Middle Eastern Deradicalization Programs

Introduction

Since the turn of the millennium, terrorism has undergone some changes, in that it has become globalised to a great degree, with terror organisations having cross border operations; even recruitment for terror organisations has become more globalised with organisations like Al Qaeda, the Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant (ISIL), or the Islamic State of Iraq and Syria (ISIS)recruiting members from different countries across the world (Khan & Estrada, 2017). Added to that is the threat of what is called as ‘lone wolf’ terror attacks such as those encouraged by Al Zawahiri, then leader of the al Qaeda, when he urged Muslims around the world to undertake attacks against the Western society (Reuters, 2015). While the death of Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi seemingly marked the end of the ISIS Caliphate (Altman, 2019), this was only after such entities proved large enough to threaten security on an international scale (Kraska, 2016). This makes combating terrorism a top priority for governments and international security and peace-keeping forces, which includes approaches for terrorist deradicalisation and disengagement (Gunaratna, Jerard and Rubin, 2011). This is a particular priority in the Middle East, which has historically experienced high levels of terrorist activity (Chasdi, 2003; Dalacoura, 2011).

Radicalisation has been defined as:

“an individual or collective (group) process whereby, usually in a situation of political polarisation, normal practices of dialogue, compromise and tolerance between political actors and groups with diverging interests are abandoned by one or both sides in a conflict dyad in favour of a growing commitment to engage in confrontational tactics of conflict-waging. These can include either (i) the use of (non-violent) pressure and coercion, (ii) various forms of political violence other than terrorism or (iii) acts of violent extremism in the form of terrorism and war crimes. The process is, on the side of rebel factions, generally accompanied by an ideological socialization away from mainstream or status quo-oriented positions towards more radical or extremist positions involving a dichotomous world view and the acceptance of an alternative focal point of political mobilization outside the dominant political order as the existing system is no longer recognized as appropriate or legitimate” (Schmid, 2011, pp. 678-79).

Thus, radicalisation is defined as a process, which involves a growing commitment on part of some actors to engage in confrontational tactics which may be violent non-violent but coercive or may amount to violent extremism. The process leads to some individuals or groups moving away from mainstream or status quo oriented positions towards more extreme or radical positions. An important point made by Schmid (2011; 2013) is that the world view of the radicalised individuals views the existing system or political order as no longer legitimate or appropriate. If one were to define de-radicalisation as the reverse of this process, then de-radicalisation is essentially a renunciation of commitment to an ideological goal, or at least the act of forsaking violence as a means to achieve it, thereby implying a greater commitment to alternative goals and values (Kruglanski et al., 2014). Radicalisation as a term has found its way into the counter-terrorism lexicon and is being used by counter-terrorism researchers (Webber et al., 2017; Schmid, 2013; Schmid, 2011).

Boucek (2008) has argued that understanding the strategies which proved effective for countering terrorism in some countries does not guarantee that the same strategies will yield the same success if implemented in other contexts. This is also the case for de-radicalisation programmes. On the other hand, there is an argument in literature that de-radicalisation programmes in one country and their success can provide some blueprint to other countries that may be similarly placed (Fenstermacher, 2011). While there is much literature on the de-radicalisation programmes in the West, such as the PREVENT strategy of UK (Mythen, et al., 2016), there is little awareness in the western literature on the de-radicalisation programmes in the Middle Eastern states, barring Saudi Arabia, whose de-radicalisation programme has been covered to some extent in the western literature, while there are many countries in the Middle East that have implemented similar deradicalization programmes (Silke, 2011; El-Said and Harrigan, 2010; Casptack, 2015).

Thus, there is a gap in the literature which makes a case for a more detailed study into de-radicalisation programmes in the Middleeastern countries. This research aims to provide a more precise understanding of how de-radicalisation programmes work in the region by adopting a comparative perspective which starts from the premise that the Middle East is not culturally homogenous. The comparison will be among three quite different Middle Eastern countries: Saudi Arabia, Kuwait and Egypt.

