The Arabian Peninsula and Its Importance

Introduction

Arabian Gulf States and Iran are called Gulf countries because they are located in the Persian Gulf region, also called as the Arabian Gulf. Many Arab countries and Iran are part of the Persian Gulf, including, Kingdom of Saudi Arabia, United Arab Emirates, Oman, Yemen, Kuwait, Qatar, Bahrain, and Iran. The Persian Gulf is in the West Asian region. The Arabian Peninsula is more a subcontinent like region in Western Asia, which consists of Kingdom of Saudi Arabia, Oman, Yemen, Kuwait, Qatar, Bahrain, and the United Arab Emirates. The Persian Gulf is to the northeast of the Arab Peninsula.

The Arab Peninsula has massive oil and natural gas reserves, due to which it is a region of immense importance. The greater part of the Arab Peninsula is covered by the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia. From the point of view of populations, the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia and Yemen form the majority of the population of the Arab Peninsula. However, from the point of view of oil reserves and wealth, the two most important countries in the region are Kingdom of Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates. The former has the largest reserves of oil in the world, whereas both the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates are the wealthiest countries in the Arab Peninsula.

The Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) has been formed by the countries in the Arab Peninsula. So far, the GCC countries have relied on the American military support for maintaining security in the region. The United States has replaced the British as the hegemonic power in the Gulf and since the 1980s and the proclamation of the Carter Doctrine, the dependency on the United States has been a prominent feature of the Arab Peninsula states’ security response. Since the 1980s, GCC states have solidified their military ties with the United States, and each of the GCC states, including the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates have security arrangements under bilateral defence deals with the United States.

One of the concerns that arise out of these bilateral defence deals with the United States is that the GCC countries, including the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates, themselves have refrained from developing their own standing armies and remain dependent on Western suppliers for expensive armaments. Thus, while the GCC countries get guarantees of defence security from the United States, they get complacent and do not develop their own armies.

The GCC is central to cooperation between Arab Peninsula states, including the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates on geographical, social, cultural, and economic issues. As such, the GCC provides the context within which the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates can discuss cooperation in the areas of economic, security, cultural and social cooperation.

Regional security concerns in the Gulf region are related to a number of security concerns, which can be classified as traditional and emerging concerns around security in the Gulf region. As some of the concerns in this area may be peculiar to the Gulf region, the concept of ‘Gulf security’ is now evolving with respect to security concerns in this region. Gulf security responds to the concerns and challenges linking internal security and external stability and international events.

Some of the emerging new concerns and challenges around security in the Gulf region are related to food, water and energy security, climate change, youth bulge, structural economic deficiencies, state failure in Yemen. There are also ‘traditional’ security concerns that have been a part of the Gulf region for significant period of time. These include security challenges related to Iraq, Iran, nuclear proliferation and terrorism.

Gulf security therefore encompasses ‘traditional’ and ‘new’ security challenges in the Gulf region. The Gulf region has also witnessed civilian movements relating to political reform and economic liberalisation. In response to these movements, regimes in the Gulf region have been continuously reacting to the shifting paradigms. It is also important to note that although military security is an important concern in the region, there are a number of long-term, non-military challenges that also need attention, particularly as the political economies in the Arab Peninsula states are changing and demanding attention to national and regional security from newer perspectives.

With change in political economies, there are a number of internal problems in the Arab oil monarchies of Kingdom of Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates, that need attention. Two important challenges in this non-military context are the continued dependence of oil rents and dependence on external security guarantees, which may no longer be as relevant or adequate as they were earlier.

Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates, are both important countries in the Middle East. Over the decades, there has been a development of diplomatic, political and economic relations between the two nations. United Arab Emirates and Saudi Arabia have certain commonalities that impact the prism through which they view their foreign policy with respect to each other. Both Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates are oil producing nations. This is one of the crucial aspects of their relationship with each other. Another important aspect of relationship is that both Saudi Arabia and United Arab Emirates have had to emphasise on regional security and regional security.

Promotion of close ties with each other is also based on the need to promote close ties with the states in the Gulf, based on common religion, history, language, culture, and tribal affinities. Both Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates have a common Arab identity. Along with their oil producing nations status, their Arab identities provides a common ground for development of United Arab Emirates and Saudi Arabia foreign relations. Indeed, Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates can be called as close allies in terms of the geopolitical and foreign policy interests of the two states being similar to a great extent. In the Middle East, particularly in the Arab oil producing states, oil has been a major political commodity for the states, having a definite impact on foreign policy and relations. One of the crucial aspects of oil in the Middle East is that the discovery and commodification of oil has been instrumental in encouraging the defining of boundaries in the Gulf region and this is true for the boundaries between the United Arab Emirates and Saudi Arabia as well. There were certain border disputes between Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates. These disputes were resolved under the Treaty of Jeddah, which was signed at Jeddah, Saudi Arabia, on 21 August 1974, although the United Arab Emirates is yet to ratify the treaty. In recent times, the non-ratification of the treaty by the United Arab Emirates has become something of a diplomatic issue. Another area of disagreement between the United Arab Emirates and Saudi Arabia in the recent times is the war in Yemen, where both countries are in a strategic alliance but there are some areas of disagreement. Nevertheless, recent diplomatic utterances by the officials in Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates depict that the relations between the two are strong diplomatically. The common threat perceptions that the United Arab Emirates and Saudi Arabia share, with respect to Iran and with respect to instability in the region, has strengthened the relations between the two countries.

1.2. Research Questions

The overarching research question in this research is why United Arab Emirates and Kingdom of Saudi Arabia have consolidated their political and strategic relationships in the recent years. The related research questions are as follows:

Are there any benefits to the consolidating of strategic and political relationships to the United Arab Emirates and Kingdom of Saudi Arabia?

In what ways have the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates consolidated their strategic and political relationships?

What are the military and security objectives for the consolidation of the relationships between Kingdom of Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates?

What are the non military and economic objectives for the consolidation of the relationships between Kingdom of Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates?

How does the war in Yemen impact the relationship between the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates?

1.3. Hypothesis

The hypothesis is based on the notion that the regional security challenge in the Arab Peninsula region provided the principle variables of the evolution of the relationship between the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates. The Yemen War is responsible for providing a shifting point in these developments.

The hypothesis drawn for this research is as follows:

“The regional security challenges in the Arab Peninsula provided the principal starting point for the development of the relationship between the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia Saudi and the United Arab Emirates, whereas the Yemen war provided a strategic shift of bilateral relations between the two countries.”

This hypothesis is drawn after a preliminary literature review, which indicates that there is a strategic shift in the bilateral relations between the United Arab Emirates and Saudi Arabia. Historically, the relations between the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates developed when the two countries were faced with certain regional challenges that they considered to be common to them. Consequently, the two countries evolved their bilateral relations in the face of such regional challenges as the Islamic revolution in Iran in 1979, the Gulf War of 1990-1991, the Arab Uprisings 2010, and the threat of rise of organisations like the Muslim Brotherhood, which are thought to represent Political Islam. A brief historical sketch is provided below to show the impact of these events on the relations between the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates. To begin with the Islamic revolution in Iran, Arabic countries like the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates have traditionally viewed Shiite Iran as a common threat to themselves. The threats from Iran are perceived by the ruling elites in the Gulf countries in the nature of ideational and political threats emanating from Teheran. The Arabic perception of Iranian threats to themselves are historic in nature. Iran had a longstanding claim on Bahrain until 1970 and has even reiterated these claims in 2007 and 2009. Iran occupied three islands belonging to the United Arab Emirates. Once the Islamic revolution happened in Iran, it also attempted to export it’s the revolution to neighbouring states of Bahrain and the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia, both countries with large Shiite populations. In the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia, government fears the politicisation of its Shiite communities. Thus, both the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates think of Iran as a common enemy and have sought to cooperate with each other against this common enemy since the Islamic revolution. The Gulf War of 1990-1991 is also one of the important events which brought the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates together. The United States was a principal player in the Gulf War as it provided support to the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia and Kuwait. The American and British forces who came to the aid of Kingdom of Saudi Arabia during the Gulf War, were deployed in the country during the period of the war. The Gulf War also involved the United Arab Emirates, which along with Kuwait was directly threatened be Saddam Hussein, who had threatened that he would use force against both Kuwait and the United Arab Emirates, the latter especially on the ground of having policies that were more in favour of American interests in the region rather than the interests of the Arab nations.

The Gulf War led to the formation of a coalition of forces: American, British, French, Saudi and Emirates. Thus, the common threat by the common enemy led to the strategic alliance between the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates. In other words, the Gulf War played an important role in developing strategic alliance between the two countries with the objective of countering a common enemy. The Arab Uprisings 2010, and the threat of rise of organisations like the Muslim Brotherhood is another factor that has played a role in bringing Kingdom of Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates together in a closer strategic relationship. Although the Arab Uprisings did not directly impact these countries and the effects of the uprising were felt more in other Arab states, the close proximity of the uprisings has been a matter of concern for all Arab states. This is due to the role played by the Social Media and Internet played in helping people to organise networks, share citizen journalism videos and blogs, and news about the movements across Middle East and North Africa. Of particular concern are the groups like April 6 Youth Movement and the Muslim Brotherhood, which have been able to use technologies for organising and building their capacities over time as well as generating more popular support for themselves. As one of the security concerns in the United Arab Emirates and the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia is to ensure the elimination of both domestic and international threats, the rise of such organisations is considered to be a major threat. The Yemen war has seen intervention by a Saudi Arabia led coalition, including the United Arab Emirates, which has meant that there is an alliance between Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates responding to a common regional threat in the shape of Yemen civil war. Recently, Saudi Arabia and Yemen have also announced aid to Yemen as per which each country will give $250 million in response to the food crisis in the war torn nation.

There are many other initiatives taken by the two countries in response to Yemen civil war, which goes to show a shift in the regional cooperation and alliance between the two, such as, aid for teachers programmes in Yemen. The hypothesis formulated is also based on the premise that Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates need each other for various reasons including political associations, environmental conservation, trade, and the humanitarian initiatives; hence, the relationship between the countries has to be consolidated, as seen in the response to the Yemen war by the two countries.

