). In the first place, the events were unpredictable with many protests taking place impromptu. The unpredictable protests were followed by a diffusion process, which carried through in different countries of the region (Dupont & Passy, 2011). Interestingly, the authoritarian regimes, which involved repression and social control over the population, also saw protests from the weakest sections of the civil protests. At the same time, the protestors were not usually organised and were highly fragmented (Dupont & Passy, 2011). Another interesting issue is that the states were strong and authoritarian and the societies were weak, yet the weak societies were able to overcome their weakness and protest against the strong societies. In political theory, social movements are usually explained with reference to three main theoretical, these being political opportunity theory, resource mobilisation approach, and framing theory. The political opportunity theory stresses on the role of political in facilitating the emergence and the development of protest movements (Dupont & Passy, 2011). The resource mobilisation approach emphasise on the importance of organisation of protest through networks and ties (Dupont & Passy, 2011).

The framing theory emphasises on the necessity of cognitive which can convert mere grievances into protests (Dupont & Passy, 2011). There are other theories other than these three theories such as, mass society approach, structural-functional approach, and relative deprivation theories approach (Moaddel, 2012). Revolutions are not just structured from economic or political factors, but are also developed out of individuals’ and their approach to the revolution. As noted by Moaddel (2012):

“Individual attitudes matter in revolutionary mobilizations. To take part in a revolutionary movement necessitates not only commitments in time and resources but also acceptance of certain risks, including arrest, injury, or even death. Thus, it would be hard to conceive of individuals making such commitments without having strong attitudes against the government, on the one hand, and being passionate about a vision of the alternative socio political order they consider as desirable, on the other” (p.5).

In the Arab Spring, there was a participation by women as well children, and in Egypt there was a level of organisation which was unique in the Arab Spring, with there being improvised field hospitals, food, clothing and blankets being distributed amongst the protestors at Tahrir Square (Sande, 2013). Individuals were central to the revolution as seen in Egypt where the individuals were well organised and focused.

Ideology can play a role in the revolution. Ideology helps shape attitudes that turn into revolutionary action. Therefore, differing attitudes and ideologies can shape the future of the revolution. This can be seen in the examples of Egypt, where the ideology and attitudes of the protestors were largely in unison and therefore, there was a structure and discipline to the revolution. In Libya on the other hand, there were conflicting clan based ideologies and conflicting attitudes, which ultimately came in the way of a united opposition to the government; instead Libya devolved into a civil war like situation where different clans were situated at different ends of the revolution.

The use of Facebook and Twitter for political purposes, when these are apolitical Social Media technologies, is an interesting aspect in the context of Arab Spring (Markham, 2014). It has been noted that the use of Social Media in Arab Spring shows that YouTube has also created new political selves and new citizenships in an online format which is intimate in the visual sense (Markham, 2014). In fact, it has been suggested that the role of Social Media needs to be understood in the context of the political environment within which the media operates (Wolfsfeld, et al., 2013).

Libya also presents an interesting case because what began as uprising turned into a civil war (Bhardwaj, 2012). The reasons why Libya descended into civil war are multifarious and there are many variables involved in this. These include harsh government crackdowns on the protestors, the absence of a unified civil society, and application of alienation techniques by the Gaddafi regime (Bhardwaj, 2012). Ethnic differences and tensions between the many tribes added to these and compounded the sense of alienation amongst the different communities. Added to this was the problem of internationalisation of conflict where rebel forces were provided training by foreign forces. This led to the turning of the uprising into a full fledged civil war (Bhardwaj, 2012). The lack of a unified civil society in Libya is one of the reasons why the Libyan situation devolved into a civil war and why Libya found it difficult to transition towards democratic institutions (Boose, 2012).