Aim and Objectives

The main aim of the current research is to contribute to theory and practice regarding re-radicalisation in the Middle East. Specifically, to better understand the impact of cultural context on the outcomes of de-radicalisation programmes in Kuwait, Saudi-Arabia and Egypt. To meet this aim, this thesis will address the following research questions:

1. How is radicalisation conceptualised and operationalised for de-radicalisation programmes in Kuwait, Saudi-Arabia and Egypt?

2. To what extent do de-radicalisation programmes in Kuwait, Saudi-Arabia and Egypt take into consideration the cultural context they are operating in?

3. Do de-radicalisation models and intervention programmes need to be adapted for use in different national contexts?

Background of the research

As discussed above, de-radicalisation is a process which aims at facilitating a reversal of the process of radicalisation, which involves a growing commitment on part of some actors to engage in confrontational tactics and moving away from mainstream or status quo oriented positions towards more extreme or radical positions (Schmid, 2013). Thus, de-radicalisation is a renunciation of commitment to an ideological goal, or at least the act of forsaking violence as a means to achieve it, and a greater commitment to alternative goals and values that are closer the mainstream and the status-quo. Social theories of identity can aid in the process of de-radicalisation according to which an individual change of identity can only be achieved with the consent and support of the community in which the individual lives (Kruglanski et al., 2014; Webber et al., 2017). Many factors are involved in radicalisation, and therefore in de-radicalisation: political ideologies, religious beliefs, socio-demographic & cultural features, experience of terrorism, and approaches to countering radicalisation and de-radicalisation. Of these, social and cultural factors are particularly important to the rehabilitation of terrorists: as will be further expanded in later chapters, it has been noted that successful (re-)integration of (former) terrorists happens more quickly when there is public willingness to encourage the intention to embrace a non-terrorist lifestyle (Abuza, 2008). This is supported by researchers who have considered the role played by social and group belonging in achieving successful de-radicalisation (Barelle, 2015; Chernov Hwang, 2015, 2018; Doosje et al., 2016; El-Said, 2012).

Unfortunately, the majority of this research was conducted in western nations and involved radicalised individuals and terrorists apprehended there (Brown and Saeed, 2014; Chasdi, 2003; Doosje et al.; 2016). While academic studies on terrorism in the Middle East are not rare, they nevertheless take a western viewpoint when analysing the matter – the research is done from the perspective of western counter-terror organisations due to there being no other models available (Venkatraman, 2007; Barelle, 2015; Chernov Hwang, 2015, 2018). This has arguably prevented the shared features of the region that distinguishes it from western states to be accounted for in full. Furthermore, factors that influence radicalisation processes and the success of de-radicalisation programmes are also likely to differ in this region. This is arguably the issue most overlooked in current research: each country in the Middle East goes about de-radicalisation differently to western nations, and even compared to the rest of its neighbour states. Indeed, even in the western countries, the processes or programmes of de-radicalisation cannot be homogenized because there are differences in approaches so much so that using terminology like western approach to de-radicalisation may not be appropriate. This is demonstrated by a research study by Butt and Tuck (2014) which suggests that although the countries focused on (Netherlands, Sweden, Denmark and Germany) are not diverse in terms of their geographical location, their approaches to counter radicalisation vary considerably. Similarly, in the Middle East, there are countries that have adopted de-radicalised programmes and countries that haven’t even settled on a single framework of their own. For example, Saudi Arabia has two different programmes aiming to place individuals who have been involved in terrorist actions in a context which fosters personal development and the reformation of beliefs (Williams & Lindsey, 2013). De-radicalisation is conducted in settings which are completely different than the typical prison environment, because the intention is to make participants aware that their actions emerged from misunderstanding the values they believe to be defending through their violent actions (Williams & Lindsey, 2013). The programmes both aim to provide them with more constructive alternative perspectives and to support them to implement this new way of thinking in their future actions. But the two de-radicalisation centres work differently, one being developed by the Ministry of Interior and the other one by the Ministry of Defense (Boucek, 2008). Their approaches are distinct in terms of the specific way of conceptualising de-radicalisation and implicitly the problem they intend to tackle (Arab News, 2017; IWC KSA, 2019). Neither has been assessed by academic critics as of this study’s writing, whether western or local, but their differences in approach are apparent: the former uses a design rooted in exposing mistakes, allegations, suspicions and deceptive techniques promoted by extremists and terrorists, via messages and communications in different languages (Arab News, 2017). The other program, however, is centered on local cultural elements, primarily religion, and seeks to de-radicalise by reframing ideological motivations invoked by radicalised individuals (IWC KSA, 2019).