1.4. Methodology

The methodology of this research is based on three pillars. The first pillar relates to the phenomenon of the regional security challenges. Regional security clusters can be created as a response to perceived or real security challenges that are common challenges within a specific region. Potential threats from challenges can lead to the formation of security alliances in the region. Alliances play an important role in developing relations between regional powers and in the development of international relations as these are defined in the context of associations for enhancing security of states, for which formal or informal arrangements for security cooperation can be developed between two or more sovereign states. The second pillar is that of theoretical foundations and rival theories. The principal theories in international relations are theories of realism and liberalism, which explain the working of the international system. Realism and neorealism approaches emphasise on the states’ desire to increase their own power vis a vis other states, so that even when states work together their motivations are to increase their own powers. On the other hand, liberalism emphasises on cooperation and coordination. Realists emphasise on the creation of powerful states, while liberals emphasise on cooperation as the central notion. Realists emphasise on self-preservation as an important goal for states because states must always seek power to protect themselves; liberalism emphasises on interdependence between states and the reasons why states tend to cooperate with each other. In this research, the balance of threat theory is used to explain the development of the relationship between Kingdom of Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates. The balance of threat theory was evolved to modify the balance of power theory. The balance of power theory posits that states form alliances for balancing the power of other states, which would be difficult to do with individual efforts. The central thesis of balance of power theory is that unbalanced power threatens the survival of less powerful states so that they strike an alliance when threatened by a more powerful state or when they seek to increase their power.

Offensive realists believe that states are always involved in a balance of power approach even of internally because they are always trying to ensure that they have secured themselves against adversaries or stronger nations that may threaten them. Balance of threat theory posits that the alliance behaviour of the states is determined by the threat they perceive from other states. The third pillar of the methodology is based on the application of the scientific method for responding to the analysis of the subject. This research is based on the application of case study methods to this research on regional security in the context of the United Arab Emirates and the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia. The case study method has certain advantages as well as the challenges and limitations. A case study is an in-depth inquiry into a topic or phenomenon. A ‘case’ can refer to any single unit, including person, group, or organisation. A case study research is useful in research studies where there is a close connection between the phenomenon under study and the context for the study as case study can help in understanding the context. One limitation of case study may be in their lack of ability to produce generalisable and reliable findings; however this may be a misunderstanding about case studies. Case studies can be used in positivist, interpretivist, deductive, inductive, descriptive, exploratory or explanatory research studies. Yin writes that case studies may be used for descriptive and explanatory purpose. She identifies four case study strategies based upon two discrete dimensions: single case versus multiple cases and holistic case versus embedded case. A single case study sees the researcher observing and analysing an unobserved phenomenon so that the researcher can then define the actual case. In multiple case studies, the researcher considers whether the findings of the cases are replicated by all the cases used. A single case study approach can be selected where the nature of the case is critical, unique or typical. In this study, a single case study is being used on the basis that the relationship between the United Arab Emirates and the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia presents a unique and critical case or phenomenon. It is not necessary that the findings with respect to this phenomenon is replicated in other cases as well. However, the use of this case study will help the researcher to define the relationship that exists between the two countries selected for this research.

1.5. Methods

The method of analysis used in this research is descriptive approach based on historical analysis. Historical analysis is based on the sequential explanation of events to explain the historical outcome. Researcher explains the key steps in the sequence with reference to theories. Theories can help explain how in the particular historical circumstances of the case, the outcome was to be expected. In this case, the outcome is that of the development of strategic relationship between the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates, which will be explained on the basis of the Balance of Threat theory. The case study of the relationship between the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates is used to test whether the theory can accurately explain the processes as well as the outcomes of this case. Mahoney, Kimball, and Koivu explain the way historical explanation can be used for descriptive research in social sciences. They explain how sequence elaboration can help researchers use historical explanations to identify the causes of outcomes in particular cases. Historical explanations along with the different types of causes for the outcomes can be useful in identifying the sequence in which events took place in history and through evaluation of the relative importance of causes involved in the events, the researcher can identify the links between the theory and outcomes in the present case. Sequence elaboration is defined as “a technique for evaluating the importance of a given causal factor through consideration of its position within a sequence and through consideration of the different types of causal factors that make up that sequence”. The sequential research will assess the importance of different causes in a specific sequence of events in order to identify the causes that are most likely to have led to the outcomes. The importance of causes in specific events is always a challenge for the researcher trying to find which causes most likely led to the outcomes. There is a dilemma involved in historical studies as explained by Geddes as follows: “If two path- dependent arguments set out to explain the same outcome, and one argument concludes that choices made at one historical juncture determined the final outcome while the other identifies a different juncture as critical, how can we tell which is correct?”. In similar vein, a question is posed by Mahoney, Kimball, and Koivu that if “multiple causes are linked together in a historical sequence, how would we know when an intervening causal factor is more important than the initial causal factor that launches the sequence itself?”.

Therefore, historical analysis is used in this study to employ sequential explanation of events for explaining the historical outcome of the relationship between the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates. Historical explanations are in the nature of inferences about the causes of specific outcomes, which are intended to explain certain outcomes. Causes may be necessary, that is, of a nature that it can be said that an outcome would not have occurred if the cause had been absent, even though the cause does not guarantee the outcome. A cause may be sufficient, that is, it may be said that it inevitably leads to the outcome, although the same outcome can be achieved through other means as well. Causes may be necessary and sufficient. Causes may be neither necessary nor sufficient (INUS) in themselves but may be a part of the larger combination that is sufficient but not necessary for the outcome. Causes may also be “sufficient but unnecessary part of a factor that is insufficient but necessary for an outcome” (SUIN causes). In this study, the researcher uses the historical analysis method to put the events in sequence and then considering the causes of the outcomes in a sequential manner, where the possibility of a specific cause being necessary or sufficient to the outcome being explored in the historical analysis.

1.6. Research Outline

This dissertation is divided into three following chapters. In the following chapter, the theoretical foundations of this research are discussed. In this chapter, the dissertation will explore the theories of Regional Security Complex and Balance of Threat theory. In this chapter after this one, the dissertation will explore the bilateral relations between United Arab Emirates and the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia. Specific regional perspectives like the GCC and Middle East are considered in a chronological sequence. The final principal chapter in this dissertation concerns institutionalization and regional security. Specific measures like the establishment of the GCC and the Peninsula Shield Force (Al-Jazeera Shield Forces) are discussed in this chapter. Also discussed are the specific concerns of regional security, the development of security and defence in the region, the balances and shifts in amity and enmity, Kingdom of Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates as powers and Iran. The three principal chapters are followed by a conclusion in which the findings of the research are concluded.

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II. Theoretical Foundations

This chapter discusses two main theoretical bases. The first relates to the theoretical justification of regional security challenges and security interdependence as a critical factor in the creation of regionally based clusters. The second basis relates to how the state builds its alliances in case of potential or actual threats. Two theories are discussed in this chapter. The first is the regional security complex and the second is the Balance of Threat theory.

2.1. Regional Security Complex

Buzan emphasised on the need to develop an idea of security complexes in order to find some systematic framework within which the problem of regional security can be studied. He also emphasised that the idea of using regional analysis in a limited sense does not make sense when there is much to be gained from such regional analysis in the security context as well. In the context of the present dissertation, the strategic alliances between Kingdom of Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates can also be understood from the perspective of regional security concerns of these countries due to the threats that emanate from other countries within the same region and the alliances being formed by these countries to respond to these threats. The Regional Security Complex theory came to be developed by Barry Buzan and Ole Waever. The central thesis of the theory is as follows:

“The central idea in RSCT is that, since most threats travel more easily over short distances than long ones, security interdependence is normally into regionally based clusters: security complexes. Process of securitization and thus the degree of security interdependence are more intense between actors inside such complexes than they are between actors inside the complex and outside of it”.

As the definition above shows, security interdependence is a part of regionally based clusters, which are described by Buzan and Wæver as ‘security complexes’. In this context, it becomes important to define region first so as to explain regional security complex. With regard to the definition of region, it is generally accepted in international relations that there is no consensus on the definition of region. Nevertheless, it is important to define the term as noted by De Albuquerque because in “order to be able to discuss the benefits of analysing the Middle East from a regional perspective, one first has to define what one means by region and whether it is appropriate to speak of the Middle East as being one”. Some scholars have ventured definitions of region in terms of administrative units, that may be functional in nature, or geographical divisions that are homogenous, cohesive units based on the features of nature and culture. Regions can also be socially constructed on the basis of regionalism/ regionalisation or regionness. The former concerns the extent to which states may share a common political or economic project and the latter relates to the formal, institutionalised state-led projects of region-making that also include regional cooperation and coordination. From this angle, regional security complex has been defined in terms of security regionalism by de Albuquerque, who argues that “security regionalism is the consequence of states within the same regional security complex cooperating on security in ways that makes their interactions more like the Deutschian notion of a security community”. The question is whether the Gulf region is a region for the purpose of the regional security complex. de Albuquerque suggests that based on the shared culture, common security threats, economic and political integration, and institutionalisation factors, it can be said that the Middle East is a region. The economic integration in the region is not high and is characterised as low generally, but the fact that the majority of states within this region do share certain cultural similarities, due to Arab ethnicity and religious affiliation to Islam as predominant characteristics (with the exception of Iran and Israel), there is a support for the contention that the Middle East is a region. Moreover, there is political cooperation and integration in the region. This can be attested with the help of the establishment of the Arab League in 1945. There are a number of Arab countries that are a part of the Arab League, and the Arab League is a forum for political, economic, and cultural cooperation. Moreover, the Arab League is also an example of formalisation of security collaboration among its member states. Even though the organisation has not been able to achieve a high degree of political collaboration, the existence of the organisation does point at the regionness efforts.

The establishment of the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) is also a factor that can be taken into consideration for assessing the regionness or regionalisation of the Gulf region. The GCC was created in 1981 and consists of Oman, Bahrain, the United Arab Emirates, Kuwait, Qatar, and Saudi Arabia. The stated purpose of the GCC is the furthering of economic and cultural cooperation in the Gulf region. Considering these factors it can be said that the Gulf region forms a region for the purpose of application of the regional security complex theory. Interestingly, the creation of the GCC was also driven by the security concerns that the members saw as common concerns related to security in the region. Particular area of security concern for the GCC members was the Iranian revolution, which was thought to have internal security repercussions within the Gulf states. In Bahrain, Shias are in majority, which makes it particularly sensitive to developments in Iran, and other Gulf countries have substantial Shiite minorities. This is a particularly significant fact in the context of the present dissertation because both the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates have elite rule, whereas Ayatollah Khomeini gave an open call for the downfall of Muslim royal regimes, which is seen as a common threat for both the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates. Therefore, it is possible that the two countries have decided to support each other through cooperation and collaboration against what are seen to be threats commonly faced by both in the regional context. Buzan defined regional security complex as a “group of states whose primary security concerns link together sufficiently closely that their national securities cannot reasonably be considered apart from one another”. Smith explains the utility of this description from the perspective of the geographical proximity between states in a region where threats from one state can travel more easily to other states within the same region. In this context, it becomes easier to understand why states in a region would cooperate with each other or enter into strategic alliances with each other due to the intimate connection of their common security concerns.