Civil society has been defined as the realm of spontaneously created social structures that are distinguishable from the state that underlie democratic political institutions (Francis, 1995). Such social structures can be created in the society only where there is a real democracy. Civil society has also been described as the “zone of voluntary associative life beyond family and clan affiliations but separate from the state and the market” (Amy, 2004, p. 5). This definition of civil society is even more relevant in the Libyan context, where the frictions between clans and ethnic divisions within the society have come in the way of forming a civil society that sees voluntary associative life between members of the society and separate from the clan and ethnic divisions in the society. There is a crucial link between civil society and democratic transition, although scholars have generally failed to agree whether civil society leads to democratic transition or vice versa (Boose, 2012). From the context of sociological and cultural perspectives, it has generally been considered that civil society develops before and in many cases leads to the conditions for democratic transitions (Boose, 2012). Even if it is argued that it is democratic transition that leads to the formation of civil society, one may still understand that in the case of Libya, there was neither a strong civil society nor a strong wave for democratic transition around the time when it got involved in the Arab Spring. The existence of a civil society is one of the crucial phenomena “that takes shape and becomes influential during processes of democratic transition” (Boose, 2012, p. 311). In the case of Libya, this simply was not so and therefore, the lack of a civil society may have contributed to the way the Libyan experience shaped and progressed during the Arab Spring in a way that was so different from the experiences of Tunisia and Libya. The experiences of other countries in Latin America, that saw a transition from authoritarian governments to democracies were also different from what the Libyan experience presents. In countries like Chile, Argentina, and Uruguay, there was a transition from authoritarian to democratic institutions; however, each of these three countries presented strong civil society organisations, which were influential in the falling of the authoritarian rulers (Boose, 2012). Similarly, the Tunisian and Egyptian experiences saw strong civil societies shape the uprisings into revolutions that led to social change in these societies, democratisation being one of these important social changes. However, in Libya, the experience was very different from these countries because a strong civil society was simply not there. Had there been a strong civil society, it is possible that the experience of Libya would have been different and Libya would also have seen a transition to democratic institutions instead of devolution into a civil war.

For the main part, the events in Libya were not easy to predict for the analysts and commentators just as they were hard to predict anywhere else (Boose, 2012). These events caught the analysts and commentators unawares because there was no way of predicting these events in countries with such authoritarian regimes as Libya (Boose, 2012). Libya had been under the regime of Gaddafi, a highly dictatorial leader for decades and it was unbelievable that Libya could have witnessed uprisings from people and then would descend into a civil war (Boose, 2012).

Goodwin (2011) points out that no one in the west was able to predict that something like the Arab Spring would occur in the Middle East and that it would lead to regime change and transition at this scale. One of the reasons why it is difficult to predict an uprising in strong states like Libya was before the uprising, is that of preference falsification, which refers to the lack of information on whether a specific population of people really do oppose a particular political regime (Goodwin, 2011). Preference falsification happens most strongly in countries where strong dictators are able to create a popular perception of the strength of their rule, and people may be scared to reveal their own preferences for government as was the case in Tunisia under Ben Ali, Egypt under Hosni Mubarak, and Libya under Gaddafi (Goodwin, 2011). While it may be true that these leaders were widely reviled by their own citizens, it was difficult to really know what individuals in these states were thinking and while they may have expressed their personal opinions within their close circles, they may not have ever made public their opinions on these issues (Goodwin, 2011). For political scientists, it would be difficult to predict that there can be a revolution in a country or a demand for regime change when the choices of the individuals are not that closely known or understood (Goodwin, 2011). Preference falsification can be said to have created a wrong impression about the regime in Libya and it was generally considered that Libya was a country with a strong government; however, it was not necessarily true, as the uprising in 2011 proved. This has been the case for most revolutions because these lead to overthrow of regimes, which may be unthinkable at times. As noted by Kurzman, the estimated of how many people would join against the government:

“cannot be known in advance; nor can the willingness to participate. They shift drastically from moment to moment on the basis of amorphous rumors, heightened emotions, and conflicting senses of duty. These shifts make retroactive prediction impossible. Even the most thorough sur- vey would not have predicted very far into the future . . . For this reason, revolutions will remain unpredictable” (Kurzman, 2004, p. 170).

Therefore, one of the important aspects of the Libyan movement is that the Gaddafi regime being so strong, there could not have been any predictions as to the happening of a revolution in Libya. An explanation of how Libya first moved towards social unrest and uprising and then towards civil war can be found in the work of Kuran (1995) who argued that even if there is a strong authoritarian government in the country, there is a likelihood that an individual who opposes a regime may join some kind of movement against it under a situation that sees many others joining such a movement as well. Kuran (1995) argues that even in strong dictatorial regimes, where it is difficult to know how many people may actually come to protest against the regime, a small “intrinsically insignificant event” may lead to a slight shift in the dynamics of those who support the regime and those who are against it and in time, this shift in distribution can see more people joining the movement against the government or regime so as to lead to a ‘‘revolutionary bandwagon’’, which eventually sees open and widespread protests that spill into the streets as more and more people join the movement and participate in the relative safety and anonymity that is offered by large crowds (Kuran, 1995, p. 1533). It is further argued that once the revolutionary movement gains strength as more supporters join in, there is a likelihood that even those people who genuinely supported the regime earlier, may now join the opposition out of fear for their future safety (Kuran, 1995).