In contrast to Saudi Arabia, the de-radicalisation programmes implemented in Egypt and Kuwait have little to no research done on them. It took personal investigation and visitations with officials from both countries to gain some first-hand insight into the situation. Both countries have de-radicalisation programmes set up in prisons. Former violent extremists share the same facilities and conditions as other inmates. The programmes make it possible for them to participate in classes or meetings with psychologists; however, these are held in offices within the prisons. This highlights the importance of analyzing the practice in depth, especially since Egypt, for example, has only recently introduced its de-radicalisation programme as a response to radicalisation that was flourishing within prisons. The circumstances are considerably different to the ones in Saudi Arabia and research will help understand the rationale behind the specific setup in each country. One way to do this may be by looking at the cultural specifics of each country will also make it possible to understand the limitations of applying Western models of de-radicalisation in these Middle East countries.

For example, developing a community intervention similar to the programme in the UK may not be possible in this region due to the culture of shame which permeates the communities (TRADOC DCSINT, 2006). Publicly acknowledging that a member of the family might be guilty of some wrongdoing can be perceived by most Arab families as a burden they would not want to carry (TRADOC DCSINT, 2006). This attitude which is linked to social values makes it more difficult to implement preventive measures for dealing with those recognised as being at risk to be radicalised. As the research study conducted by Butt and Tuck (2014) has also indicated, socio-cultural factors do inform the formulation of de-radicalisation programmes and may also shape their success; it is possible that socio-cultural factors in the individual countries need to be investigated for their link to the formulating and success of de-radicalisation programmes.

Socio-cultural factors may play a role here, in addition to the financial and human resources available (Eaton et al., 2008; Ameur, 2016; Badawi, 2016; Kuwait.gov, 2019). Indeed, they influence how former violent extremists are perceived, chiefly whether they can reform or not, and by extension if they should be punished or helped to overcome the reasons which pulled them to engage in such violence to begin with. By extension, these factors presumably help determine how society perceives its responsibility for how these individuals developed, and if their respective communities are responsible for their development. Thus, the question arises: what are the circumstances which facilitated radicalization, and what could communities and society do to prevent their reemergence?

Socio-cultural factors with reference to Saudi Arabia, Kuwait and Egypt

Referring specifically to the three countries considered in this study, certain socio-economic factors stand out. In Saudi society, for example, the custom of magnanimity and pride play a role in all aspects of society, or what is locally called 'Faza'a' (rushing to help) and 'Hamiyya' (being morally sharp). This custom is inherent in the structure of this society. The most significant evidence on this deep-rooted habit comes from heroic stories; such as the Jeddah Floods which caused catastrophic loss of life, as those who rushed in to help did so with no thought of their own safety only thinking of those individuals who needed help (Ameur, 2016). [[The strong presence of the 'family' and more generally kinship in the Saudi society is another relevant factor to any psycho-social program such as deradicalisation, as the family still represents the most significant value that Saudi society maintains (Al-Omani, 2014). This is also known as the concept of Silat Rahim, whereby Saudi society sees real communication in the form of verbal, face to face communication as of great importance in light of modern-day means of communication such as social media interaction. The Qur’an and hadiths alike emphasise the significance of family ties and instruct Muslims to preserve good relations with family and relatives, through Silat Rahim (Venkatraman, 2007; Eaton et al., 2008; Abdel Haleem, 2016). Since Silat Rahim has deep rooted ties to the teaching of Islam, its meaning – that one must maintain the ties of kinship, visiting parents and relatives and disregarding and forgiving faults – is one that ignores border and applies to all countries of this faith (Venkatraman, 2007; Abdel Haleem, 2016), and therefore include both Kuwait and Egypt. Although these customs are not exclusive to Saudi Arabia, they are seemingly most prominent there, having existed in the region before borders were assigned, in no small part due to Muslim religious background. However, these customs can be found in society across the Arabian Peninsula (Al-Omani, 2014). One of the gaps in the current literature on de-radicalisation in these Middleeastern countries is that there is little or no research on how such socio-cultural factors inform and affect de-radicalisation programmes and their outcomes. There are socio-cultural differences within the regions themselves which may need more study. In Egypt, for example, the traditionalist/progressive split between the southern governorates (Upper Egypt) and Lower Egypt (authentic Arab) may very well be a major factor. There is a difference between the culture of urban regions and rural ones much greater than in Kuwait and Saudi Arabia: the rural communities are governed by the oldest male member of the family and live more traditionally, while the urban communities have a more modern set of expectations that give the appearance of a more liberal existence. Radicalised individuals coming from such regionsmay require different approaches to de-radicalisation, but no study has been done on the issue.