These common concerns of security in the same region makes the states within a specific regional complex interdependent. Buzan and Wæver further note that such complexes “must possess a degree of security interdependence sufficient both to establish them as a linked set and to differentiate them from surrounding security regions”. The regional security complex theory identifies a regional security complex as a group of states with closely intertwined national security concerns. The concerns of the group of states are so closely linked that these cannot be extracted or addressed independently of each other. Due to these closely connected security concerns, regionally based clusters may be created; these closely connected concerns are critical factors in the growth of such clusters. Therefore, Regional Security Complex theory provides a framework for analysis and comparison of regional security of different regions. This regional framework should be used to explore international security as relations between states often depict regular, geographically clustered patterns. Regional security complexes are distinct patterns of interaction between countries within a geographical region, where such patterns are consistent over a period of time and are distinguished from one another. Where countries have formed a regional security complex, their level of interaction is high. Due to the formation of clusters based on the concept of security, these clusters see more interactions in the nature of securitisation as well as more intense security interdependence between countries within the regional security complex. Security interdependence in a regional cluster would mean that there are clusters being formed by regional actors for the purpose of enhancing their security vis a vis threats that are emanating to these actors from within the same region. According to Buzan and Wæver, regionally proximate actors are more likely to have shared concerns or more interactions on security related issues with each other because physically proximately does have the impact of generation of more interaction between actors. In this regard, they write:

“Simple physical adjacency tends to generate more security interaction among neighbours than among states located in different areas, a point also emphasised by Walt (1987: 276-7). Adjacency is potent for security because many threats travel more easily over short distances than over long ones”.

The reason that Buzan and Wæver particularly emphasise on proximity for the increase in security interactions is because of the ease with which threats move in a physically proximate environment. Countries that have barriers between themselves, be these natural barriers or other countries, may not have as much interaction with each other on security issues because these barriers insulate the countries from such interactions with one another. Deserts, oceans, mountains can form natural barriers that insulate countries from security related interactions. Thus, closer the countries are to each other in a specific geographical context, the higher are the interactions between the countries in security related matters. On the other hand, if there are barriers insulating countries from such security related interactions, these barriers will stop security concerns from travelling easily. Regional security cluster theory argues that geographical proximity is the principal factor that impacts the actions and motivations of the countries in a specific regional context because the security of one country will also interact with the security of other countries in the same region. In other words, the theory posits that the country’s security concerns are primarily generated within the immediate geographical neighbourhood of that country. As mentioned above, security concerns are not able to travel easily over distances, which may be a reason why such concerns are felt the strongest when they emanate from the immediate neighbourhood. With respect to this, Buzan and Wæver write: “Security features at the level of regions are durable. They are substantially self-contained not in the sense of being totally free-standing, but rather in possessing a security dynamic that would exist even if other actors did not impinge on it. This relative autonomy was revealed by the ending of the Cold War, when enmities such as that between Israel and Syria, and Iraq and the Gulf Arab States, easily survived the demise of a superpower rivalry that had supported, but not generated, them”.

The above statement is telling. Security interactions in a specific region may get some support from the other countries that may have geopolitical ambitions in the region. An example in the Middle East region can be given of United States that have significant interest in the region and which has continued to take a stand on security concerns in the region including the Gulf War in 1991. However, what Buzan and Wæver write is that security concerns in the region are self-contained and may be impacted by countries from outside the region, but are not usually generated by them. Thus, there is a relative autonomy attached to the security concerns and interactions from within the region due to which, outside influences may impact these interactions but they cannot be the critical factors responsible for the commencement of end of such security interactions. Aras and Okumus outline the development of the Middle East alliances in the aftermath of the dissolution of the Soviet Union, which widened the northern tier of the Middle East region. They write that the emergence of new ties between the newly independent states and the traditional Middle East in the aftermath of the dissolution was to a great extent driven by new security needs. Before the disintegration of the Soviet Union, the world was largely bipolar and there were alliances that were driven by the bipolar understanding of the world and international relations. After the end of the Cold War, the bipolar composition of world politics no longer held sway, and the regional factors became central to determining the shaping of security patterns of international politics, which explains the formation of regional security clusters in the world. The regional security clusters as per the theory developed by Buzan, Wæver, and De Wilde sees security not as given but as constructed. Furthermore, the regional security complex theory sees the development of regional clusters as part of a more realist approach to security on a regional basis. For instance, Smith writes that the “structure of a region is also composed of its material balance of power, making it largely consistent with realism ... The polarity of the system can be altered by factors internal to the region, such as revolution and differentiated economic development, or through external intervention. Although RSCT provides no specific method for quantifying the distribution of capabilities, traditional indices include military capabilities, economic power, and manpower”.

Thus, there is a realist perspective to the development of security clusters within a region. This is also explained by Buzan who defines relationships of amity and enmity. Relationships of amity range “from genuine friendship to expectations of support” whilst relationships of enmity is “set by suspicion and fear”. These relationships of amity and enmity drive social relationships between states as relations are not zero sum. Social relations exist along a spectrum and between “a broad band of indifference and neutrality, which amity and enmity are either too weak to matter much, or else mixed in a way that produces no clear leaning one way or the other”. In this way, realism may be driving states to form clusters of security with those who are within the same region. In this respect, Buzan note that an analysis of patterns of amity and enmity provides “a clearer sense of the relational pattern and character of insecurity [in a regional security complex] than that provided by the raw abstraction of the balance-of-power”. Therefore, a realist perspective on why states decide to ally or cooperate with other regional actors is provided in the regional security complex theory. Regional security complex can also see the involvement of actors outside the region. This is particularly depicted in the relationship between the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia and the United States. With respect to this, Ayoob pointed out that the United States being the ally of Saudi Arabia, makes it somewhat related to the security cluster in the region of which the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia is also a part, although their relationship does not mean that the United States is a member of the Gulf regional security complex. It has also been said that the United States often adopts an intrusive position with respect to the regional cluster due to its relationship with the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia. Therefore, while the external states to a specific region may not be members of the regional security complex, they may play a role in the formulation of threats and responses to the same within this region.

2.2. Balance of Threat

The Balance of Threat theory was developed by Walt in the 1980s. Prior to the development of this theoretical approach by Stephen Walt, the dominant model used for explaining the actions or behaviours of the states was the Balance of Power theory. The premise for the Balance of Power theory was that states define their goals vis a vis the power of other states, wherein the states try to build their powers to match the powers of the strongest state, so as to balance that power with its own power. It is not necessary that the states whose power is sought to be balanced should be acting aggressively for other states to try to balance that power by increasing its own powers. Thus, the purpose of increasing their powers vis a vis the other states was realist in nature where maintaining the balance of power was considered to be a realist motive for ensuring that no single country is drastically more powerful than the others. By balancing these powers, states ensure mutual security. Walt questioned the premise of the balance of powers theory, by arguing that historical evidence does not really support it. Walt argued that instead of matching up to the power of those countries who were the most powerful but who did not pose any threat to the other countries or who had adopted a non-aggressive stance, countries balanced the powers of less powerful states that were more aggressive. Thus, the premise from which Walt was arguing was that countries try to balance much less powerful, but more aggressive threats. Therefore for states, ideas of security are defined by perceived threats, and not a need to maintain a balance of power. According to Walt, states associate their own security with perceived threats and seek to balance these threats through international relations with other states. Walt posits that there are four elements that define perceived threat to the state, which are aggregate power, geographic proximity, offensive capabilities, and offensive intentions. These are the elements that states use to assess the nature and the extent of the threat that they expect from the other states. The four criteria mentioned here help states to evaluate the threat posed to them by other states. If the other state’s aggregate power is high and the state is proximate, with both offensive intentions and capabilities, the threat from that state will be perceived to be that much greater. Balance of threat theory of Walt has modified realism and has separated the concept of power from threat. In other words, Walt posits that it is not the power of the other state that is considered to be of importance for the purpose of balancing by one state, rather it is the nature and extent of threat that the state perceives from another states, which leads one state to balance the power of another state. The balance of power theory was found to be inadequate to explain the reasons why states enter into alliances and international relations to balance the powers of other states as was posited in the balance of power theory under realism.

Walt argued that actual state practice and international relations show that states are not as bothered by the powers of other states as they are more impacted by the threats perceived from the other states. Empirical evidence from the actual state practice was used by Walt to prove the point that it is the balance of threat in which states do not seek to balance against those who are rising in power but do not display offensive intentions but balance of threat from states who may not be as powerful but pose threat to the state, which guides the international relations of the states. In a more recent work, Walt further explained his position on the balance of threat theory. He begins his argument from the point that all of the alarmist fears of the United States due to the Cold War were off and that instead of United States coming to a decline as was thought by many alarmists in the United States and the western world, it was the USSR which declined. This point is taken by Walt to argue that it is not the rising powers of certain states that other states seek to balance, but the actual threats that are faced by states that make a difference to how they manage their international relations. The establishment of the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) has also been explained in the context of balance of threat theory by Priess, and Gause III, wherein the alliances in the Middle East or Gulf region are explained on the basis of the balance of threats that are perceived by the actors in the GCC. In the context of the GCC and the balance of threat theory, there is much scholarship which provides contested opinions on whether the formation of GCC is driven by the balance of threats or not. Walt himself viewed the formation of the GCC as an example of states cooperating in response to security threats from other states in the region; in the case of the GCC members this threat was perceived by the members to Iran and the Soviet Union.