In the Arab Spring, the small and insignificant event was the event that happened in Tunisia, where a Tunisian street vendor, Mohamed El Bouazizi immolated himself on 7th December 2010. This event started the movement in Tunisia and later spread to Libya. As mentioned earlier, Libya was under a strong dictatorial government and no one could have predicted that there would be an uprising in Libya as well. However, Kuran (1995) may be correct in his assessment as shown in the Libyan example because although no one could have predicted such a revolution in Libya, Libyan people joined in the movement and social unrest once started, quickly devolved. This ultimately led to the ouster of the Gaddafi regime. Kuran (1995) is also proved right in his assessment that once the revolution is in full swing, people who were once loyal to the regime are also shown to join the opposition. In Libya, this is what happened after Gaddafi’s ouster, wherein people who were once in the Gaddafi regime and army became part of the National Transitional Council, which was the anti-Gaddafi government in Benghazi, established very early on in the uprising (Goodwin, 2011). Thus, former officials in the Gaddafi regime began to join the movement when it became evident that the movement was getting stronger (Goodwin, 2011).

Chapter 3: The Role of the Army, Civil Society and Islamist Groups and the Significance of the Social Classes in the Arab Spring

Introduction

The Arab Spring saw significant roles being played by the armed forces, the civil society, and Islamist groups that wanted resurgence of traditional Islamic law in these countries. Other factors that were important in the Arab Spring include social classes and how these classes impacted the way these revolutions shaped. This chapter discusses these points in detail.

Armed Forces’ Role in the Arab Spring

In Tunisia, army played a negative role in the revolution because although Ben Ali controlled the army, army refused to participate in the revolution. Therefore, the Tunisian army did not play a very important role in the Tunisian revolution or its transition in the post-revolution period (Anderson, 2011). In fact, the Tunisian army did refuse to support the government in the revolution time (Anderson, 2011). It may be said that the Tunisian army played an important role in refusing to participate on the side of the government in the sense that this allowed the people to organise mass protests without the fear of retribution or action from the armed forces of the country.

Unlike Tunisia, which saw a limited role of the army in the revolution, Egypt saw a major influence of the army in the revolution (Anderson, 2011). The Hosni Mubarak government in Egypt had increasingly come to be seen as inefficient and unable to provide the basic services to the people of the country. There was widespread unemployment and increasing poverty, especially visible in the urban regions where the youth felt alienated by the government’s inability to provide them with employment and basic services, while the urban rich has a growing conspicuous consumption (Anderson, 2011). As the urban youth rose in uprisings against the Mubarak government, the army also played a role by intervening in the uprising (Anderson, 2011). Ultimately after the fall of the Mubarak government, the army took control of Egypt, which is an experience completely different from Tunisia (Anderson, 2011). It has been argued that the army in Egypt had its own vested interests, both political and economic, due to which it refused to participate on behalf of Mubarak (Allagui & Kuebler, 2011). This may be justified by the post revolution events in Egypt, which saw the establishment of the military ruling council in charge of the political rule in Egypt due to which Egypt could not be said to have undergone regime change immediately as the country was anyway run by the military since 1952 (Allagui & Kuebler, 2011). The military ruling council did undertake to hand power over to an elected government in 2011, but its political, economic, and social vested interests were more inclined to continue with the status quo in Egypt after the ouster of Mubarak and no other strong government or leader in sight. The high autonomy enjoyed by the army under the previous regime, with no subjection of its budget to parliamentary scrutiny, and the business interests that army enjoyed in sectors such as olive oil, bottled water, hotels, construction, petrol industries and hospitals, meant that the army would have had its vested interests in not siding with the Mubarak government and then forming its ruling council in the aftermath of Mubarak’s ouster (Allagui & Kuebler, 2011).