Indeed, preliminary literature research and first-hand investigations for this study indicate the possibility that Egyptian programmes are designed for individuals living in urban areas as opposed to those in village areas, in the latter, there would be efforts to engage village madrassas and mosques (Harrigan & El-Said, 2018). In Kuwait, the de-radicalisation programmes have tried to effect these interventions in the normal environment of the individuals, which is less ‘toxic’ than prison environs (Msall, 2017). As Upper Egypt rural communities are more alike their Kuwaiti peers from a socio-economic and cultural perspective, compared to Lower Egyptians who live in urban areas, there is a possibility that Kuwaiti programme may prove effective in certain regions of Egypt(Badawi, 2016; Kuwait.gov, 2019). Kuwaiti society is inherently closed and governed by customs and traditions, a reality that is becoming increasingly more pronounced with the proliferation of the 'Diwaniya’, the quintessential manifestation of both wealth and the family-centric, kinship-focused lifestyle, where a room or yard, is separated from the rest of the house to act as the separate 'reception hall' for guests, neighbours, friends and relatives. Such separation has become evidence of involvement in the social, political and economic, democratic and parliamentary life of Kuwait as a whole. How such closed and separate social and political aspects impact both radicalisation and de-radicalisation need to be explored further.

In summary, here are distinct social, cultural and economic factors specific to each region whch may influence the success of their deradicalisation programs in Middle Eastern countries, and specifically Saudi Arabia, Egypt and Kuwait but the extent to which de-radicalisation programmes take into account these factors is as yet not known clearly. Without proper exploration of such, it will remain difficult, if not impossible, to understand and account for the full breadth of factors behind radical behaviour and terrorist acts in the people of the three nations. Unfortunately, none of these issues have been studied in depth, and indeed it is unclear whether the concept of radicalisation (let alone de-rdicalisation) is even conceptualised similarly in the three countries. Furthermore, what little research does exist has been done from a western perspective, rather than a local one. For these reasons, the proposed study will carry out a cross-cultural comparison of the three countries’ deradicalization programs and their socio-cultural and national contexts, as outlined in the methodology below.

Methodology

Research Philosophy

To meet the aims of this thesis, a pragmatist qualitative approach to primary research will be adopted. Specifically, qualitative research will be undertaken in order to gather and analyse social and cultural data from the three countries under consideration. Pragmatism aims to find practical solutions to issues and problems or gaps in existing research (Elkjaer & Simpson, 2011). In this study, the researcher seeks to explore the gaps in de-radicalisation programmes and which have an impact on the outcomes of these programmes for which reason pragmatism research philosophy is adopted. Qualitative research method is chosen because of the exploratory nature of this study and the need to consider different narratives from different communities in three different countries. Qualitative research will allow the researcher to collect data that is in-depth and nuanced in terms of different narratives of the different communities.

Research Approach

The qualitative research will consist of a series of semi-structured interviews – these being the backbone of the study – backed by official records and files where appropriate or available. Referring back to the research questions, this effectively means that the methodology will centred around semi-structured interviews. Semi-structured interviews allow for a wide range of views to be expressed because the interviewer does not exercise a high level of control in the interview, thus giving flexibility and freedom to the interviewee to give more detailed narratives (Bryman, 2015; Bryman, 2007; Vogt, 2011). In this study, such detailed narratives can shed more light on the issues of radicalisation and de-radicalisation in Saudi Arabia, Kuwait and Egypt (). As the main goal of this research is to understand how the processes of de-radicalisation are undertaken in these countries and how these differ across the three countries (in theory as well as in practice), maximizing this range of viewpoints is considered the most important goal of the research approach. That said, three research vectors will be used, as detailed below. Supplementing the qualitative data collected through semi-structured interviews will be a thematic analysis of official case files and records for people who are part of, or have gone through, these programmes. This will provide validity and reliability to the study results by ensuring the widest range of views on how radicalisation and de-radicalisation are conceptualised and approached by the programs in the three countries (Vogt, 2011).