Priess agreed with Walt that the formation of the GCC was in response to the need to balance threats, however, these threats were posited by Priess only to emanate from within the countries themselves and not from countries from the region. In other words, Priess agreed to the contention that the GCC was an example of alliance for balance of threat but disagreed that such threats could be external in nature and rather agreed that the ouster of the Shah in Iran and the Iranian revolution meant that the Gulf states were also concerned about internal impacts of these events in their own countries. These scholarly works offer evidence to support the thesis that it is balance of threats and not balance of powers in the Gulf region that impact the decision making of states with respect to alliances and partnerships like the GCC. Similar arguments are presented by He and Feng with relation to the strategic alliances formed by the United States in Europe and Asia. He and Feng argue that the United States has entered into multilateral alliances in Europe, but bilateral alliances in Asia after World War II because of the level of threat perceptions in the region. Based on the American alliances in Europe and Asia, He and Feng write that decision making with regard to alliances is influenced by two factors: “(1) high threats frame decision-makers in a domain of losses, and multilateral alliances become a favorable alliance choice because states are more likely to take the risk of constraining their freedom of action in return for more help from multiple allies as well as for avoiding further strategic losses; (2) low threats position leaders in a domain of gains, and bilateral alliances win out because states are risk-averse in terms of maintaining their freedom of action in seeking security through alliances with fewer allies. US alliance policy toward Asia after World War II is a within-case analysis that tests the validity of the prospect-threat alliance model”. It may be said that now there is significant support for the thesis advanced by Walt that states are impacted in their alliances and internatinal relations not by the fact of the powers of the other states that they want to balance but the fact of the threats that are perceived from other states that they want to balance.

III. United Arab Emirates - Saudi Bilateral Relations

3.1. From Regional Perspectives (GCC and Middle East)

This section discusses the bilateral relations between Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates in comparison with other relations between the GCC members and the other Middle-Eastern countries. This section will discuss how the regional threat perceptions are driving the bilateral relations and policies of Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates towards other countries in the Middle East and even beyond. In a recent article, Mansour and Ahmed (2019) have argued that the active policies adopted by Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates are driven to a large extent by the existence of rival regional powers in Iran and Turkey. Iran and Turkey and the perception of their adoption of policies deemed threatening to Riyadh and Abu Dhabi impact the bilateral relations of Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates, and also their policies towards countries in the Horn of Africa. The term “alliance politics” is used by Mansour and Ahmed to explain the relations between Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates. The “alliance politics” of Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates are explained as the use of their policies in alliance for containing regional threats by building alliances with other countries even outside the Middle East, and especially in the countries of Horn of Africa with whom Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates are entering into military and trade relations. Khashan takes a more negative view of the ties and bilateral relations between Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates. He writes that western writers often view the relations between the members of the GCC from the western prism of legal-rational processes in which they think that just because countries are publicly professing to be amicable, they are. Instead he writes: “Relations between Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates (UAE), the GCC’s two leading states with a modicum of military muscle, have been anything but amicable despite their close economic ties, with both leaderships finding it difficult to transcend their egos, biases, and personal politics in favor of the national interest. At best, they have managed to hide their hostility and rivalry behind a thin veneer of hospitality and politeness, as vividly illustrated during their 2017 collaboration against Qatar. While Riyadh’s animosity toward Doha revolved around the latter’s support for the Muslim Brotherhood and Hamas and strong relations with Erdoğan’s Turkey, Abu Dhabi sought to cut Qatar down to size before its growing economic prowess overshadowed the UAE’s business model. Despite this show of cooperation, the two states are more often than not in competition in the political and economic spheres.”

The above statement appears to argue that the bilateral relations between Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates are not as amicable as they appear to be and that instead of being amicable partners, they are competitors in the region. This statement appears to be too pessimistic and is based on the assumptions that the two states must be competitors when the facts point to the contrary. For instead, in the above statement itself, it is clear that the two countries have taken similar positions on Qatar. The similar positions taken by the two countries shows that they have common concerns that emanate from the regional situations. As this research has discussed in the sections above alliances between two or more countries can be based on the balancing of threats perceptions of the countries. It is not always necessary that balancing of powers would determine the course of action for the countries. The argument made by Khashan above is based on the assumptions arising out of balance of power. On the other hand, ample evidence has been put forth on the basis of literature that indicates that Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates are acting on the basis of balancing of threats and not balancing of powers. Had they been acting on the basis of balancing of powers, it is possible that they would have taken decisions that were more focussed on balancing each other’s powers; however, the evidence presented in the dissertation throughout indicates that Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates are cooperating with each other and acting together on regional threats that they perceive to be common to themselves. An example that may further support the above argument can be found in the positions taken by Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates with reference to Egypt. Egypt under President Abdel Fattah al-Sisi has seen a common approach by both Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates, both of which have been generous financial donors to Egypt. To some extent, it is argued, Riyadh is driven in its approach to Egypt by its overriding priority stem Iran’s influence in Yemen and Syria and the Middle East in general. Both Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates have taken a common stance on Egypt. al-Sisi has taken a divergent stance from Saudi Arabia in Syria and both Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates are frustrated by Egypt’s lack of progress in financial, economic and security contexts. Prior to 2015, both countries were primarily concerned with the containment of the Arab Spring, with the consequence that the foreign policy of both countries was militarised. The rise of the Muslim Brotherhood in Egypt in the first democratic elections in that country in 2011-2012 and of Ennahda, in the 2011 elections in Tunisia, have been common concerns for both Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates.

Another common concern for both Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates with respect to Egypt apart from the possible “export of revolutions” promoted by the Muslim Brotherhood, is a concern that Egypt might seek a rapprochement with Iran. Certain events have led to these concerns of Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates with respect to Egypt. For instance, in August 2012 Mohammed Morsi became the first Egyptian President to travel to Tehran after the 1979 Cultural Revolution in that country and this was followed by a number of state visits between Egypt and Iran. Egypt being the most populous Arab country and also the home of the Muslim Brotherhood, the possible rapprochment between Egypt and Iran has been a common cause of concern for Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates. Although Khashan above has argued that the show of amicability between Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates hides animosity, actual facts related to the common policies on Egypt between these two countries point at a concern with commonly perceived regional threats and having an alliance in how they respond to these common threats. It is true that after 2015, Saudi Arabia has also taken steps towards raprochment with the Muslim Brotherhood, however, United Arab Emirates has also signalled some policy change with respect to Egypt and Muslim Brotherhood post 2015. Therefore, there is a noticeable change in the positions of the two countries with respect to Egypt and the Muslim Brotherhood, with Saudi Arabia taking a more visible rapprochment towards Egypt, but there are still commonalities of approach between Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates which sees both countries cooling off with respect to the threat perception from Egypt. The Muslim Brotherhood is no longer seen as a big threat by both countries because of its weakened position in Egypt, which allows both countries to follow a more friendly approach to Egypt once again. Instead, a stronger Iran is once again engaging the allied policies of Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates. The war in Yemen and the role that Iran has played in it, has led to the shifting of focus once again to Iran for both Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates. In this respect, it has been said: “The great extent to which Iran is now per- ceived as a threat by Saudi Arabia and the UAE can be seen in Yemen. The two Gulf States absolutely want to prevent Iran’s influence from spreading onto the Arabian Peninsula. Riyadh and Abu Dhabi therefore consider Yemen the red line that must not be crossed by Iran. They accuse Tehran of supporting the Yemeni Houthi rebels, who stormed the capital Sanaa in September 2014 and drove the government of Presi- dent Abd Rabbuh Mansur Hadi from office.

Therefore, contrary to what Khashan argues about Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates not having common concerns and being driven by animosity towards each other, what is seen is that the two countries are still driven in their foreign policies towards other countries in the GCC and the Middle East by the common threat perceptions that they have from the other countries in the region. It may be said that Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates are still an alliance that has common concerns that emanate from the threat perceptions that are rooted in the Middle Eastern region. This is particualrly noted in the case of threat perceptions from Iran, and grounded in the concerns related to the wars in Syria and Yemen. Coming specifically to the relations between the United Arab Emirates and Iran, although, the former has had a better bilateral relationship with Iran as compared to Saudi Arabia, the post sanctions era beginning in 2005 has seen cooling off of relations between the United Arab Emirates and Iran as the former benefitted economically from the sanctions imposed on the latter. As Iran’s isolation grew due to the sanctions, the United Arab Emirates emerged as a more preferred destination for investment, travel and business. Relations between the United States and Abu Dhabi improved significantly and with that came the pressure to distance itself from Iran. From 2011, there was a slight improvement of relations between the United Arab Emirates and Iran; however, the war in Yemen broke the momentum of the bilateral relations improvement between the two countries as Iran’s support for the Houthi rebels became known. This brought Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates together along with other GCC states as is noted below: “As the military operations in Yemen unfolded, with the initial Operation Decisive Storm phase giving way to a secondary phase entitled Operation Restoring Hope in April 2015, the UAE assumed a leading role in the ground war and in combat and humanitarian operations in southern Yemen in particular. Emirati and UAE-trained forces constituted the most accomplished element of Operation Golden Arrow, the land offensive launched in July 2015 to retake Aden and southern Yemen from Houthi control, with more than 3000 troops supported by Apache attack helicop- ters and dozens of tanks and armored personnel carriers. The conflict in Yemen thus highlighted the new assertiveness in UAE and GCC policies as Emirati and Saudi officials worked closely together in a bid to project and protect their regional interests, and represented a potentially volatile evolution in regional security structures, as the locus of decision-making lay in (Arab) Gulf capitals rather than external partners in Washington, D.C.”

As depicted in the passage above, the Yemen crisis brought the United Arab Emirates and Saudi Arabia together and even if the United Arab Emirates had sought rapprochment with Iran in the period after 2011, the role that Iran has played in Yemen has meant that the United Arab Emirates has once again distanced itself from Iran and aligned itself with Saudi Arabia in Yemen. This shows that instead of balance of powers, it is balance of threat that is driving the decisions and policies of the two Gulf countries and their bilateral relations as well as their relationships with other GCC members.