In Libya, army played an important role. First, it may be noted that as compared to the Egyptian and Tunisian armed forces, Libyan armed forces were not as professional or organised (Goodwin, 2011, p. 455). In Egypt and Tunisia, the army refused to support the governments of the day and this may have led to the dictators falling relatively quickly in these countries as without the support from the armies, Egyptian and Tunisian governments were considerably weakened against the revolution (Goodwin, 2011). Had the Egyptian and Tunisian armies supported the dictators, it would have facilitated the dictator’s hold of power and the conflict may have been protracted and much more bloodier (Goodwin, 2011). It is also possible that the revolution may have become fragmented. Goodwin (2011) argues that there is a deeper agenda to why the armies in Tunisia and Egypt refused to side with the dictators. These armies are more professional and institutionalised armies and it is possible that they calculated that their best interests would be in abandoning the dictators. In Egypt, the army was able to take on a stronger role once Mubarak was ousted (Goodwin, 2011). Libyan army on the other hand was secretarian and was dominated by issues of clan, tribe, religious sect, and ethnicity. For its greater part, the Libyan army was dominated by Gaddafi’s tribe and it remained loyal to Gaddafi for a long time (Goodwin, 2011). Goodwin (2011) argues that the role that the armies in the three countries played at the time of the revolution, could not have been predicted by the analysts, but over time, the armed forces responded with their own interest in mind.

The Islamist and Civil/Liberal Movement

The Islamists and civil liberal societies played their own roles in the revolution. In Egypt, the civil society were the first occupants of Cairo’s Tahrir Square, and in many respects these people shared the aspirations of their Tunisian counterparts (Howard, et al., 2011). As a civil society, these people were in many respects like- minded, and shared similar characteristics like being educated but underemployed, and being excited for a political and social change in their societies (Howard, et al., 2011). In one respect, these first occupants of the Tahrir square were similar, in that they were not given to any particular religious fervour or zeal (Howard, et al., 2011). These first occupants were therefore, more of a secular bent and were focussed on social change that was related to economic and political institutions and not religious institutions (Howard, et al., 2011). The networking of these people is what was important in these early days of revolution in Egypt and these networks led to the widespread participation of relatively liberal, middle class, and peaceful citizens (Howard, et al., 2011). The dominance was of the liberal civil society; however, there was also a participation by the traditional Islamists, opposition parties, and union organisations (Howard, et al., 2011). The social media networks that were used at this time showed content that was both civil and liberal oriented as well as religious and both kinds of content received attention from the people. For example, a video featuring a detailed 20-minute dialogue between a religious scholar and political philosopher about the future of Egypt, received 100,000 views from the people (Howard, et al., 2011). This indicates that the revolution in Egypt was also impacted by the participation of religious leaders and traditional Islamists as well. In Egypt especially, the role played by organisations like the Muslim Brotherhood was important and continues to be a significant factor in the transition of the country from an authoritarian regime to democracy (Springborg, 2011). Those who were involved in the revolution in Egypt, included both the secular civil society as well as Islamists. This has impacted the post revolution scenario in the country as well as the transition process. The Muslim Brotherhood formed its own party and there is also a variety of Islamists, such as, Salifis, former insurrectionists, and the Gama’a Islamiyya, which became involved in the revolution and have continued to play an important role in the post revolution scenario (Springborg, 2011). This indicates that the Islamists played a role in the revolution, but also that Islamists themselves were divided and were from different groups and sects (Springborg, 2011). Therefore, while the revolution saw participation from both the secularists as well as the Islamists, there was a lack of cohesiveness between these groups and in some ways these groups represented the opposite sides of the spectrum (Springborg, 2011). The Muslim Brotherhood has been by far the most organised political force in Egypt and at the time of the revolution in Egypt, the Muslim Brotherhood was an outlawed organisation, which had not been allowed to operate for more that 50 years (Allagui & Kuebler, 2011). However, despite its strong Islamist stance, the Muslim Brotherhood enjoyed popular support in Egypt due to its political and social work, especially in the area of social network of hospitals, pharmacies, and schools (Allagui & Kuebler, 2011).

In Tunisia, Islamists have played an important role in the time of the revolution and more so in the post revolution phase (Allagui & Kuebler, 2011). The Islamist Ennahda in particular has been successful in gathering momentum in the time of the revolution and has emerged as a strong political force after the revolution (Allagui & Kuebler, 2011). It has managed to generate interest by holding nationwide rallies to gain support, which led to most Tunisians supporting the Ennahda in the post revolution phase. It may also be noted that the Islamist movement has been strong in Tunisia as may be inferred from the fact that many Tunisians have supported the formation of government with the Islamist party (Allagui & Kuebler, 2011).