Research Design

Literature identifies different ways in which the efficacy of de-radicalisation programmes can be measured, one of these being measuring recidivism rates (Feddes & Gallucci, 2015).. Although relevant, this measure cannot be applied until sufficient time has passed since the graduation of several cohorts of participants. While it is a well recognised idea that de-radicalisation policies and programmes are required to be 'evidence-based', where evaluators apply rigorous empirical methodology and measurement techniques to test the efficacy of the programmes, there is a lack of consensus on the indicators of successful de-radicalisation (Feddes & Gallucci, 2015). As such, researchers have used either quantitative or qualitative or mixed methods to explore the effectiveness of de-radicalisation programmes. In this study, it is proposed that the impact of cultural and social factors on likely success, as some factors could be facilitators as well as potential barriers to success be explored through primary data collected from the participants of semi-structured interviews.

First off, a set of semi-structured interviews will be held with experts who are in the field of practicing de-radicalisation programmes. This will help answer the first research question, namely how radicalisation is conceptualised and operationalised for de-radicalisation programmes in Kuwait, Saudi-Arabia and Egypt. Official case files and records will also be used here, to help inform the questions as well as the analysis. Pilot interviews will be conducted with a small group of experts to test the efficacy of the interview questions and rework the interview questions if required.

The second research vector will answer the second research question, namely ‘to what extent do de-radicalisation programmes in Kuwait, Saudi-Arabia and Egypt take into consideration the cultural context they are operating in?’ This will be done in two steps: (a) by establishing the cultural context, which means a second series of interviews, this time with community interviews in each country to establish cultural constraints/facilitators that are likely to influence the success of de-rad programmes; and (b) data from the first phase of interviews (with de-radicalisation program managers/staff), to establish whether these are being taken into consideration. The community interviews will be in the nature of individual interviews with members of the community.

The third question, (Do de-radicalisation models and intervention programmes need to be adapted for use in different national contexts) will be answered based on an analysis of both sets of interview data, while also drawing on any available relevant official reports/docs as available.

Data Collection

The purposive sampling method will be used for expert interviews where the sample is identifiable by the expertise of the participants in the three countries. The purposive sampling method will be employed for selecting the sample for the community interviews where participants will be selected from each of the three countries. Purposive sampling will allow the researcher to identify participants from different tribes, and community groups in the three countries in order to get the different narratives from different communities in the three countries, which will provide in depth and nuanced data on the de-radicalisation programmes.

In Kuwait, the first phase of interviews will be carried out with academics in the field, as well as MPs and Members of Social Development offices. Given the researcher’s connections, it may even be possible to carry out interviews with Kuwait Royal Family Members. Meanwhile, the second phase will involve heads of tribes, social activist, clerics and journalist.

Saudi Arabia data collection will follow the same model, and it is possible that the second phase will prove slightly more effective due to personal connections being skewed more towards heads of tribes than officials or academics. That said, there is no shortage of connections in either side, which includes high ranked officers in the ministry of Defence and Mininstry of Interior.

As for Egypt, family and business connections provide inroads with many highly important people in Eygpt, ensuring that the spectrum of sources will be as broad as for the other two countries. Highlights include connections with the founders of the Islamic Group, including leading figures from the Anatomy of the Extreme Mind de-radicalisation program.

Currently, the plan is to visit the countries one after another and spend a period of one or more months in each, during which both interview phases will be carried out for the country in question. The exact durations will depend on the results of the sampling process – vastly differing sample sizes are expected due to the differences in country size: Saudi Arabia and Egypt are large nations, whereas Kuwait is much smaller (The True Size, 2020), a fact reflected in their populations of ~34 million, 102 million and 4 million, respectively (Worldometers, 2020).