3.2. From Chronological Sequence

The Saudi – Emirati coordination Council has been set up under the agreement between the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates in May 2016. The agreement was entered into by the two countries to set up a bilateral forum for cooperation and coordination between the two countries. The Saudi – Emirati coordination Council is therefore a model of bilateral cooperation. Interestingly, the Council is supportive of the work within the joint GCC system of which both the countries are part. Within this context, the Council is working on joint initiatives for creation of job opportunities, GDP growth, and increased investments between the two countries. The Council particularly works on the principle of sustainable bilateral relations and for strengthening economic integration as per the GCC commitments. The council also works towards the enhancement of political, security and military cooperation and integration between the two countries. Security and sovereignty are two important considerations for the cooperation between the two countries as the formation of this Council shows because one of its objectives is to cooperate on security issues common to both countries at regional and international levels. The three pillars driving the work of the Council are economic pillar, human and knowledge pillar, and political, security and military pillar. Al Hasani writes about the impact of the establishment of the Saudi – Emirati Coordination Council on the GCC and the general cooperation between Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates. He also writes about the background of the Saudi – Emirati Coordination Council and the reasons why the two countries felt compelled to establish such a council when they were already part of the GCC as well. The Saudi-Emirati Coordination Council was envisaged as a medium through which the friendly ties between the two countries and their cooperation in military, political, financial, and social fields, could be enhanced (Al Hasani, 2019). Thus, despite being the members of the GCC, both Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates felt compelled to establish ties between themselves in a bilateral format due to which the Council was established.

The steps taken by Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates before and after the establishment of the Saudi – Emirati Coordination Council also indicates that they have been looking at cooperation and coordination in bilateral relations. For instance, in December 2017, UAE President, His Highness Sheik Khalifa canister Zayed Al Nahyan, issued an announcement that there will be a development of Co-operation Committee, between Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates, which would be aimed at the merging of the current solid bilateral ties between the United Arab Emirates and Saudi Arabia. He also announced that the countries would seek to improve their cooperation on vital regional and international issues through the establishment of this Cooperation Committee. Literature sees the establishment of ties between the United Arab Emirates and Saudi Arabia as natural considering their shared interests and concerns, which is also reflected in the establishment of joint co-operation under the Saudi-Emirati Coordination Council in Jeddah. One of the important aspects of the establishment of the Saudi – Emirati Coordination Council is that it seeks to create a platform where the two countries can undertake joint projects with each other aimed at improving the prosperity and contentment of the population of the two nations. The three pillars devised under the Saudi – Emirati Coordination Council, these being, the economic pillar, human and knowledge pillar, and political, security and military pillar, are the framework under which the cooperation between the two countries is sought to be achieved. These pillars were devised under work done by the Saudi and Emirati governments officials for over 12 months. These pillars are related to the areas of cooperation between the two countries, the objectives behind cooperation and the projects that can be planned by the two countries to be achieved within five years from the signing of the joint cooperation decree.

Under the economic pillar, the Saudi-Emirati Coordination Council envisages the establishment of arrangements leading to the empowering of the banking sector so that banks' branches in the two countries can upgrade their business and take advantage of the available development opportunities in the two countries. There are possibilities for development and cooperation in the field of financial innovation for both countries which they seek to delve into under the economic pillar. The insurance sector presents another area of cooperation to the two countries whereby they can enhance and bolster insurance markets, devise new products and create effective regulatory mechanisms. The second pillar, that is, the human and knowledge pillar, aims at creating an integrated and effective instructive framework related to technical education, public education, research cooperation and higher education, as per which citizens of both countries can benefit. The political pillar is aimed at creating cooperation in the political, security and military fields, and it is here that the two countries seek to recognise and act on opportunities that are strategically aimed at addressing common security and safety concerns of the two countries. Not all scholars and commentators take an optimistic view of the bilateral ties between Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates. For instance, one commentator writes: “Relations between Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates, the GCC's two leading states with a modicum of military muscle, have been anything but amicable despite their close economic ties, with both leaderships finding it difficult to transcend their egos, biases, and personal politics in favor of the national interest. At best, they have managed to hide their hostility and rivalry behind a thin veneer of hospitality and politeness, as vividly illustrated during their 2017 collaboration against Qatar. While Riyadh's animosity toward Doha revolved around the latter's support for the Muslim Brotherhood and Hamas and strong relations with Erdoğan's Turkey, Abu Dhabi sought to cut Qatar down to size before its growing economic prowess overshadowed the UAE's business model. Despite this show of cooperation, the two states are more often than not in competition in the political and economic spheres”.

The above statement of Khashan can be understood in the context of balance of threat theory. Countries respond to threats and the level of threat perception has an impact on the level of response. In the case of Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates, the two countries do compete with each other, but at the same time, the two countries do not have a high level of threat perception from each other. This allows them to enter into strategic alliances that allow them to cooperate and coordinate with each other despite the competitive tendencies that may exist between the two countries. From a regional security complex perspective, the alliances, particularly in the form of the Political Pillar of the Saudi-Emirati Coordination Council can be understood as a strategic alliance where two countries within the same region are coming together to form a security complex in the face of threats from other countries in the region that they perceive are common to them. Khashan himself mentions this common threat in the region in the form of Qatar and mentions the 2017 collaboration between Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates against Qatar. The reasons why the two countries perceive this threat from Qatar may be different. In the case of Saudi Arabia, it may be due to the Qatari support for the Muslim Brotherhood and Hamas and strong relations with Erdoğan's Turkey and in the case of United Arab Emirates, the threat perception is more related to the economic factors. However, there is a common threat and due to this, both Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates come together to form an alliance against Qatar. Indeed, Qatar is not the only country to whom Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates have responded in a collaborative manner. Collaborative actions by the two countries have also been seen in Bahrain in 2011 and Yemen in 2015. After the Arab Spring, the two countries have sought to position themselves as collaborators in economic, diplomatic, and military sense. Since 2011, the United Arab Emirates and Saudi Arabia have increasingly sought a more bilateral angle on their strategic relationship which is beyond the GCC. One of the reasons why both countries have sought this route to managing common interests is their apparent common desire to isolate Qatar. The joint economic and military partnership between the United Arab Emirates and Saudi Arabia is to be seen in the context of the crisis within the GCC as well, because the 6 members of the GCC are not compatible.

The tensions within the GCC follow the move by Saudi Arabia, the United Arab Emirates and Bahrain to launch trade and travel embargo against fellow member Qatar. Qatar has been accused of sponsoring terrorism by these states, which it has consistently denied. Kuwait, another member of the GCC had tried to mediate between these countries but was not successful, eventually there was a move towards the establishment of a joint coordination committee by United Arab Emirates and Saudi Arabia.

3.2.1. United Arab Emirates- Establishment to 2015

Gause says that the regional security strategy of Saudi Arabia has been consistent over a long period of time. The overriding goal of the Saudi Arabian regional security strategy has remained the need to protect their security against external threats in the nature of conventional regional military threats as well as challenges in the transnational ideological nature. Therefore, Saudi Arabia, has tried to insulate itself from the threats posed to it domestically and transnationally through a regional security dimension. Thus, the regional security policy of Saudi Arabia has to be understood in the context of national security from the internal and external threats. In this backdrop, Saudi Arabia’s relationships with other states in the same region and the threat perceptions that it has from these states has to be understood from the perspective of Saudi Arabia’s security. Thus, Saudi Arabia’s relationship and closely developing strategic partnership with the United Arab Emirates have to be understood from the point of view of the national security in both nations. Ehteshami writes that the Middle East international relations have been fluid for the most part of the last five decades. The Baghdad Pact, which was supposed to create better international and regional security regime for these states failed to do so in the face of the Arab Cold War between pro Western countries in the region and the nationalist and populist regimes meant that the Baghdad Pact did not achieve much success in the context of regional security.

IV. Institutionalisation and Regional Security

Institutionalisation in the Gulf region has happened predominantly through the establishment of the Gulf Cooperation Council and later with the Peninsula Shield Force. Both of these institutions have seen an active involvement of Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates. These are discussed in some detail below.

4.1. Institutionalisation

The institutionalisation that has happened within the Gulf region, particularly with reference to Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates relates to the formation of institutions of collaboration and cooperation in the region. The most important institution in this context is the Gulf Cooperation Council or the GCC. The GCC is an important development in the Gulf region, which can also help to explain the international relations of states within this region. The establishment of the GCC has been used to explain regionalism and provide culturalist explanations within the alliance theory in international relations with respect to the Gulf area.

4.1.1. Gulf Cooperation Council

The GCC is an important step in the instituionalisation of cooperation in the Gulf region. The GCC was formed with six member countries: Bahrain, Kuwait, Oman, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, and the United Arab Emirates. These Gulf countries came together because they are similar in terms of ethnicity, religion, historical experience, and political systems. The economic and geographical sizes of these countries is however varied and this also has impacted the dynamics within the GCC. Saudi Arabia is the strongest economy and is also the largest in terms of geographical size. In 2013, the contribution to GDP by Saudi Arabia stood at 46% to the total GDP of the GCC region making it the highest contributor to the region’s GDP. Due to its high contribution to the GDP, Saudi Arabia is considered to be an engine of the GCC growth, matching closely the GCC’s outputs. Saudi Arabia also has 55% of GCC oil reserves and 75% of the total GCC population. Saudi Arabia is also the only Arab country in the Group of Twenty (G20) nations. Due to these factors, Saudi Arabia has been considered the natural leader of the GCC. After Saudi Arabia, United Arab Emirates is the highest contributor to GDP in the region at 24% in 2013. GCC nations have managed to drive some cooperation in the field of infrastructure development as they are now seeking to diversify away from hydrocarbons, and towards becoming knowledge economies. The GCC electricity grid interconnection is an example of integration within the GCC. The GCC Dolphin pipeline is another example; it transports natural gas from Qatar to the UAE and on to Oman. The GCC nations are also investing in a GCC wide railway network to connect the GCC nations. Despite the initiatives taken within the GCC, there are some interesting dynamics within the GCC where Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates have tended to collaborate. The United Arab Emirates has followed public relations policy since its inception which has aligned it to Saudi Arabia. The two countries have common interests and common threats that has aligned them within the GCC. Indeed even the formation of the GCC has to be seen in the light of the common interests and perceptions of the members states.

In this respect, Bianco states that the establishment of the GCC is seen by most realist scholars as a response to the fall of the Shah of Iran in 1979, and the emergence of a revolutionary regime in Tehran, which was thought to be a threat to the Arab countries in the neighbourhood. The realist emphasis is that the events in Iran forced the Arab countries to consider how the Arab Gulf monarchies in the region may also be threatened by the ideology. Thus, from a realist perspective, the coming together the six Gulf monarchies was a way to present a unified front for shared security needs, meaning that they wanted to safeguard sovereignty. The element of sovereignty is in fact central to comprehensively analyse the full story of the GCC, as well as the evolution of intra-GCC relations. Analyses of the overall status of the GCC as a regional organization, based on the developments since the 1980s, have indeed poised that the GCC has been unable to establish itself as a full-fledged cooperative and integrated body mainly due to a high degree of resistance to sharing sovereignty, resulting in the lack of supranational authority or form of legitimacy.