Significance of Social Classes in the Shaping of the Arab Spring

Social classes and the distinction between the elites, the middle class and the poorer lower classes has always been distinctly seen in the Arab countries (Ismael & Ismael, 2013). Social classes and the distinction were created in the colonial period which led to the creation of the colonial bureaucrats and the post colonial period saw the emergence of stronger middle classes in the Arab states (Ismael & Ismael, 2013). The colonial upper classes and the new middle classes were groomed by their colonial overseers to consider the others as socially, culturally, and politically alienated (Ismael & Ismael, 2013). Due to these distinctions between the social classes in the Arab countries, national unity has been fragile in these countries (Ismael & Ismael, 2013). Despite these distinctions between social classes, the Arab Spring witnessed participation by people of all social classes. For instance, as noted by Al-Ali (2012):

“And during the height of the actual protests to oust Ben Ali and Mubarak, women of all generations and social classes were on the streets in large numbers. Notably in places like Tahrir Square in Cairo, where men and women mingled for weeks in extremely crowded and volatile situations, many Egyptian women reported that they had never felt as safe and been treated as respectfully as during the time of these protests” (p.27).

In Egypt, as noted above, there was participation in the protests by people of all social classes.

External Interventions

The international community also got involved in the Libyan civil war. In 2011, the United Nations Security Council passed Resolution 1973 authorising the use of force for the purpose of protection civilian population in Libya as there were excesses by the government reported from Libya (Garwood-Gowers, 2013). The Resolution 1973 exemplifies the principle of responsibility to protect (R2P), which comes into play when a state is considered to be unable or unwilling to protect its civilian populations (Garwood-Gowers, 2013). Therefore, another angle that is seen in the case of Libya is that of state excesses and the involvement of the international community manifested in the Security Council resolution 1973. The resolution is useful in understanding the level of violence that the Gaddafi regime unleashed on the civilian populations in Libya that led the international community to respond with resolution 1973. This violent crackdown in Libya in the initial days of the uprising is one of the crucial factors responsible for the turn of events that changed the uprising into a civil war (Garwood-Gowers, 2013). Later, it was found that Libya had a large cache of weapons of mass destruction, which also complicated the situation from an international perspective as Libya had publicly announced that it had destroyed its weapons of mass destruction (Busch & Pilat, 2013).

Chapter 4: Conclusion

There are several factors that led to the Arab Spring. For the countries that were involved in the Arab Spring, there is no uniformity in how these different factors played out. If economic issues were important in the Egyptian context, it was not so in the case of Tunisia. If army played a more important role in Libya by participating on behalf of the dictator, the case was not similar in Egypt and Tunisia, where the armed forces specifically refused to side with the dictators. This led to the relatively early and not as violent finish to the revolution in these countries as opposed to Libya where the revolution quickly devolved into a civil war.

Different political theories can be used to explain how the experiences of these countries played out in the Arab Spring. These theories explain how the revolutions were not anticipated (preference falsification), or how the social movements played out in context of the opportunity theory, resource mobilisation approach, and framing theory. This dissertation has used these theories to understand the contexts of the Arab Spring.

The principal conclusion of this dissertation is that there is no one explanation that fits the events of the three countries. In each country, the experience of the social movement was different. The three countries were not even similar in terms of their economy and political contexts. Libya was a strong dictatorial state, Tunisia had a single person rule for decades, but there was relative economic prosperity, Egyptians were allowed liberties like speech and expression even during the Arab Spring but people were disillusioned with the lack of employment opportunities and growing poverty.

The youth bulge also played a role in Egypt and there was a serious discontent amongst the young people of Egypt who were not engaged in the employment market. In this context, the dissertation has used literature on youth bulge which shows the prevalence of social movements in places where there is a higher population of young people but not as much opportunity in the employment market. The use of social media and technology was an important factor in all three countries studied in this dissertation and it has been found that social media played an important role in facilitating networks of people who joined the movement in a short span of time. In this context, the preference falsification theory is also relevant because no one could have predicted revolutions in these strong countries but with the use of social media and the spread of images and messages, people joined the protestors with the idea of protection or relative security of being in the large crowds.

Finally, it can be noted that the Arab Spring is a common name that is being used to describe the events in countries across the Middle East and North Africa region while the events in these countries themselves were not uniform and the causes of the social unrest were not always common. This common name may be attributed to the time and spatial context of the Arab Spring which started in Tunisia and spread across the wider Middle East and North Africa region where people took to streets against their own governments for causes that were peculiar in some ways to the individual countries.

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