Ensuring Research Quality

As this is a qualitative research project which involves data that is subjective in nature one of the concerns in terms of quality relates to reliability of the findings, which are based on subjective data (Bush, 2012). This weakness is offset by the emphasis of the sampling technique of variety of viewpoints, which will be collected from two groups of participants, through expert and community interviews. Official records and case files supplement the interview phase and can be used for the purpose of triangulation that improves the reliability of the findings (Bush, 2012).

The only challenge remaining lies in guaranteeing data integrity, which could potentially be undermined by the researcher effectively holding an insider position in the domain of de-radicalisation, and more broadly counter-terrorism. Though this position is perhaps the only reason why the chosen sampling technique is ideal for this study, there is a risk that bias (personal and professional on the part of the researcher and interviewees alike) may taint the accuracy and consistency of the data, as well as its maintenance over the course of this study (Gaskell and Bauer, 2000; Bryman, 2007). There is a possibility that the experts may feel called upon to justify their programmes due to their bias of involvement in the programmes.

In short, the internal validity, and reliability of the findings of the proposed research is expected to be high enough to offset the weaknesses in terms of external validity and reliability of measures, especially via transparency and procedural clarity (Gaskell and Bauer, 2000; Bryman, 2007).

Data Analysis

A thematic analysis will be used for all three stages of the research. A thematic analysis allows the researcher to explore the data and organise the recurrent or significant themes observed in the data (Bearman & Dawson, 2013, p. 252). The themes are the key messages that are found in the data and which also relate to the research questions raised by the researcher (Bearman & Dawson, 2013). A thematic analysis method will allow for both common and diverging themes to be identified in the responses of both the programme developers / staff as well as community/tribe representatives from each country. A thematic analysis will help answer how de-radicalisation is conceptualized, and how this potentially affects the outcomes of people who pass through the system, by providing insight into the following matters: what the premise was in setting up the programs, the awareness of how others have dealt with the same issue, and the barriers or reasons the interviewees see for doing things differently. The supplemental information (the official records and case files, etc.) will further enable this thematic analysis to explore the extent to which these themes, as resulting from the answers, are actually reflected (or not) in practice. Through this, it should become possible to understand the effectiveness of the de-radicalisation programmes of the three countries, especially in terms of how persuasive they are regarding their ability to lead to change.

Ethical Considerations

Primary research involving people comes with a number of ethical risks that must be observed. The first regards anonymity and confidentiality, which will be satisfied through the exclusion of names from the final research unless permission is secured from participants. A second concern, that of authenticity, means the ones involved in the research must be informed of what the research will consist of, how their information and participation will be used, and assurances that the data will not be used in any other way. This will be satisfied by including all this information in the consent forms from the very beginning. Finally, the principles of beneficence and non-maleficence are relevant here: the data collected from the participants must not be used in a way that will harm them or their life prospects, and perhaps even benefit them. While benefits are expected just from the insight provided into de-radicalisation methods, non-maleficence cannot strictly be guaranteed for any primary research unless the principle of anonymity is fully enforced. This may mean that none of the high authorities set to be involved in the research can be named, robbing the thesis of a valuable potential source of credibility (Bryman, 2007; Vogt, 2011; Emanuel, 2011).

As this is a research involving prisoners or former prisoners, however, some additional observations are needed. Social power, academic freedom and the politics of knowledge production all carry implications here, especially with the research focused on those in power over radicalised individuals. The social researcher arguably has a public responsibility to the wider societies which radicalised individuals are a part of, in addition to a professional responsibility to ensure the integrity of scientific knowledge (Mills, Massoumi and Miller, 2019). Which is to say, the social impact of this research needs to be accounted for, in addition to policy actors. Conversely, in addition to protecting vulnerable research subjects, the researcher requires protection from any powerful interests which may attempt to undermine the research, whether via coercion, smears or other means, blatant or otherwise (ibid.). Considering the variety of personal connection with the people in power over radicalised individuals, the risks of the latter are high. This is because of the mutual balancing influence of the personal contacts set to be involved in the interviews: the viewpoints of specialists/staff will be balanced by those of community/tribe leaders, as well as the informed consent form procedures that will be employed.

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