4.1.2. Peninsula Shield Force (Al-Jazeera Shield Forces)

The Peninsula Shield Force is the military arm of the GCC. The purpose of the establishment of this body is to help the GCC members deter and respond to military aggression against any one of these countries. The Peninsula Shield Force was established in 1984 when the members of the GCC decided to create a joint military force. The force was to consists of 10,000 soldiers that were divided into two brigades. The force was based in Saudi Arabia. The Peninsula Shield Force consists of infantry, artillery, combat support, and armoured elements that are contributed to by each of the GCC countries. The Peninsula Shield Force has not always had a uniform military strength. In 1992, the strength was 5,000 men from all the GCC member states and in 2006, it was at 7,000 personnel. At this time, the Peninsula Shield Force also functioned as a joint intervention force defending the joint border of Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, and Iraq. In December 2007, there was some discussion on the creation of replacement for the Peninsula Shield Force, where the replacement would also work towards the joint defence of the GCC countries. The Peninsula Shield Force has been challenged in some ways due to internal issues of the GCC nations as well. Although, the Peninsula Shield Force is an example of systematic and institutionalised cooperation between the Arab Gulf states, increased defence collaboration has been slow in the region and within the GCC. One of the reasons for this is that there are always fears of angering neighbouring countries, in particular Iran, which may consider the strengthening of the military collaboration as aimed against itself. Another reason is that GCC members are focussing on strengthening of national militaries and also rely to some extent on foreign allies. An example can be taken here of Saudi Arabia and its reliance on the American military. Therefore, the Peninsula Shield Force has seen at different times increased and decreased cooperation in defence. Jabri writes that security considerations and the common threat perception from Iran and also Iraq at one point in time, the Gulf nations decided to come together to respond to these security threats. The GCC was formed after the Iranian-Iraqi war in 1980 and the Peninsula Shield Force was established in 1982 as a defensive measure against Iran.

Although Iraq no longer poses a threat for the Gulf region after the events of 2003, Iran is still a prominent threat and is seen as a threat and a rival by almost all Gulf countries. For Saudi Arabia in particular, the cultural revolution in Iran and the ouster of the Shah of Iran was an important indicator of threat. The war in Yemen has continued to increase the Saudi Arabian perceptions of threat from Iran and vice versa. There is an increasing rivalry between Iran and Saudi Arabia, which also impacts the dynamics within the GCC and the Peninsula Shield Force. The Saudi Arabian interest in the use of Peninsula Shield Force to counter the threat from Iran can be seen in the way Saudi Arabia has dominated the Peninsula Shield Force. At the time of the establishment of the force, it was stationed in Saudi Arabia under a Saudi commander as a defence strategy during the Iranian and Iraqi war of 1984. Saudi Arabia is the biggest contributor financially to the Peninsula Task Force. The first training of the force was in the United Arab Emirates.

4.2. Regional Security

4.2.1. Development of security and defence

Recent events in the region have led to the further consolidation of ties between Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates. Particularly significant in this context is the recent attacks on Saudi Arabia’s oil reserves. In October, 2019, following these attacks against Saudi Arabia, there was a meeting between the Abu Dhabi Crown Prince Sheikh Mohammed bin Zayed Al Nahyan and Saudi Vice Minister of Defence Prince Khalid bin Salman. This meeting is significant because in this meeting, the two leaders discussed "challenges facing the Gulf Arab region and repercussions on the stability and security of its countries ... and efforts to confront them." One of the major challenges recognised by the two countries is the tensions between Saudi Arabia and Iran after the attacks on Saudi oil facilities on September 14, 2019. Interestingly, while Iran continues to deny a role in the attacks, both Washington and Riyadh blame the attacks on Iran. The Houthi movement has actually taken the responsibility for the attacks. The Yemen crisis is one of the significant issues in the Middle East security dimension that has brought Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates close together. Both countries have formed a partnership against the Houthis. Not only that, the two countries also support the "maximum pressure" campaign of the United States against Iran after Washington quit the 2015 nuclear pact with Iran and reimposed sanctions on Iran. Therefore, in the context of development of security and defence between the two countries, the Iran angle plays an important role. Interestingly, while security issues in context of Iran had brought Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates together, the latter has recently softened its stance on Iran and has even urged de-escalation of tensions post the 2019 attacks on oil tankers in Gulf waters in May and June, and again in September. Therefore, there are some differences of opinion between Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates over Yemen and Iran with Saudi Arabia adopting a more strict posture than the United Arab Emirates with regard to tensions with Iran.

It is important to note that the war in Yemen is viewed by some as a proxy war between Saudi Arabia and Iran. The Houthis are supported by Iran. On the other hand, the Saudi-led coalition intervened in Yemen against the Houthis in March 2015. Yemen has a Saudi backed government at this point and Saudi Arabia has been trying to host talks between the separatists and Yemen's Saudi-backed government, to find a solution to the Yemen problem. In the light of the above background, it can be seen that at this time there are certain issues related to security and defence that are related to external conditions in the Middle East, particularly, the situation in Yemen. Against this background, one can try to understand the steps taken by the governments in Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates to strengthen their security and defence paradigm in context of bilateral relations between the states. In the recent talks conducted between the leaders of Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates, there were important issues of security and defence that were discussed, and it may be noted that defence officials from the two countries also participated in the talks. These discussions are also to be seen in the context of the GCC, which has also been pushing for arrangements that can strengthen the defence of the region. Among the various routes open to Saudi Arabia and United Arab Emirates for strengthening their defence and security, is the possibility of using hard power as an instrument for driving assertive foreign policy. Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates in particular advance the hard power approach for the purpose of establishing strategic relationships with extra-regional partners, and advancing the local technology base.

One of the possibilities that the two countries is talking about is the setting up of an indigenous defence industry. There is a growing momentum to establish local defence industries in Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates. It is also believed that having defence industries will also serve a political goal for these countries so that they can push for techno- industrial relations with other partners. Indigenous defence industry is not the only area where Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates have established a possibility of future collaboration and support. There are other areas in the domain of security and defence collaboration that the two countries are looking at. Recently there has been a news that Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates are involved in other projects as well that are related to the collaboration between the two nations in the area of security and defence. Some of these projects are in the private domain with corporations in both countries entering into arrangements to develop related equipment, with encouragements from their respective governments. An example can be seen in the recent collaboration announced by Al Seer Marine, an Abu Dhabi-based manufacturer of unmanned surface vessels, with Advanced Electronics Company (AEC), a Saudi-based company. Through this collaboration, the two companies seek to build unmanned surface vessels for Saudi Arabia. The Emirati company will be the primary manufacturer for unmanned surface vessels and the AEC will be the partner in Saudi Arabia. What is particularly interesting is the statement put out by the CEO of the AEC in Saudi Arabia, as reported in the media: “Our strategic partnership offers tremendous growth potential and we are confident that we will enhance our support to the KSA defence forces. This partnership strengthens Saudi-UAE collaboration in key defence sectors.”

One of the possibilities that the two countries is talking about is the setting up of an indigenous defence industry. There is a growing momentum to establish local defence industries in Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates. It is also believed that having defence industries will also serve a political goal for these countries so that they can push for techno- industrial relations with other partners. Indigenous defence industry is not the only area where Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates have established a possibility of future collaboration and support. There are other areas in the domain of security and defence collaboration that the two countries are looking at. Recently there has been a news that Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates are involved in other projects as well that are related to the collaboration between the two nations in the area of security and defence. Some of these projects are in the private domain with corporations in both countries entering into arrangements to develop related equipment, with encouragements from their respective governments. An example can be seen in the recent collaboration announced by Al Seer Marine, an Abu Dhabi-based manufacturer of unmanned surface vessels, with Advanced Electronics Company (AEC), a Saudi-based company. Through this collaboration, the two companies seek to build unmanned surface vessels for Saudi Arabia. The Emirati company will be the primary manufacturer for unmanned surface vessels and the AEC will be the partner in Saudi Arabia. What is particularly interesting is the statement put out by the CEO of the AEC in Saudi Arabia, as reported in the media: “Our strategic partnership offers tremendous growth potential and we are confident that we will enhance our support to the KSA defence forces. This partnership strengthens Saudi-UAE collaboration in key defence sectors.”

Arab-state defence industries have come up in the region recently, and as mentioned above, the emergence of the industries have changed the security paradigms for countries like Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates who are no longer just customers, but are also becoming manufacturers of defence supplies. However, it is also observed that the emergence of the Arab-state defence industries has led to some conflict in the region as there is more militarisation efforts in the region. This is due to the existing conflicts in the regions. It is also notable that there are different reasons why countries in the Middle East choose to militarise and to increase their defence production through Arab-state defence industries. For Egypt, the reasons are economic as the country wishes to produce and export defence equipment to other countries. For Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates, the reasons are more oriented towards security and defence. Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates have been vocal about their desires to be less import reliant in the area of defence, and more focussed on increasing their own capabilities for defence manufacturing. It is to be noted that Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates have been major importers of defence equipment and therefore, their collaborative stance in the area of defence manufacturing is interesting because it signals the decision of the two countries to come together in this important area. What would be more interesting is whether there are specific security challenges and security policies that have led the two countries to adopt this collaborative stance with each other. This is discussed in the next section.

4.2.2. Security challenges and security policy

It is argued that the development of Arab-state defence industries is an indicator of the security and defence concerns of the countries in the region, unlike the development of the European arms industries that are not really influenced or impacted by immediate security concerns in the European region. This has been noted as follows: The armaments industries of Arab states share one common aspect: they evolve within a very specific strategic landscape determined very much by war and conflict. Whereas European arms industries are less concerned with European conflict theatres, Arab arms industries are a reflection of how their respective decision-makers perceive challenges emanating from their immediate political, and ultimately military, environment. This applies particularly to the Gulf States but to a lesser extent also to Egypt.” The above statement provides an interesting insight into the perceptions related to security and defence, particularly in the Gulf countries and now these perceptions have led these countries to greater militarisation. As noted above, the decision makers in the Gulf region have very specific concerns about the security and defence and other concerns in the immediate neighbourhood. Therefore, Arab arms industries are a reflection on the perception of challenges in the immediate political, and ultimately military, environment of the Gulf countries. Therefore, the recent announcements by Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates related to collaboration in the area of defence industries can be understood in the context of the immediate security concerns. There are other indicators of perceptions of security challenges and security policy in the Saudi Arabian and Emirati contexts. Some of these indicators may reflect on the common threat perceptions of the two nations, while others may indicate a more nuanced perspective. The Yemen conflict is an example of that. Till July 2019, the United Arab Emirates has a more active involvement in the Yemen conflict. It was a part of the Saudi- led military effort meant to pressurise the Iran-backed Zaidi Shia Houthi rebels. The United States, a long time ally of both Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates, was also a part of this effort in Yemen as it provided logistical support. However, criticism of the coalition role in Yemen has led United Arab Emirates to take a divergent stance on the issue since July 2019, when it decided to remove most of its ground forces from Yemen. However, the United Arab Emirates is still involved in the conflict as a partner of Saudi Arabia. Therefore, there is a shift in the stance of the United Arab Emirates from the earlier common stance taken with Saudi Arabia. This indicates that there may be areas where the two countries do not have the same point of view on security issues in the region.

However, there are still areas where Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates continue to have similar approaches to regional security issues. This is particularly two with reference to the approaches of the two countries in the area of opposition to Muslim Brotherhood-linked regional organisations, which are seen as regional and domestic threats by both Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates. Interestingly, the common approach taken to this by Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates led to a rift with Qatar, which was a member of the GCC alliance. Therefore, one of the concerns of both Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates is related to organisations like Muslim Brotherhood and countries like Qatar that support these organisations. With reference to this common concern, there has been a concerted reaction by Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates, which manifested in the June 2017 events within the GCC that saw the United Arab Emirates and Saudi Arabia isolate Qatar. Similarly, with relation to Iran, the United Arab Emirates and Saudi Arabia have adopted a common and concerted approach which has seen these countries support the Trump Administration policy of pressuring Iran economically and politically. In this respect, the Saudi Arabian policy is more strict than the approach adopted by the United Arab Emirates, but essentially both countries view Iran with concern. It may be noted that Iran is considered to be a security concern by both countries, with the difference that the United Arab Emirates is more concerned about a possible war with Iran which it has shown a desire to avoid. This has led to the shift in the Emirati policy where they are seeking more engagement with Iran and stressing on the need to scale down tensions. There are many views to understanding the relationships in the Gulf and the ties that are developing between Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates. One view is that there is a power angle, where different players in the region are responding to the power issues in the region. Seen from that angle, there is a geopolitical perspective to understanding the developing relations between Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates. One author puts is across as follows:

“The Arab Spring, the Syrian conflict, the war in Yemen and the Iranian nuclear deal have all created a battleground, often quite literally, for state power interests to compete with one another.” The above statement reveals that one perspective over understanding the Gulf relations can be that there is significant regional conflict which is created by or caused by the different events in these regions, including, the Yemen war and the Iranian nuclear deal.

V. Regional Security Complex Analysis

5.1. Arab Peninsula & Neighbouring Countries regional security complex and Middle East

The regional security complex that is seen to be developing in the Arab Peninsula as discussed in the sections above clearly indicates that the United Arab Emirates and Saudi Arabia are developing a close alliance that responds to the threats that they perceive to be common to both arising from within the region. In particular, the threat is perceived from Iran. Both Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates perceive a threat from Iran. Interestingly, while the United Arab Emirates has attempted rapprochement with Iran in the period following 2011, the Yemen war brought that rapprochement to an end and United Arab Emirates sided with Saudi Arabia in taking action against the Houthi rebels who were provided supported by Iran. Therefore, despite some signals at developing bilateral relations with Iran, the perception of a common threat from Iran has kept the United Arab Emirates firmly with Saudi Arabia. This section will detail how the regional security complex is developed in the Arab Peninsula. In the Arab Peninsula, the regional security complex has been developed over a period of time. This regional security complex has seen the drive by two main players, which are the United Arab Emirates and Saudi Arabia. These two countries have forged a collaborative stance on military and security issues. The events of the past years, which have seen a war in Iraq, Syria and Yemen, have seen both Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates come together. In Yemen, they have actively involved themselves in the situation by involving their military in the action in Yemen. The security complex that has developed in this region is driven by regional threat perceptions for the two countries. Both Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates are concerned with the rise of the Iranian influence in the region. The Yemen war has indicated Iran’s position as antithetical to that taken by Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates. Based on the analysis of the concept of the regional security complex done earlier in this dissertation, it can be said that Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates are clearly involved in a regional security complex. It may be reiterated that regional security complex has been defined in terms of security regionalism as “the consequence of states within the same regional security complex cooperating on security in ways that makes their interactions more like the Deutschian notion of a security community”. This definition fits the manner in which Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates continue to collaborate with each other on military and security matters in the way that shows them to be a security community. The recent decisions of the two countries to form a joint security body in Saudi – Emirati Coordination Council reinforces this point.

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5.2. Balances and Shifts in Amity and Enmity

The experience of the relations between Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates do not indicate too much imbalances and shifts in amity and enmity. Both countries have adopted a very consistent approach to their foreign relations with other countries in the region and with each other. Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates continue to be friendly with each other and have taken steps to increase their cooperation not just in military matters but also in economic and finance areas. Both countries have been a part of the GCC and they have also established the Saudi – Emirati Coordination Council. These are important steps and show a balanced and consistent approach to their foreign policies. The following sections will shed more light on how the two countries continue to be balanced in their approach to each other and how they continue to be friendly with each other. There have been some areas of dissension between the two countries, particularly in how they have approached Iran, as the sections will indicate. However, in the wider sense, they continue to be collaborative with each other.

5.3. Kingdom of Saudi Arabia as a Regional Power and United Arab Emirates as a Rising Power

While Saudi Arabia is recognised to be a regional power in the gulf regional, the United Arab Emirates is considered to be a rising power in this region. Saudi Arabia is an established regional hegemon in the Gulf region; and it is the country that exudes considerable power in this region along with Iran. Both Saudi Arabia and Iran can be said to be the established powers of the Gulf region and to some extent, the tensions in the region are also resultant of the competitions and conflicts between these two countries. Iran and Saudi Arabia have been in proxy competition in Iraq, where the arrival of the US led coalition forces and their overthrow of the Saddam regime led to a space being created for Saudi Arabia to play a more active role in the country. Consequently, a space was also created for the proxy competition between Saudi Arabia and Iran in Iraq. The rivalry between Iran and Saudi Arabia is complicated. This rivalry also complicates the regional security paradigms, because the two countries have often and consistently adopted divergent positions on security related issues in the wider Gulf geopolitical scenario. Given the well established role of Saudi Arabia as a regional power, it can be said that the country is a regional power in the Gulf region. In literature, the usual descriptions of the United Arab Emirates is as a middle, regional, or rising power, which contrasts with the way that Saudi Arabia is described in literature. The support for the claim that the United Arab Emirates is a rising regional power comes from the recent shifts in the policies of the country where it went from being a non-interventionist country to a country that has become more interventionist and militarily active. United Arab Emirates’ role in the Yemeni war where it has supported the Saudi-led efforts to limit the Houthis when Iran has supported them, points to its evolving as a country that is increasingly comfortable with intervening in the regional security concerns. There are other actions that are taken by Yemen in this regard; for instance, it has conducted anti-ISIS bombing campaign, and sending troops to Yemen.

Another indicator of the growing clout of the United Arab Emirates is that the country is using both hard power as well as soft or smart power. This aligns with countries like the United States, India, and China, which have also used hard and soft power in international relations. In the context of United Arab Emirates, soft power is seen in its humanitarianism efforts, hard power is seen in its militarism. Smart power is seen in its multilateralism, through which the United Arab Emirates projects itself as a rising power regionally and internationally. As a soft war, the United Arab Emirates has increasingly involved itself in efforts related to providing international aid to other countries. It has also used funding in order to host and sponsor sporting clubs and events, which also involves branding exercises for the United Arab Emirates. In the context of donating money and resources, the United Arab Emirates has emerged as one of the major donors in the world, as is revealed by statistics. For instance, the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) revealed in 2015 that the United Arab Emirates was the world’s largest donor by percentage of gross national income in that year, and that it contributed 1.09 percent, the highest in the world at the time. The United Arab Emirates has also emerged as the second-largest donor to Yemen, and a significant donor to Syria, Egypt, Morocco, Jordan, and Palestine. It is reported that the United Arab Emirates donates to 178 countries. The discussion above indicates that the United Arab Emirates is emerging as a rising power. It has applied both hard power as well as soft power in the region in order to portray its rise as a regional power in the Gulf. The use of hard power and soft power by the United Arab Emirates is explained as follows: “What explains the UAE’s recent turn to hard power? The first is the government’s perceived need to counter Islamism in all its forms. The purging of the Muslim Brotherhood in the 1990s, and the more recent approach to military confrontation with Al Qaeda and the so-called Islamic State, is part of a counter-jihadist plan that sets the UAE apart from some neighbouring Gulf countries. The second reason is the realization that soft power is not, by itself, adequate to counter regional threats. The ongoing Saudi-Iranian rivalry, which has played out in Yemen and is attached to a broader Gulf fear of an expansionist Iran, has positioned the UAE’s military responses as essential for weakening Iranian influence.”

As the observation above indicates, there are specific security related reasons that have led to the use of hard power and soft power in the region by the United Arab Emirates. The reasons are grounded in the response to rising Islamism, manifested in the rise of Muslim Brotherhood, the Al Qaeda and the Islamic State. Therefore, one aspect of the United Arab Emirates’ approach to increasing hard and soft power is related to countering rising Islamist and jihadist forces in the region. Moreover, the United Arab Emirates has also come to the realisation that it is important to not only focus on the soft power but to also focus on the use of hard power. The increased military approach of United Arab Emirates indicates that it is consciously trying to counter regional threats that are posed in the security and safety contexts. These security concerns are related to the ongoing Saudi-Iranian conflict, the Yemen conflict, and its own perspective on Iran. The fact that the United Arab Emirates is a smaller country in the region, more similar to Qatar and not to Saudi Arabia is an interesting aspect of how the United Arab Emirates has managed to develop its rising power in the region. In contrast, Saudi Arabia and Iran are established regional hegemons in the Gulf area. Despite its smaller size, the United Arab Emirates has managed to developed its foreign policies in the recent times, with an ability to portray both hard and soft power. United Arab Emirates’ rising power is reflected in the way it was able to take a lead role in the diplomatic boycott and economic embargo launched against Qatar in June 2017.

5.4. Iran and its Regional Allies & Militias

Iran is an important and hegemonic regional power in the gulf area. Although Iran has not found itself in opposition to the United States in the west and Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates in the Middle East, it is a country that has managed to remain relevant in the geopolitical context. The following discussion reflects on the role of Iran in the region, its own allies and the role of militias. There are many indicators that point at the important role that Iran plays in the Middle East. For instance, during the 2006 war between Israel and the Lebanese militant group Hezbollah, the former being supported by the United States and the latter being supported by Iran, one of the revelations was that instead of making Hezbollah and its sponsor, Iran, irrelevant, the war only showed the continuing relevance of the “axis of resistance,” which is the name given to the power bloc including Iran, Iraq, Syria, Hezbollah, and Hamas. The 2006 war just added to the perception of the growing significance of Iran in the Middle East region, which also found a space for exerting its influence in Iraq. Moreover, the recent fall of Mosul to ISIS in 2014, also shows the continuing influence of Iran in the region as this event led to the further empowerment of Shiite militias. Iran and its allies, including Russia, have been able to build a new regional political and security architecture in the light of the recent changes brought by the Arab Spring and Syrian war. It is considered that the Tehran is the centre of the axis. The evidence of the growing strength of the Shiite armed movements in Iraq and in other parts of the Middle East also indicate a more muscular and effective Iran. An indicator of the growing significance of the Shiite movements in the Middle East and the role that Iran plays in the axis is presented in the form of the United States’ growing opposition to Iran and the decisions taken by the current administration to quit the 2015 Iranian nuclear agreement. The Middle East has seen volatility in the recent years; Iran is a part of this region and it has continued to be heavily sanctioned by the United States, but despite this, Iran continues to present a country that is relatively stable. Iran’s stability of regime as well as a relatively good economy has much to do with its oil-rich resources. It is argued that despite the challenges posed to Iran due to international sanctions as well as the domestic conditions that are focused on the maintenance of its Islamic regime, it has managed to weather considerable challenges and remains a critical regional player.

It may be noted that post the cultural revolution in Iran, there were a number of scholars and observers who considered that the political and religious leadership of Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini may not last. Despite these predictions and the challenges posed by sanctions, Iran has continued to remain relevant. This is important in the context of the perceptions of Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates and their concerns regarding Iran.

VI. Conclusion

The Arab Peninsula has seen the development of a regional security complex with the participation of Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates as allies and collaborators. The principal research question involved in this research was why United Arab Emirates and Kingdom of Saudi Arabia have consolidated their political and strategic relationships in the recent years. This research finds that instead of the development of security policies of these states on the basis of balance of power, the balance of threat appears to be driving the development of regional security policies of Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates. This final section of the dissertation will conclude with the answers to the principal research question raised in this research as well as related research questions. These related research questions were related to: (a) benefits to the consolidating of strategic and political relationships to the United Arab Emirates and Saudi Arabia; (b) ways in which Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates have consolidated their strategic and political relationships; (c) the military and security objectives for the consolidation of the relationships between Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates; (d) non military and economic objectives for the consolidation of the relationships between Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates; and (e) the impact of the war in Yemen on the relationship between Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates. Over a period of time, the threat perceptions in both Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates have been impacted by the perception of both countries towards Iran. There are other reasons why the relationships between Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates have been consolidated. This is manifested in the military and non-military collaborations between the two countries. With reference to the first question, that is, what are the benefits to the consolidating of strategic and political relationships to the United Arab Emirates and Saudi Arabia, this dissertation finds that as founding members of the GCC, both countries have invested in the development of the body. Through this body, a number of benefits are drawn by Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates. These benefits include the collaboration on projects that seek to increase human development, economy, financial strength, and military strength of the two countries.

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From the perspective of the regional security complex, what can be seen in the way that Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates have collaborated with each other within the GCC is that they have a common agenda even within the GCC. This is supported by the actions of the GCC members led by Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates against Qatar in 2017. The benefits to Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates are that they can consolidate their strengths through their partnerships with each other. When it comes to their common issues in the context of regional security, they are aligned even though there may have been differences in their approaches sometimes. With reference to the second question, that is, ways in which Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates have consolidated their strategic and political relationships, one of the ways in which such consolidation has been done is by developing institutions. Steps in this direction include the developing of the Peninsula Shield Forces, and the Saudi – Emirati Coordination Council. Through these mechanisms, strategic relationships between the two countries have been consolidated. The second way in which consolidation has happened is through collaboration on issues of common concern, like the Yemen war. In the context of the regional security complex, the institutions are also built with the intention of creating a more consolidated position in the strategic and political sense even though there may have been some differences in their approaches earlier. For instance, the United Arab Emirates did attempt rapprochement with Iran in the period following 2011, but with the start of the Yemen war, the rapprochement came to an end and United Arab Emirates sided with Saudi Arabia in taking action against the Houthi rebels who were provided supported by Iran. Therefore, despite some signals at developing bilateral relations with Iran, the perception of a common threat from Iran has kept the United Arab Emirates firmly with Saudi Arabia. he events of the past years, which have seen a war in Iraq, Syria and Yemen, have seen both Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates come together. In Yemen, they have actively involved themselves in the situation by involving their military in the action in Yemen. This is a shift in the strategic and political position taken by United Arab Emirates away from the Saudi position and then back to the Saudi position vis a vis Iran. Now with the development of the Peninsula Shield Forces, and the Saudi – Emirati Coordination Council, there are common platforms where the Saudi Arabian leadership and the Emirati leadership can formulate common programmes to respond to commonly significant strategic and political issues, like Iran. This is a sign of consolidation of the relationship further and an example of how Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates are driven by their common regional security perceptions.

With reference to the third question, that is, the military and security objectives for the consolidation of the relationships between Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates, the membership of the GCC and the recent creation of the Saudi – Emirati Coordination Council are both relevant. The Council works on security and military cooperation and integration between Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates. One of the three pillars of the Council’s work is the military pillar. The council aims at creating collaboration between the two countries for the purpose of strengthening their national security and regional security goals. The regional security complex argument is bolstered in this context with the evidence of the combined position taken by Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates in response to Iranian influence in the region, especially in the backdrop of the Yemen war. It can be clearly seen that the security complex that has developed in this region is driven by regional threat perceptions from Iran and the military and security related objectives of their collaboration seem aimed at containing the rise of the Iranian influence in the region. The military and security objectives thus appear to be common in the context of the regional security threat perceptions for both Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates. Added to that, the establishment of the Saudi – Emirati Coordination Council appears clearly aimed at consolidating their military efforts. The increased military approach of United Arab Emirates and its support for the Saudi position on the Yemen war also indicates that it is consciously trying to counter regional threats that are posed in the security and safety contexts. Iran and its allies, including Russia, have been able to build a new regional political and security architecture in the light of the recent changes brought by the Arab Spring and Syrian war. The establishment of the Saudi – Emirati Coordination Council is clearly aimed at responding to this by consolidating regional security complex of Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates. With reference to the fourth question, that is, non military and economic objectives for the consolidation of the relationships between Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates, the recent steps taken by the two countries for the formation of a collaborative body in the Saudi – Emirati Coordination Council is a manifestation of the collaborative intent of the two countries on non-military and economic objectives. The establishment of the council comes after the decades long development of diplomatic, political and economic relations between the two nations.

The Saudi – Emirati Coordination Council is a model of bilateral cooperation and comes as a supplement to the joint GCC system. The Council is working on joint initiatives for creation of job opportunities, GDP growth, and increased investments between the two countries. The strengthening of economic integration as per the GCC commitments is one of the goals of the Council. The three pillars driving the work of the Council are economic pillar, human and knowledge pillar, and political, security and military pillar. The economic pillar envisages the establishment of arrangements leading to the empowering of the banking sector in both countries for upgrading their banking and insurance sectors. The human and knowledge pillar aims at creating an integrated instructive framework related to technical education, public education, research cooperation and higher education. Therefore, it can be concluded that Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates are both involved in collaborating with each other on non military and economic objectives. Both countries are advantaged by these positions because they can consolidate their relationships on non military and economic causes. Eventually, through such consolidation they seek to strengthen their individual economies. An example of such positions is seen in the way both countries are trying to make it easier for their respective banking sector to conduct cross country business so that the development opportunities can be taken advantage of in the two countries. The common objectives that are sought to be achieved through this are possibilities for development of financial innovation, insurance sector and effective regulatory mechanisms. All of these are aimed at achieving economic objectives. There are other non military objectives such as, research cooperation, and creating cooperation in the political fields that are being sought to be achieved. It can be said that the two countries have been brought together by the common threat of a rising Iran and they are responding to that threat not only through military and security collaboration but also economic and political collaboration.

With reference to the fifth question, that is, the impact of the war in Yemen on the relationship between Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates, the findings of this research indicates that the Yemen war brought Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates closer. This is due to the common concerns that both countries have about the role that Iran has played in the Yemen war. Prior to the Yemen war, there had been some movements towards rapprochement between Iran and the United Arab Emirates. However, after the war in Yemen started and the greater awareness of role of Iran for the latter’s support to the Houthi rebels, the United Arab Emirates decided to come together with Saudi Arabia in military intervention in Syria. Clearly, the war in Yemen has been instrumental in bringing Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates closer. While this research study has explored the case study of Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates relations in the context of the regional security complex through qualitative research employing literature review, one limitation of this research is that the findings are based on the secondary literature. Future research in the same area can be conducted through the employing of the method of data analysis with a focus on diplomatic communications between the two nations and the government reports in order to further explore the relations between the two states in the context of the regional security complex. This research has added to the literature in the area of regional security complex by using a case study of the relations between Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates. While other research studies have explored this area before, there is little research in the period of the Yemen crisis and the collaborated response to the same by Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates.

To conclude finally, it can be stated that the major events in the region, such as, the Yemen war, have seen Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates play the role of collaborators. Saudi Arabia is already an established power in the Middle East and the United Arab Emirates is a rising power in the region. However, the two countries are not driven in their foreign policy by the need to balance each other’s powers. They are motivated by the idea of balancing the threats that emanate from this region by playing a collaborative role.

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